Sovereign debt default: the impact of creditor composition (2009)
Dhillon, Amrita, García Fronti, Javier I.
The main motivation of this paper is to study the impact of the composition of creditors on the probability of default and the risk premium on sovereign bonds, when there is debtor moral hazard. In...
Corporate control and multiple large shareholders (2009)
Dhillon, Amrita, Rossetto, Silvia
Many firms have more than one blockholder, but finance theory suggests that one blockholder should be sufficient to bestow all benefits on a firm that arise from concentrated ownership. This paper...
Leader reputation and default in sovereign debt (2009)
Dhillon, Amrita, Sjöström, Tomas
This paper compares default incentives in competitive sovereign debt markets when leaders can be either democratically elected or dictators. When leaders can be replaced as in democracies, the...
Games of status and discriminatory contracts (2008)
Dhillon, Amrita, Hertzog-Stein, Alexander
Following recent empirical evidence which indicates the importance of rank for the determination of workers' wellbeing, this paper introduces status seeking preferences in the form of rank-dependent...
Arulampalam, Wiji, Dasgupta, Sugato, Dhillon, Amrita
We construct a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to make transfers to state governments on the basis of political considerations....
Arulampalam, Wiji, Dasgupta, Sugato, Dhillon, Amrita, Dutta, Bhaskar
We construct a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to make transfers to state governments on the basis of political considerations....
Tax Competition Reconsidered 1 (2007)
Myrna H. Wooders, Myrna Wooders, Ben Zissimos, Ben Zissimos, Amrita Dhillon, Amrita Dhillon
Abstract: In a classic model of tax competition, we show that the level of public good provision and taxation in a Nash equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much, or too little...
Learning in Elections and Voter Turnout Equilibria (2007)
Amrita Dhillon, Stefano Demichelis, Stefano Demichelis, Amrita Dhillon I
Both complete and incomplete game Theoretic Models of Voter Turnout (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983,1985) have the problem of multiple equilibria, some of which seem unreasonable. How can the counter...
¤ We would like to thank Tilman Borgers, Martin Cripps, Jean-Francois Mertens, and Myrna Wooders for very valuable advice. We would also like to thank seminar participants at the ESRC
¤ We would like to thank Tilman Borgers, Martin Cripps, Jean-Francois Mertens, and Myrna Wooders for very valuable advice. We would also like to thank seminar participants at the ESRC
Profit-Sharing, Bertrand Competition and Monopoly Unions: A Note. (2007)
Amrita Dhillon, Amrita Dhillon, Emmanuel Petrakis, Emmanuel Petrakis
This paper studies a strategic aspect of profit-sharing in an olig-opolistic industry with a monopoly union. Whenever a uniform profit share exists in the industry, we show that a union that values...
Protests and reputation (2006)
Buenrostro, Lucia, Dhillon, Amrita, Wooders, Myrna Holtz
Protests take place for a variety of reasons. In this paper we focus on protests that have a well defined objective, that is in conflict with the objectives of the government. Hence the success or...
Development and the interaction of enforcement institutions (2006)
Dhillon, Amrita, Rigolini, Jamele
We examine how institutions that enforce contracts between two parties, producers and consumers, interact in a competitive market with one-sided symmetric information and productivity shocks. We...
Games of status and discriminatory contracts (2006)
Dhillon, Amrita, Hertzog-Stein, Alexander
Following recent empirical evidence which indicates the importance of rank for the determination of workers’ wellbeing, this paper introduces status seeking preferences in the form of...
Bargaining and sustainability: the Argentine debt swap of 2005 (2006)
Dhillon, Amrita, García Fronti, Javier I., Ghosal, Sayantan
When Argentine sovereign default in December 2001 led to a collapse of the peso, the burden of dollar debt became demonstrably unsustainable. But it was not clear what restructuring was feasible, nor...
Bargaining and sustainability: the Argentine debt swap of 2005 (2005)
Dhillon, Amrita, García Fronti, Javier I., Ghosal, Sayantan
When Argentine sovereign default in December 2001 led to a collapse of the peso, the burden of dollar debt became demonstrably unsustainable. But it was not clear what restructuring was feasible, nor...
Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability (2003)
Buenrostro, Lucia, Dhillon, Amrita
This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) of general scoring rule voting games. The scoring rules we study include Plurality rule, Approval...
Political parties and coalition formation (2003)
This chapter gives a flavour of recent theoretical work on coalition formation and political parties. I survey recent work on both pre-election coalition formation and post election coalition (or...
Multiple equilibria in the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy: a comment (2002)
Dhillon, Amrita, Lockwood, Ben
The Besley-Coate model of representative democracy has the problem of multiple equilibria (Besley-Coate, 1997). We show that requiring the Besley-Coate political equilibria to be iteratively...
Tax competition reconsidered (2001)
Wooders, Myrna H., Zissimos, Ben, Dhillon, Amrita
In a classic model of tax competition, we show that the level of public good provision and taxation in a Nash equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much, or too little public...
Profit-sharing, Bertrand competition and monopoly unions: a note (2001)
This paper studies a strategic aspect of profit-sharing in an oligopolistic industry with a monopoly union. Whenever a uniform profit share exists in the industry, we show that a union that values...
Learning in elections and voter turnout equilibria (2001)
DeMichelis, Stefano, Dhillon, Amrita
Both complete and incomplete game Theoretic Models of Voter Turnout (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983,1985) have the problem of multiple equilibria, some of which seem unreasonable. How can the counter...
Tax earmarking and grass-roots accountability (2001)
Dhillon, Amrita, Peroni, Carlo
We ask whether tax earmarking can foster accountability in public provision of goods and services when consumers can privately monitor provision. We show that earmarking can raise the stakes that...
When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable? (1999)
Dhillon, Amrita, Lockwood, Ben
This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) of plurality rule voting games. For K > 3 alternatives and n > 3 voters, we find sufficient...
On centralized bargaining in a symmetric oligopolistic industry (1996)
Dhillon, Amrita, Petrakis, Emmanuel
In this paper we study interactions between labor and product markets, in an imperfectly competitive industry with centralized wage bargaining. Firms jointly bargain with the union over wages and...
Extended paretian rules and relative utilitarianism (1995)
This paper introduces the 'Extended Pareto' axiom on Social welfare functions and gives a characterization of the axiom when it is assumed that the Social Welfare Functions that satisfy it in a...
An axiomatic derivation of a social welfare function /--by Amrita Dhillon. (1994)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1994.
Amrita Dhillon, Myrna H. Wooders, Ben Zissimos
In a classic model of tax competition, we show that the level of public good provision and taxation in a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much, or too little...
Bargaining and Sustainability: The Argentine Debt Swap of 2005
Dhillon, Amrita, García-Fronti, Javier, Ghosal, Sayantan, Miller, Marcus
When Argentine sovereign default in December 2001 led to a collapse of the peso, the burden of dollar debt became demonstrably unsustainable. But it was not clear what restructuring was feasible, nor...
Development and the Interaction of Enforcement Institutions
Dhillon, Amrita, Rigolini, Jamele
We examine how institutions that enforce contracts between two parties, producers and consumers, interact in a competitive market with one-sided asymmetric information and productivity shocks. We...
Learning in elections and voter turnout equilibria
DeMichelis, Stefano, Dhillon, Amrita
Both complete and incomplete game Theoretic Models of Voter Turnout (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983,1985) have the problem of multiple equilibria, some of which seem unreasonable. How can the counter...
Wooders, Myrna, Zissimos, Ben, Dhillon, Amrita
In a classic model of tax competition, we show that the level of public good provision and taxation in a Nash equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much, or too little public...
Implementing Tax Coordination.
Amrita Dhillon, Carlo Perroni, Kimberley A. Scharf
This paper investigates whether tax competition can survive under tax coordination, when information is private or nonverifiable. We focus on a two-jurisdiction model where capital can move across...
Development and the interaction of enforcement institutions
Dhillon, Amrita, Rigolini, Jamele
The authors examine how institutions that enforce contracts between two parties-producers and consumers-interact in a competitive market with one-sided asymmetric information and productivity shocks....
Multiple Equilibria in the Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracy.
Dhillon, Amrita, Lockwood, Ben
The Besley-Coate model of representative democracy has the problem of multiple equilibria (Besley-Coate 1997). We show that requiring the Besley-Coate political equilibria to be iteratively...
Debt Restructuring and Economic Recovery: Analysing the Argentine Swap
Amrita Dhillon, Javier García-Fronti, Sayantan Ghosal, Marcus Miller
When Argentine sovereign default in December 2001 led to a collapse of the peso, the burden of dollar debt became demonstrably unsustainable. But it was not clear what restructuring was feasible, nor...
Electoral Goals and Center-State Transfers: A Theoretical Model and Empirical Evidence from India
Arulampalam, Wiji, Dasgupta, Sugato, Dhillon, Amrita, Dutta, Bhaskar
We construct a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to make transfers to state governments on the basis of political considerations....
AMRITA DHILLON, MYRNA WOODERS, BEN ZISSIMOS
In a classic model of tax competition, this paper shows that the level of public good provision and taxation in a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much or too...
Amrita Dhillon, Jean-Francois Mertens
In a framework of preferences over lotteries, the authors show that an axiom system consisting of weakened versions of Arrow's axioms has a unique solution, 'relative utilitarianism.' This consists...
Economic Theories Of Voter Turnout
Amrita Dhillon, Susana Peralta
Copyright 2002 Royal Economic Society
Implementing tax co-ordination
Amrita Dhillon, Carlo Perroni, Kim Scharf
This paper investigates whether tax competition can survive under tax coordination, when information is private or nonverifiable. We focus on a two-jurisdiction model where capital can move across...
Extended Pareto rules and relative utilitarianism
This paper introduces the "Extended Pareto" axiom on Social Welfare Functions and gives a characterization of the axiom when it is assumed that the Social Welfare Functions that satisfy it in a...
Lucia Buenrostro, Amrita Dhillon, Myrna H. Wooders
Protests take place for a variety of reasons. In this paper we focus on protests that have a well defined objective, that is in conflict with the objectives of the government. Hence the success or...
On Centralized Bargaining in a Symmetric Oligopolistic Industry
Dhillon, Amrita, Petrakis, Emmanuel
In this paper we study interactions between labor and product markets, in an imperfectly competitive industry with centralized wage bargaining. Firms jointly bargain with the union over wages and...
Profit-sharing, bertrand competition and monopoly unions : a note
Dhillon, Amrita, Petrakis, Emmanuel
This paper studies a strategic aspect of pro t-sharing in an oligopolistic industry with a monopoly union. Whenever a uniform pro t share exists in the industry, we show that a union that values the...
SCORING RULE VOTING GAMES AND DOMINANCE SOLVABILITY
Buenrostro, Lucia, Dhillon, Amrita
This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) of general scoring rule voting games. The scoring rules we study include Plurality rule, Approval...
POLITICAL PARTIES AND COALITION FORMATION
This chapter gives a avour of recent theoretical work on coalition formation and political parties. I survey recent work on both pre-election coalition formation and post election coalition (or...
Games of Status and Discrininatory Contract
Dhillon, Amrita, Herzog-Stein, Alexander
Following recent empirical evidence which indicates the importance of rank for the determination of workers’ wellbeing, this paper introduces status seeking preferences in the form of...
Buenrostro, Lucia, Dhillon, Amrita, Wooders, Myrna
Protests take place for a variety of reasons. In this paper we focus on protests that have a well defined objective, that is in conflict with the objectives of the government. Hence the success or...
Electoral goals and center-state transfers: A theoretical model and empirical evidence from India
Arulampalam, Wiji, Dasgupta, Sugato, Dhillon, Amrita, Dutta, Bhaskar
We construct a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to make transfers to state governments on the basis of political considerations....
Leader Reputation and Default in Sovereign Debt
Dhillon, Amrita, Sjostrom, Tomas
This paper compares default incentives in competitive sovereign debt markets when leaders can be either democratically elected or dictators. When leaders can be replaced as in democracies, the...
Learning in elections and voter turnout
DEMICHELIS, Stefano, DHILLON, Amrita
Game theoretic models of voter turnout have recently fallen into disrepute because the crucial ingredient of the model, the probability of being pivotal for an individual voter, is infinitesimal in...
Corporate Control and Multiple Large Shareholders
Dhillon, Amrita, Rossetto, Silvia
Many firms have more than one blockholder, but finance theory suggests that one blockholder should be sufficient to bestow all benefits on a firm that arise from concentrated ownership. This paper...
Games of status and discriminatory contracts
Dhillon, Amrita, Herzog-Stein, Alexander
Following recent empirical evidence which indicates the importance of rank for the determination of workers' wellbeing, this paper introduces status seeking preferences in the form of rank-dependent...
Electoral goals and center-state transfers: A Theoretical model and empirical evidence from India
Wiji Arulampalam, Sugato Dasgupta, Amrita Dhillon, Bhaskar Dutta
We construct a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to make transfers to state governments on the basis of political considerations....