Approximate Privacy: Foundations and Quantification (2009)
Feigenbaum, Joan, Jaggard, Aaron D., Schapira, Michael
Increasing use of computers and networks in business, government, recreation, and almost all aspects of daily life has led to a proliferation of online sensitive data about individuals and...
Towards a Unified Approach to (In)Decision: Routing, Games, Circuits, Consensus, and Beyond (2009)
Jaggard, Aaron D., Schapira, Michael, Wright, Rebecca N.
In this paper, we explore a unified treatment of the difficulty of reaching a decision in constrained distributed computing environments in which there is a lack of global coordination or knowledge....
Towards the Design of Robust Inter-domain Routing Protocols (2008)
Aaron D. Jaggard, Vijay Ramachandran
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the inter-domain routing protocol for the Internet, allows for a wide variety of routing policies that may interact in unintended and unstable ways. Recent work on...
ABSTRACT Design Principles of Policy Languages for Path Vector Protocols ∗ (2008)
Timothy G. Griffin, Aaron D. Jaggard
BGP is unique among IP-routing protocols in that routing is determined using semantically rich routing policies. However, this expressiveness has come with hidden risks. The interaction oflocally...
Subsequence containment by involutions (2008)
Inspired by work of McKay, Morse, and Wilf, we give an exact count of the involutions in Sn which contain a given permutation τ ∈Sk as a subsequence; this number depends on the patterns of the...
Formal analysis of kerberos 5 (2008)
Frederick Butler, Iliano Cervesato, Aaron D. Jaggard
We report on the detailed verification of a substantial portion of the Kerberos 5 protocol specification. Because it targeted a deployed protocol rather than an academic abstraction, this multi-year...
Formal Analysis of Kerberos 5 (2008)
Frederick Butler Iliano, Frederick Butler, Iliano Cervesato, Aaron D. Jaggard
We report on the detailed verification of a substantial portion of the Kerberos 5 protocol specification. Because it targeted a deployed protocol rather than an academic abstraction, this multi-year...
Verifying Confidentiality and Authentication in Kerberos 5 (2007)
Frederick Butler, Iliano Cervesato, Aaron D. Jaggard, Andre Scedrov
We present recent results of an on-going analysis of a detailed specification of Kerberos 5. It shows that the main expected properties of this protocol, namely confidentiality and authentication, do...
Robust Path-Vector Routing Despite Inconsistent Route Preferences (2006)
Abstract — Some commonly used inter-domain-routing policies—e.g., those using BGP’s MED attribute for cold-potato routing—are beyond the scope of routing theory developed to date. This is...
Robust Path-Vector Routing Despite Inconsistent Route Preferences (2006)
Abstract — Some commonly used inter-domain-routing policies—e.g., those using BGP’s MED attribute for cold-potato routing—are beyond the scope of routing theory developed to date. This is...
Breaking and fixing public-key Kerberos (2006)
Iliano Cervesato, Aaron D. Jaggard, Andre Scedrov, Joe-kai Tsay, Christopher Walstad
We report on a man-in-the-middle attack on PKINIT, the public key extension of the widely deployed Kerberos 5 authentication protocol. This flaw allows an attacker to impersonate Kerberos...
Breaking and fixing public-key Kerberos (2006)
Aaron D. Jaggard, Andre Scedrov, Joe-kai Tsay, Christopher Walstad
Aspects of this work have appeared in WITS'06 and ASIAN'06. 1
Relating two formal models of path-vector routing (2005)
Abstract — This paper unifies two independently developed formalisms for path-vector routing protocols such as the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the standard inter-domain routing protocol for the...
Relating two formal models of path-vector routing (2005)
Vijay Ramachandran, Aaron D. Jaggard, Aaron D. Jaggard, Vijay Ramach
Abstract — This paper unifies two independently developed formalisms for path-vector routing protocols such as the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the standard interdomain routing protocol for the...
A Formal Analysis of Some Properties of Kerberos 5 Using MSR (2004)
Butler, Frederick, Cervesato, Iliano, Jaggard, Aaron D., Scedrov, Andre
We give three formalizations of the Kerberos 5 authentication protocol in the Multi-Set Rewriting (MSR) formalism. One is a high-level formalization containing just enough detail to prove...
Robustness of Class-Based Path-Vector Systems (2004)
Griffin, Jaggard, and Ramachandran [5] introduced a framework for studying design principles for path-vector protocols, such as the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) used for inter-domain routing in the...
A Formal Analysis of Some Properties of Kerberos 5 Using MSR (2004)
Frederick Butler, Iliano Cervesato, Aaron D. Jaggard, Andre Scedrov
We give three formalizations of the Kerberos 5 authentication protocol in the Multi-Set Rewriting (MSR) formalism. One is a high-level formalization containing just enough detail to prove...
Design Principles of Policy Languages (2004)
Timothy G. Griffin, Aaron D. Jaggard, Vijay Ramachandran
been published as a conference paper [8].
Robustness of Class-Based Path-Vector Systems (2004)
Aaron D. Jaggard, Vijay Ramachandran
been published as a conference paper [10]. Robustness of Class-Based Path-Vector Systems Griffin, Jaggard, and Ramachandran [5] introduced a framework for studying design principles for path-vector...
Verifying Confidentiality and Authentication in (2003)
Kerberos Frederick Butler, Frederick Butler, Iliano Cervesato, Aaron D. Jaggard
We present results from a recent project analyzing Kerberos 5. The main expected properties of this protocol, namely confidentiality and authentication, hold throughout the protocol. Our analysis...
Verifying confidentiality and authentication (2003)
Frederick Butler, Iliano Cervesato, Aaron D. Jaggard
Abstract. We present results from a recent project analyzing Kerberos 5. The main expected properties of this protocol, namely confidentiality and authentication, hold throughout the protocol. Our...
A Formal Analysis of Some Properties of Kerberos 5 Using MSR (2002)
Frederick Butler, Iliano Cervesato, Aaron D. Jaggard, Andre Scedrov
We formalize aspects of the Kerberos 5 authentication protocol in the Multi-Set Rewriting formalism (MSR) on two levels of detail. The more detailed formalization reflects the intricate structure of...
A formal analysis of some properties of Kerberos 5 using MSR (2002)
Frederick Butler, Iliano Cervesato, Aaron D. Jaggard, Andre Scedrov
We formalize aspects of the Kerberos 5 authentication protocol in the Multi-Set Rewriting formalism (MSR) on two levels of detail. The more detailed formalization reflects the intricate structure of...
A formal analysis of some properties of Kerberos 5 using MSR (2002)
Frederick Butler, Iliano Cervesato, Aaron D. Jaggard, Andre Scedrov
We give three formalizations of the Kerberos 5 authentication protocol in the Multi-Set Rewriting (MSR) formalism. One is a high-level formalization containing just enough detail to prove...
A Formal Analysis of Some Properties of Kerberos 5 Using MSR (2002)
Frederick Butler Iliano, Frederick Butler, Iliano Cervesato, Aaron D. Jaggard, Andre Scedrov
We formalize aspects of the Kerberos 5 authentication protocol in the Multi-Set Rewriting formalism (MSR) on two levels of detail. The more detailed formalization reflects the intricate structure of...