| Do banking secrecy and withholding taxes discipline Leviathan governments abroad? (2006) | |||||||||||
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| Institute Economics Department Economics University Gallen banking secrecy and withholding taxes discipline Leviathan governments abroad Presentation draws two our papers Welfare and distribution effects bank secrecy laws Department Economics University Gallen Discussion paper Can tax evasion tame Leviathan governments Department Economics University Gallen Discussion paper Frode Brevik and Manfred rtner WEAI Annual Conference July slide The continuing debate bank secrecy International Institutions and Organizations OECD IMF commission The discussion within the European Union Austria Belgium Luxembourg Jersey Dutch Antilles Madeira Switzerland bilateral negotiations Non government organizations Bank secrecy and developing countries Academic work Boadway and Keen International Economic Review Frode Brevik and Manfred rtner WEAI Annual Conference July slide The scope positions taken Frode Brevik and Manfred rtner WEAI Annual Conference July slide Initial questions Which type model appears promising Representative Agents Overlapping Generations RBC models which macroeconomic context analyze the issues Small open economy large open economy country model country model perfect competition Exogenous and endogenous variables Tax payers honesty degree tax evasion government preferences international tax cooperation How make tax rates endogenous Public spending the utililty function public spending factor production income distribution the utility function Frode Brevik and Manfred rtne | |||||||||||
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