on the efficiency of team-based meritocracies (2008)
Gunnthorsdottir, Anna, Vragov, Roumen, Seifert, Stefan, McCabe, Kevin
According to theory a pure meritocracy is efficient because individual members are competitively rewarded according to their individual contributions to society. However, purely individually based...
Partner selection in public goods experiments ∗ (2007)
Giorgio Coricelli A, Dietmar Fehr B, Gerlinde Fellner C, Anna Gunnthorsdottir, Werner Güth, Georg Kirchsteiger
This paper studies the effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good. Subjects participate in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good...
The meritocracy as a mechanism to overcome social dilemmas (2007)
Gunnthorsdottir, Anna, Vragov, Roumen, Mccabe, Kevin
A new mechanism that substantially mitigates social dilemmas is examined theoretically and experimentally. It resembles the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) except that in each decision round...
The meritocracy as a mechanism to overcome social dilemmas (2007)
Gunnthorsdottir, Anna, Vragov, Roumen, Mccabe, Kevin, Seifert, Stefan
A new mechanism that substantially mitigates social dilemmas is examined theoretically and experimentally. It resembles the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) except that in each decision round...
Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments (2003)
Giorgio Coricelli, Dietmar Fehr, Gerlinde Fellner, Werner Güth, Anna Gunnthorsdottir, Georg Kirchsteiger, ...
This paper studies the e#ect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good. Subjects participate in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good...
2001, Disposition, history and contributions in public goods experiments, Working Paper 99-02 (2002)
Private incentives to invest in a public good are modeled as self-interested reciprocity where individuals use reputational scoring rules to determine their optimal level of investment. The model...
The meritocracy as a mechanism to overcome social dilemmas
Gunnthorsdottir, Anna, Vragov, Roumen, Mccabe, Kevin, Seifert, Stefan
A new mechanism that substantially mitigates social dilemmas is examined theoretically and experimentally. It resembles the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) except that in each decision round...
The effect of sharing rules on group competition
Anna Gunnthorsdottir, Amnon Rapoport
We consider embedding independent within-group conflicts for the provision of public goods in a between-group competition for an exogenously determined prize as a structural mechanism for reducing...
Disposition, History and Contributions in Public Goods Experiments
Anna Gunnthorsdottir, Daniel Houser, Kevin McCabe, Holly Ameden
Private incentives to invest in a public good are modeled as self- interested reciprocity where individuals use reputational scoring rules to determine their optimal level of investment. The model...
on the efficiency of team-based meritocracies
Gunnthorsdottir, Anna, Vragov, Roumen, Seifert, Stefan, McCabe, Kevin
According to theory a pure meritocracy is efficient because individual members are competitively rewarded according to their individual contributions to society. However, purely individually based...