| Sophisticated EWA Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games (2007) | |||||||||||||||
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| Hong Kong UST. Sophisticated EWA Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games Most learning models assume players are adaptive (i.e., they respond only to their own previous experience and ignore others ' payo ® information) and that behavior is not sen-sitive to the way in which players are matched. Empirical evidence suggests otherwise. In this paper, we extend our adaptive experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning model to capture sophisticated learning and strategic teaching in repeated games. The generalized model assumes that there is a mixture of adaptive learners and so-phisticated players. Like before, an adaptive learner adjusts his behavior the EWA way. A sophisticated player however does not learn and rationally best-responds to her fore-casts of all other behaviors. A sophisticated player can be either myopic or foresighted. A foresighted player develops multiple-period rather than single-period forecasts of others' behaviors and chooses to `teach ' the other players by choosing a strategy scenario that gives her the highest discounted net present value. Consequently a foresighted player can | |||||||||||||||
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