The Transparency of Politics and the Quality of Politicians (2007)
Mattozzi, Andrea, Merlo, Antonio
Politics has always attracted the attention of the media, citizens organizations, and the general public. Recent years have also witnessed a global process of “spectacularization” of politics,...
Felli, Leonardo, Merlo, Antonio
In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy...
Felli, Leonardo, Merlo, Antonio
In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy...
Felli, Leonardo, Merlo, Antonio
In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy...
Felli, Leonardo, Merlo, Antonio
In this paper, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy...
Felli, Leonardo, Merlo, Antonio
In this paper, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy...
Gender differences in education in a dynamic household bargaining model (1997)
Echevarria, Cristina, Merlo, Antonio
In this paper, we explore the issue of gender differences in education in the context of a two-sex overlapping generations model where men and women of each generation bargain over consumpt ion,...
Gender differences in education in a dynamic household bargaining model
Cristina Echevarria, Antonio Merlo
We interpret observed gender differences in education as the equilibrium outcome of a two-sex overlapping generations model where men and women of each generation bargain over consumption, number of...
On the political economy of income redistribution and crime
Ayse Imrohoroglu, Antonio Merlo, Peter Rupert
We study a one-sector growth model which is standard except for the presence of an externality in the production function. The set of competitive equilibria is large. It includes constant equilibria,...
The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies
Daniel Diermeier, Hulya Eraslan, Antonio Merlo
In this article we present an overview of our recent research on the effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies. Our approach is based on the solution and...
In this paper we address the following questions: (i) To what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely testable or falsifiable? And (ii) in environments where the hypothesis is...
Gender Differences in Education in a Dynamic Household Bargaining Model.
Echevarria, Cristina, Merlo, Antonio
We explore the issue of gender differences in education in the context of a two-sex overlapping generations model where men and women of each generation bargain over consumption, number of children,...
On the Political Economy of Income Redistribution and Crime.
Imrohoroglu, Ayse, Merlo, Antonio, Rupert, Peter
This article analyzes a general equilibrium model in which agents choose to specialize in either legitimate or criminal activities. Expenditures on police to apprehend criminals, as well as income...
In this article, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenouslobbying.We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy...
A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers
Daniel Diermeier, Michael Keane, Antonio Merlo
Our main goal is to quantify the returns to a career in the United States Congress. We specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of Congress and estimate this model using a newly...
Robert Marshall, Antonio Merlo
Many unions in the United States have for several years engaged in what is known as pattern bargaining—a union determines a sequence for negotiations with firms within an industry where the...
A Structural Model of Turnout and Voting in Multiple Elections
In this paper, we propose a unified approach to study participation and voting in multiple elections. The theoretical framework combines an “uncertain-voter” model of turnout with a spatial model...
Income Distribution, Police Expenditures, and Crime: A Political Economy Perspective
In this paper, I present a structural approach to investigate empirically the relation between income distribution, police expenditures and crime. The approach is based on the estimation of an...
Understanding the determinants of crime
Ayse Imrohoroglu, Antonio Merlo, Peter Rupert
In this paper, we use an overlapping generations model where individuals are allowed to engage in both legitimate market activities and criminal behavior in order to assess the role of certain...
Bicameralism and Government Formation, Second Version
Daniel Diermeier, Hulya Eraslan, Antonio Merlo
In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model...
A Structural Model of Turnout and Voting in Multiple Elections
This paper develops a unified approach to study participation and voting in multiple elections. The theoretical setting combines an “uncertain-voter” model of turnout with a spatial model of...
Mattozzi, Andrea, Merlo, Antonio
In this paper, we study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by a party who faces competition for political talent...
Political Careers or Career Politicians?
Mattozzi, Andrea, Merlo, Antonio
Two main career paths are prevalent among politicians in modern democracies: there are career politicians (i.e., politicians who work in the political sector until retirement), and political careers...
Degan, Arianna, Merlo, Antonio
In this paper we address the following question: To what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely testable or falsifiable? We show that using data only on how individuals vote in a single...
Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies
Daniel Diermeier, Antonio Merlo
In this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation and termination in parliamentary democracies. Our analysis accounts for the following observed phenomena: (1) Cabinet reshuffles; (2)...
Political Careers or Career Politicians?
Andrea Mattozzi, Antonio Merlo
Two main career paths are prevalent among politicians in modern democracies: there are career politicians (i.e., politicians who work in the political sector until retirement), and political careers...
In this paper we address the following question: To what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely testable or falsifiable? We show that using data only on how individuals vote in a single...
A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers
Daniel Diermeier, Michael Keane, Antonio Merlo
Theories in political economy depend critically on assumptions about motivations of politicians. Our analysis starts from the premise that politicians, like other economic agents, are rational...
If You Cannot Get Your Friends Elected, Lobby Your Enemies
We incorporate campaign contributions in the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying of Felli and Merlo (2006). In equilibrium, lobbies contribute to the...
INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC MODELS OF CRIME
This introduction to the "IER" symposium on economic models of crime briefly reviews the articles in this issue and tries to put them in the context of the current research on the economics of crime....
WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE DECLINE IN CRIME?
Ayse Imrohoroglu, Antonio Merlo, Peter Rupert
In this article we analyze recent trends in aggregate property crime rates in the United States. We propose a dynamic equilibrium model that guides our quantitative investigation of the major...
Robert C. Marshall, Antonio Merlo
Many unions in the United States have for several years engaged in what is known as pattern bargaining. In this article, we show that pattern bargaining is preferred by a union to both simultaneous...
In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy...
Do Citizens Vote Sincerely (If They Vote at All)? Theory and Evidence from U. S. National Elections
Understanding citizens’ electoral behavior (e.g., selective abstention and split ticket voting), represents a fundamental step in the analysis of democratic institutions. In this paper, we assess...
Bargaining over Residential Real Estate: Evidence from England (Third Version)
Antonio Merlo, François Ortalo-Magné
This paper presents a new data set of individual residential property transactions in England. The main novelty of the data is the record of all listing price changes and all offers made between...
A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers
Daniel Diermeier, Michael Keane, Antonio Merlo
Theories in political economy depend critically on assumptions about motivations of politicians. Our analysis starts from the premise that politicians, like other economic agents, are rational...
A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers: Supplementary Materiel
Daniel Diermeier, Michael Keane, Antonio Merlo
This paper contains additional details about the model in our paper “A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers” (Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2004)), as well as the computational methods...
In this paper, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy...
Political Careers or Career Politicians?
Andrea Mattozzi, Antonio Merlo
Two main career paths are prevalent among politicians in modern democracies: there are career politicians (i.e., politicians who work in the political sector until retirement), and political careers...
Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues
In this paper, I discuss recent developments in political economy. By focusing on the microeconomic side of the discipline, I present an overview of current research on four of the fundamental...
Money, Political Ambition, and the Career Decisions of Politicians
Michael P. Keane, Antonio Merlo
In this paper we assess the impact of a variety of policies that may influence the career decisions of members of the U.S. Congress, using the empirical framework of Diermeier, Keane and Merlo...
- GENDER DIFFERENCES IN EDUCATION IN A DYNAMIC HOUSEHOLD BARGAINING MODEL
Antonio Merlo, Cristina Echevarria
In this paper, we explore the issue of gender differences in education in the context of a two-sexoverlapping generations model where men and women of each generation bargain over consumption, number...
Do Voters Vote Sincerely? Second Version
In this paper we address the following question: To what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely testable or falsifiable? We show that using data only on how individuals vote in a single...
Andrea Mattozzi, Antonio Merlo
In this paper, we study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by a party who faces competition for political talent...
The Transparency of Politics and the Quality of Politicians
Andrea Mattozzi, Antonio Merlo
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between the transparency of politics and the quality of politicians in a model of parties’ political recruitment. We find that an increase in the...
Political Careers or Career Politicians? Second Version
Andrea Mattozzi, Antonio Merlo
Two main career paths are prevalent among politicians in modern democracies: there are career politicians (i.e., politicians who work in the political sector until retirement), and political careers...
A Structural Model of Turnout and Voting in Multiple Elections, Fourth Version
This paper develops a unified approach to study participation and voting in multiple elections. The theoretical setting combines an “uncertain-voter” model of turnout with a spatial model of...
Felli, Leonhardo, Merlo, Antonio
In this paper we endogenize the number and characteristics of lobbies in a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy where citizens can lobby an elected policy-maker. We find that lobbying...
Bargaining over Residential Real Estate: Evidence from England
Merlo, Antonio, Ortalo-Magne, Francois
This paper presents and investigates a new data set of individual residential property transactions in England. The main novelty of the data is the record of all listing price changes and all offers...
The Role of Campaign War Chest in Congressional Careers
The main goal of this paper is to investigate the role of campaign fund in congressional careers. To achieve this goal, we specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of Congress. In...
A Structural Model of Government Formation
Daniel Diermeier, Hulya Eraslan, Antonio Merlo
In this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies. We use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments aimed at evaluating the...
A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information.
Merlo, Antonio, Wilson, Charles A
The authors consider a k-player sequential bargaining model in which the size of the cake and the order in which players move follow a general Markov process. For games in which one agent makes an...
Bicameralism and Government Formation
Antonio Merlo, Daniel Diermeier, Hülya Eraslan
In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model...
On the political economy of income redistribution and crime
Ayse Imrohoroglu, Antonio Merlo, Peter Rupert
A general equilibrium analysis of the effects of income redistribution and crime, showing that while expenditures on police protection reduce crime, it is possible for the crime rate to increase with...
What accounts for the decline in crime?
Ayse Imrohoroglu, Antonio Merlo, Peter Rupert
The authors’ dynamic equilibrium model guides their quantitative investigation of the major determinants of property-crime patterns in the U.S. The model is capable of reproducing the drop in...
Do Citizens Vote Strategically (if they vote at all)? Evidence from U.S. National Elections
Two prominent facts emerge from data on U.S. presidential and congressional elections. First, often people vote a split-ticket, that is, they vote for different parties' candidates for President and...
The Research Agenda: Dynamic Model of Crime and Punishment
Antonio Merlo is the Lawrence R. Klein Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania and is Director of the Penn Institute for Economic Research. His field is political economy,...
Felli, Leonardo, Merlo, Antonio
In this paper, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy...
Economic Dynamics And Government Stability In Postwar Italy
In this paper I estimate a duration model of the Italian government. The main finding of the paper is that the downfall probability of an Italian government depends on both political and economic...
Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining
We consider a k-player sequential bargaining model in which both the cake size and the identity of the proposer are determined by a stochastic process. For the case where the cake is a simplex (of...
EXPERIMENTATION AND LEARNING IN LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS: HARRISON'S CRITICISM REVISITED
Merlo, Antonio, Schotter, Andrew
experiments ; research methods ; learning ; laboratories ; games
Experimentation and Learning in Laboratory Experiments: Harrison’s Criticism Revisited
Merlo, Antonio, Schotter, Andrew
Economic equilibrium ; costs
An Econometric Analysis of Government Tenure Histories: The Italian Case
Political aspects ; economic aspects ; government ; inflation
Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies
Diermeier, Daniel, Merlo, Antonio
government stability; minority coalitions; surplus coalitions
Do Voters Vote Ideologically?, Third Version
In this paper we address the following question: To what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote “ideologically” (i.e., they always vote for the candidate who is ideologically “closest” to...
Political careers or career politicians?
Mattozzi, Andrea, Merlo, Antonio
Two main career paths are prevalent among politicians in modern democracies: there are career politicians (i.e., politicians who work in the political sector until retirement), and political careers...
The Transition from School to Jail: Youth Crime and High School Completion Among Black Males
Antonio Merlo, Kenneth I. Wolpin
In this paper, we propose a new approach to the empirical study of the relationships among schooling, youth employment and youth crime which provides a comprehensive analysis of the dynamic...
Andrea Mattozzi, Antonio Merlo
In this paper, we study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by a party who faces competition for political talent...
Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment.
In this paper, the author structurally estimates a stochastic bargaining model of government formation in a multiparty parliamentary democracy and he conducts policy experiments to evaluate the...