Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare (2009)
This paper investigates the role of campaign advertising and the opportunity of legal restrictions on it. An electoral race is modeled as a signalling game with three classes of players: many voters,...
One of the main problems in pension policy is to develop an institutional framework that guarantees that public and private pensions promises are kept. This paper discusses how the governance of...
Endogenous Communication in Complex Organizations Antoni Calvó-Armengol y (2009)
We study the information ‡ows that arise within an organization with local knowledge and payo ¤ externalities. Our organization is modeled as a network game played by agents with asymmetric...
Active and passive waste in government spending: evidence from a policy experiment (2008)
Bandiera, Oriana, Prat, Andrea, Valletti, Tommaso
We propose a distinction between active waste and passive waste as determinants of the cost of public services. Active waste entails utility for the public decision maker (as in the case of bribery)...
Active and passive waste in government spending: evidence from a policy experiment (2008)
Bandiera, Oriana, Prat, Andrea, Valletti, Tommaso
We propose a distinction between active waste and passive waste as determinants of the cost of public services. Active waste entails utility for the public decision maker (as in the case of bribery)...
Matching Firms, Managers and Incentives (2008)
BANDIERA, Oriana, GUISO, Luigi, PRAT, Andrea, SADUN, Raffaella
We provide evidence on the match between firms, managers and incentives using a new survey designed for this purpose. The survey contains information on a sample of executives’ risk preferences and...
The Price Impact of Institutional Herding (2008)
Amil Dasgupta, Andrea Prat, Michela Verardo
We present a simple theoretical model of the price impact of institutional herding. In our model, career-concerned fund managers interact with pro…t-motivated proprietary traders and monopolistic...
Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment ∗ (2008)
Oriana Bandiera, Andrea Prat, Tommaso Valletti, Nicola Persico, Imran Rasul, Giancarlo Spagnolo, ...
We propose a distinction between active waste and passive waste as determinants of the cost of public services. Active waste entails utility for the public decision maker (as in the case of bribery)...
Italian Managers: Fidelity or Performance? (2008)
Oriana B, Luigi Guiso, Andrea Prat, Raffaella Sadun
Abstract: Is there a link between Italy’s disappointing productivity growth and the way Italian firms select and develop managerial talent? We collect extensive information on the characteristics...
Institutional Trade Persistence and Long-Term Equity Returns. Working Paper (2008)
Amil Dasgupta, Andrea Prat, Michela Verardo, Gregory Connor, David Hirshleifer, ...
A number of recent studies show that institutional herding positively predicts future returns on a two to four quarter horizon. These studies concentrate on relatively short-term herding behavior,...
Games Played through Agents ∗ (2007)
We introduce a game of complete information with multiple principals and multiple agents. Each agent makes a decision that can affect the payoffs of all principals. Each principal offers monetary...
THE VALUE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION IN MONOPOLY (2007)
1 � introduction Consider the standard nonlinear pricing monopoly problem (Mussa and Rosen (1978)). A monopolist offers a price-quantity menu to a single privately informed buyer with quasi-linear...
Institutional trade persistence and long-term equity returns (2007)
Dasgupta, Amil, Prat, Andrea, Verardo, Michela
How does the trading behaviour of institutional money managers affect stock prices? In this paper we document a robust relationship between the net trade patterns of institutional money managers and...
Institutional trade persistence and long-term equity returns (2007)
Dasgupta, Amil, Prat, Andrea, Verardo, Michela
How does the trading behaviour of institutional money managers affect stock prices? In this paper we document a robust relationship between the net trade patterns of institutional money managers and...
The political economy of housing supply: homeowners, workers, and voters (2007)
Ortalo-Magne, Francois, Prat, Andrea
Equilibrium of the housing market depends on a complex set of interactions between: (1) individual location decisions; (2) individual housing investment; (3) collective decisions on urban growth. We...
The political economy of housing supply: homeowners, workers, and voters (2007)
Ortalo-Magne, Francois, Prat, Andrea
Equilibrium of the housing market depends on a complex set of interactions between: (1) individual location decisions; (2) individual housing investment; (3) collective decisions on urban growth. We...
The Suntory-Toyota International Centers for Economics and Related Disciplines (2007)
François Ortalo-magné, Andrea Prat, Stephen Malpezzi, Monika Piazzesi
Equilibrium of the housing market depends on a complex set of interactions between: (1) individual location decisions; (2) individual housing investment; (3) collective decisions on urban growth. We...
What is the e¤ect of liberalizing a country’s broadcasting system on the level of information of its citizens? To analyze this question, we …rst construct a model of state monopoly broadcasting...
Financial Equilibrium with Career Concerns (2006)
Amil Dasgupta, Andrea Prat, Sudipto Bhattacharya, Jordi Blanes
What are the equilibrium features of a Þnancial market where a sizeable proportion of traders face reputational concerns? This question is central to our understanding of Þnancial markets that are...
Asset price dynamics when traders care about reputation (2005)
What are the equilibrium features of a dynamic financial market where traders care about their reputation for ability? We modify a standard sequential trading model to study a financial market with...
Asset price dynamics when traders care about reputation (2005)
What are the equilibrium features of a dynamic financial market where traders care about their reputation for ability? We modify a standard sequential trading model to study a financial market with...
Handcuffs for the grabbing hand: media capture and government accountability (2005)
It has long been recognized that the media play an essential role in government accountability. However, even in the absence of censorship, the government may in‡uence news content by maintaining a...
Handcuffs for the grabbing hand: media capture and government accountability (2005)
It has long been recognized that the media play an essential role in government accountability. However, even in the absence of censorship, the government may in‡uence news content by maintaining a...
Commercial television and voter information (2005)
Prat, Andrea, Stromberg, David
What is the effect of liberalizing a country’s broadcasting system on the level of information of its citizens? To analyse this question, we first construct a model of state monopoly broadcasting...
Commercial television and voter information (2005)
Prat, Andrea, Stromberg, David
What is the effect of liberalizing a country’s broadcasting system on the level of information of its citizens? To analyse this question, we first construct a model of state monopoly broadcasting...
One of the main problems in pension policy is to develop an institutional framework that guarantees that public and private pensions promises are kept. This paper discusses how the governance of...
One of the main problems in pension policy is to develop an institutional framework that guarantees that public and private pensions promises are kept. This paper discusses how the governance of...
Reputation and price dynamics in financial markets (2005)
What are the equilibrium features of a dynamic Þnancial market where traders care about their reputation for ability? We modify a standard sequential trading model to allow for career concerns. We...
Reputation and price dynamics in financial markets (2005)
What are the equilibrium features of a dynamic Þnancial market where traders care about their reputation for ability? We modify a standard sequential trading model to allow for career concerns. We...
The More Closely we are Watched, the Better we Behave? (2005)
Transparency is a complex issue, which can be approached from many angles and with various conceptual tools. This contribution provides a brief survey of the economic literature on transparency. The...
Andrea Prat, Roman Inderst, Ro Lizzeri, George Mailath, Stephen Morris, ...
In a model of career concerns for experts, when is a principal hurt from observing more information about her agent? This paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the...
Language and the Theory of the Firm 1 (2005)
Jacques Crémer, Luis Garicano, Andrea Prat
workshop, the NBER Organizational Economics Workhop, and at various universities for useful comments and Pedro Vicente for outstanding research assistance. Garicano thanks the Toulouse Network on...
The Price of Conformism ∗ (2005)
Amil Dasgupta, Michela Verardo, Andrea Prat, Antonio Mele, Stefan Nagel, ...
As previous agency models have shown, fund managers with career concerns have an incentive to imitate the recent trading strategy of other managers. We embed this rational conformist tendency in a...
One of the main problems in pension policy is to develop an institutional framework that guarantees that public and private pensions promises are kept. This paper discusses how the governance of...
The wrong kind of transparency (2004)
In a model of career concerns for experts, when is a principal hurt from observing more information about her agent? This paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the...
Career concerns in financial markets (2004)
What are the equilibrium features of a market where a sizeable portion of traders face career concerns? This question is central to our understanding of Þnancial markets that are increasingly...
Cremer, Jacques, Garicano, Luis, Prat, Andrea
A code is a technical language that members of an organization learn in order to communicate among themselves and with members of other organizations. What are the features of an optimal code and how...
Cremer, Jacques, Garicano, Luis, Prat, Andrea
A code is a technical language that members of an organization learn in order to communicate among themselves and with members of other organizations. What are the features of an optimal code and how...
Rational Voters and Political Advertising (2004)
Most political scholars agree that organized groups play a key role in modern democracy. One aspect of special interest politics that has caught the attention of both academic researchers and the...
Information Aggregation in Financial Markets with Career Concerns (2004)
What are the equilibrium features of a dynamic …nancial market in which traders care about their reputation for ability? We modify a standard sequential trading model to include traders with career...
Trading volume with career concerns (2003)
This Paper shows that trade can occur in a market where all traders are rational and none of them is subject to exogenous shocks. We develop a model of delegated portfolio management that captures...
Trading volume with career concerns (2003)
This Paper shows that trade can occur in a market where all traders are rational and none of them is subject to exogenous shocks. We develop a model of delegated portfolio management that captures...
Pension fund governance and the choice between defined benefit and defined contribution plans (2003)
Recent events in several countries have underscored the importance of good governance in private occupational pension plans. The present paper uses contract theory to analyze the interplay of...
The wrong kind of transparency (2003)
In a model of career concerns for experts, when is a principal hurt from observing more information about their agent? This Paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of...
The wrong kind of transparency (2003)
In a model of career concerns for experts, when is a principal hurt from observing more information about their agent? This Paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of...
Pension fund governance and the choice between defined benefit and defined contribution plans (2003)
Pension fund governance and the choice between defined benefit and defined contribution plans (2003)
Theory of Reputational Cheap (2003)
Marco Ottaviani A, Markus Brunnermeier, Vincent Crawford, Eddie Dekel, ...
This paper studies strategic communication by an expert who is concerned about appearing to be well informed. The expert is assumed to observe a private signal with a simple and particularly...
Theory of Reputational Cheap (2003)
Marco Ottaviani A, Markus Brunnermeier, Vincent Crawford, Eddie Dekel, ...
This paper studies strategic communication by an expert who is concerned about appearing to be well informed. The expert is assumed to observe a private signal with a simple and particularly...
The wrong kind of transparency (2003)
Andrea Prat, Roman Inderst, Ro Lizzeri, George Mailath, Margaret Meyer
In a model of career concerns for experts, when is a principal hurt from observing more information about her agent? This paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the...
Recent events in several countries have underscored the importance of good governance in private occupational pension plans. The present paper uses contract theory to analyze the interplay of...
The wrong kind of transparency (2002)
In a model of career concerns for experts, when is the principal hurt from observing more information about her agent? This paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of...
The wrong kind of transparency (2002)
In a model of career concerns for experts, when is the principal hurt from observing more information about her agent? This paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of...
Mass Media and Political Accountability ∗ (2002)
Timothy Besley, Robin Burgess, Andrea Prat
Mass media can play a key role in enabling citizens to monitor the actions of incumbents and to use this information in their voting decisions. This can lead to government which is more accountable...
Mutual fund tournament: risk taking incentives induced by ranking objectives (2001)
Goriaev, Alexei P., Palomino, Frédéric, Prat, Andrea
There is now extensive empirical evidence showing that fund managers have relative performance objectives and adapt their investment strategy in the last part of the calendar year to balance their...
Mutual fund tournament: risk taking incentives induced by ranking objectives (2001)
Goriaev, Alexei P., Palomino, Frédéric, Prat, Andrea
There is now extensive empirical evidence showing that fund managers have relative performance objectives and adapt their investment strategy in the last part of the calendar year to balance their...
The Value of Public Information in Monopoly (2001)
The logic of the linkage principle of Milgrom and Weber (1982) extends to price discrimination. A non-linear pricing monopolist who sells to a single buyer always prefers to commit to publicly reveal...
Handcu s for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability," mimeo (2001)
It has long been recognized that the media play an essential role in government accountability. However, even in the absence of censorship, the government may in‡uence news content by maintaining a...
Handcu s for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability," mimeo (2001)
It has long been recognized that the media play an essential role in democracy. However, even in the absence of censorship, the government may in‡uence news content by maintaining a...
Lo "spettro" delle frequenze radio (2000)
Valletti, Tommaso, Prat, Andrea
Economic theory, as well as various countries' experiences, show that auctioning the spectrum works better than other allocation methods, such as beauty contests. As well as raising revenues, a...
Lo "spettro" delle frequenze radio (2000)
Valletti, Tommaso, Prat, Andrea
Economic theory, as well as various countries' experiences, show that auctioning the spectrum works better than other allocation methods, such as beauty contests. As well as raising revenues, a...
Mutual fund tournament: risk taking incentives induced by ranking objectives. (2000)
Goriaev, A., Palomino, Frédéric, Prat, Andrea
There is now extensive empirical evidence showing that fund managers have relative performance objectives and adapt their investment strategy in the last part of the calendar year to their...
Mutual fund tournament: risk taking incentives induced by ranking objectives. (2000)
Goriaev, A., Palomino, Frédéric, Prat, Andrea
There is now extensive empirical evidence showing that fund managers have relative performance objectives and adapt their investment strategy in the last part of the calendar year to their...
An economic analysis of campaign finance (2000)
Electoral campaign finance is an important, and much debated, phenomenon in democracies throughout the world. This article discusses a possible economic model of campaign finance, which could be used...
An economic analysis of campaign finance (2000)
Electoral campaign finance is an important, and much debated, phenomenon in democracies throughout the world. This article discusses a possible economic model of campaign finance, which could be used...
Campaign advertising and voter welfare (1999)
This paper investigates the role of campaign advertising and the opportunity of legal restrictions on it. An electoral race is modelled as a signalling game with three classes of players: a continuum...
Campaign advertising and voter welfare (1999)
This paper investigates the role of campaign advertising and the opportunity of legal restrictions on it. An electoral race is modelled as a signalling game with three classes of players: a continuum...
Common agency and computational complexity: theory and experimental evidence. (1999)
Kirchsteiger, G., Prat, Andrea
In a common agency game, several principals try to in°uence the behavior of an agent. Common agency games typically have multiple equilibria. One class of equilibria, called truthful, has been...
Common agency and computational complexity: theory and experimental evidence. (1999)
Kirchsteiger, G., Prat, Andrea
In a common agency game, several principals try to in°uence the behavior of an agent. Common agency games typically have multiple equilibria. One class of equilibria, called truthful, has been...
Risk taking and optimal contracts for money managers (1999)
Palomino, Frédéric, Prat, Andrea
Recent empirical work suggests a strong connection between the incentives money managers are offered and their risk-taking behaviour. We develop a general model of delegated portfolio management,...
Risk taking and optimal contracts for money managers (1999)
Palomino, Frédéric, Prat, Andrea
Recent empirical work suggests a strong connection between the incentives money managers are offered and their risk-taking behaviour. We develop a general model of delegated portfolio management,...
Common Agency: Truthful or Natural? (1999)
Georg Kirchsteiger, Andrea Prat, Simon Gäachter, Richard Mckelvey, Rebecca Morton
In a common agency game, several principals try to influence the behavior of an agent. Common agency games typically have multiple equilibria. One class of equilibria, called truthful, has been...
Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers (1999)
Frédéric Palomino, Andrea Prat
Recent empirical work suggests a strong connection between the incentives money managers are o#ered and their risk-taking behavior. We develop a general model of delegated portfolio management, with...
Games Played through Agents (1999)
We introduce a game of complete information with multiple principals and multiple agents. Each agent makes a decision that can affect the payoffs of all principals and all agents. Each principal...
Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers," Discussion Paper No. 2066 (1999)
Frédéric Palomino, Andrea Prat
We develop a general model of delegated portfolio management, with the feature that the agent can control the riskiness of the portfolio. This represents a departure from the existing literature on...
Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies (1998)
I introduce a microfounded model of campaign ¯nance with o±ce-seeking politicians, a continuum of voters, and a large number of heterogeneous lobbies. Lobbies make contributions to politicians...
Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies (1998)
I introduce a microfounded model of campaign ¯nance with o±ce-seeking politicians, a continuum of voters, and a large number of heterogeneous lobbies. Lobbies make contributions to politicians...
Sequential common agency (1998)
In a common agency game a set of principals promises monetary transfers to an agent which depend on the action he will take. The agent then chooses the action, and is paid the corresponding...
Sequential common agency (1998)
In a common agency game a set of principals promises monetary transfers to an agent which depend on the action he will take. The agent then chooses the action, and is paid the corresponding...
Sequential Common Agency (1998)
Andrea Prat, Aldo Rustichini, Inacommonagencygamethereareseveralprincipalsandoneagent Theagent
In a common agency game a set of principals promises monetary transfers to an agent which depend on the action he will take. The agent then chooses the action, and is paid the corresponding...
How Homogeneous Should a Team Be? (1998)
Andrea Prat, Joshua Gans, Thomas Hellmann, Marcos Lisboa, Paul Milgrom, Dolf Talman, ...
Should an organization hire people with similar backgrounds or with different backgrounds? We formulate this question within the framework of team theory. The team manager must fill n jobs and can...
Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and Multiple Lobbies (1998)
I introduce a microfounded model of campaign nance with oce-seeking politicians, a continuum of voters, and a large number of heterogeneous lobbies. Lobbies make contributions to politicians...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Stanford University, 1997.
Campaign advertising and voter welfare (1997)
This paper investigates the role of campaign advertising and the opportunity of legal restrictions on it. An electoral race is modeled as a signalling game with three classes of players: a continuum...
Campaign advertising and voter welfare (1997)
This paper investigates the role of campaign advertising and the opportunity of legal restrictions on it. An electoral race is modeled as a signalling game with three classes of players: a continuum...
Mutual Fund Tournament: Risk Taking Incentives Induced By Ranking Objectives
Goriaev, Alexei P., Palomino, Frédéric, Prat, Andrea
There is now extensive empirical evidence showing that fund managers have relative performance objectives and adapt their investment strategy in the last part of the calendar year to balance their...
An Economic Analysis of Campaign Finance
Electoral campaign finance is an important, and much debated, phenomenon in democracies throughout the world. This article discusses a possible economic model of campaign finance, which could be used...
Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability
It has long been recognized that the media play an essential role in government accountability. Even in the absence of censorship, however, the government may influence news content by maintaining a...
Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers.
Palomino, Frederic, Prat, Andrea
We study delegated portfolio management when the agent controls the riskiness of the portfolio. Under general conditions, we show that the optimal contract is simply a bonus contract: the agent is...
Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers
Palomino, Frédéric, Prat, Andrea
Recent empirical work suggests a strong connection between the incentives money managers are offered and their risk-taking behavior. We develop a general model of delegated portfolio management, with...
Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment
Oriana Bandiera, Andrea Prat, Tommaso Valletti
We propose a distinction between active waste and passive waste as determinants of the cost of public services. Active waste entails utility for the public decision maker (as in the case of bribery)...
Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns
What are the equilibrium features of a dynamic financial market in which traders care about their reputation for ability? We modify a standard sequential trading model to include traders with career...
Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives
Bandiera, Oriana, Guiso, Luigi, Prat, Andrea, Sadun, Raffaella
We provide evidence on the match between firms, managers and incentives using a new survey designed for this purpose. The survey contains information on a sample of executives' risk preferences and...
Matching Firms, Managers and Incentives
Oriana Bandiera, Luigi Guiso, Andrea Prat, Raffaella Sadun
We provide evidence on the match between firms, managers and incentives using a new survey designed for this purpose. The survey contains information on a sample of executives’ risk preferences and...
Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment
Oriana Bandiera, Andrea Prat, Tommaso Valletti
We propose a distinction between active and passive waste as determinants of the cost of public services. Active waste entails utility for the public decision maker, whereas passive waste does not....