On the Strategic Advantages of a Lack of Common Knowledge (2008)
I illustrate the surprising strategic effects a lack of common knowledge can have in a simple example. I analyze a two-person bargaining game in which the seller makes a single take-it-or-leave-it...
Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games 1 (2007)
helpful suggestions, Northwestern University for enjoyable visits during which this research was begun, and SSHRCC for nancial support. We show that the standard results for nitely repeated games do...
Barton L. Lipman, Luca Anderlini, Jim Bergin, Eddie Dekel, Itzhak Gilboa, Joe Halpern, ...
for helpful suggestions and conversations. Financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged. A preliminary version of this paper was...
A Unique Subjective State Space for Unforeseen Contingencies (1997)
Eddie Dekel, Barton L. Lipman, Aldo Rustichini, Ranispiegler Andnumerousseminaraudiencesforhelpfulcomments Dekelandrustichinithankthensfand
We axiomatically characterize a representation of preferences over opportunity sets which exhibit a preference for exibility, interpreted as a model of unforeseen contingencies. In this...
Ex ante versus interim rationality and the existence of bubbles (1995)
Lipman, Barton L., Bhattacharyya, Sugato
Tirole (1982) is commonly interpreted as proving that bubbles are impossible with finitely many rational traders with common priors. We study a simple variation of his model in which bubbles can...
An axiomatic approach to the logical omniscience problem (1994)
Standard models of knowledge have the unrealistic property that agents are logically omniscient in the sense that they know all logical implications of their information. While many nonstandard...
Eddie Eckel, Barton L Lipman, Aldo Rustichini
“My own behavior baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe.” Saint Paul What behavior can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent...
Finite Order Implications of Common Priors in Infinite Models
Lipman [2003] shows that in a finite model, the common prior assumption has weak implications for finite orders of beliefs about beliefs. In particular, the only such implications are those stemming...
Eddie Dekel, Barton L. Lipman, Aldo Rustichini
“My own behavior baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe.” Saint Paul What behavior can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent...
Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games
We show that small switching costs can have surprisingly dramatic effects in infinitely repeated games if these costs are large relative to payoffs in a single period. This shows that the results in...
Information Processing and Bounded Rationality : A Survey.
This paper surveys some recent attempts to formulate a plausible and tractable model of bounded rationality. I focus in particular on models which view bounded rationality as stemming from limited...
Logics for Nonomniscient Agents: An Axiomatic Approach.
It has long been recognized that solving the logical omniscience problem requires using some kind of nonstandard possible worlds. While many such logics have been proposed, none has an obvious claim...
Partial Provability in Communication Games.
Barton L. Lipman, Duane J. Seppi
This paper studies the ability of interested parities to communicate private information credibly to a decision maker in settings where their payoffs depend on the decision maker's action, but not on...
Limited Rationality and Endogenously Incomplete Contracts.
The purpose of this paper is to provided a simple model in which limited rationality endogenously generates incomplete contracts. I model limited rationality as in Lipman [1991,1992], focusing on the...
Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space: Corrigendum
Eddie Eckel, Barton L Lipman, Aldo Rustichini, Todd Sarver
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Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games1
We show that small switching costs can have surprisingly dramatic effects in infinitely repeated games if these costs are large relative to payoffs in a single period. This shows that the results in...
Temptation–Driven Preferences1
“My own behavior baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe.” Saint Paul What behavior can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent...
Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games
We show that the standard results for finitely repeated games do not survive the combination of two simple variations on the usual model. In particular, we add a small cost of changing actions and...
Eddie Dekel, Barton L. Lipman, Aldo Rustichini
“My own behavior baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe.” Saint Paul What behavior can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent...
Decision Theory without Logical Omniscience: Toward an Axiomatic Framework for Bounded Rationality.
The author proposes modeling boundedly rational agents as agents who are not logically omniscient, that is, who do not know all logical or mathematical implications of what they know. He shows how a...
Finite Order Implications of Common Priors
I characterize the implications of the common prior assumption for finite orders of beliefs about beliefs at a state and show that in finite models, the only such implications are those stemming from...
Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations.
Bergin, James, Lipman, Barton L
Recent evolutionary models have introduced 'small mutation rates' as a way of refining predictions of long-run behavior. The authors show that this refinement effect can only be obtained by...
Information Processing and Bounded Rationality: A Survey.
This paper surveys recent attempts to formulate a plausible and tractable model of bounded rationality. The author focuses in particular on models that view bounded rationality as stemming from...
Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space: A Corrigendum -super-1
Eddie Dekel, Barton L Lipman, Aldo Rustichini, Todd Sarver
Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) (henceforth DLR) axiomatically characterized three representations of preferences that allow for a desire for flexibility and/or commitment. In one of these...
How to Decide How to Decide How to. . . : Modeling Limited Rationality.
It seems inconsistent to model boundedly rational action choice by assuming that the agent chooses the optimal decision procedure. This criticism is not avoided by assuming that he chooses the...
Finite Order Implications of Common Priors
I characterize the implications of the common prior assumption for finite orders of beliefs about beliefs at a state and show that the only such implications are those stemming from the weaker...
Stock Price Manipulation Through Takeover Bids
Mark Bagnoli, Barton L. Lipman
The announcement of a takeover bid causes significant increases in the target's stock price, but the possibility that a bid is motivated to cause this increase so that the bidder can sell his...
Ex ante versus interim rationality and the existence of bubbles
Barton L. Lipman, Sugato Bhattacharyya
Tirole (1982) is commonly interpreted as proving that bubbles are impossible with finitely many rational traders with common priors. We study a simple variation of his model in which bubbles can...
Implementation and Partial Provability
Elchanan Ben-Porath, Barton L. Lipman
We extend implementation theory by allowing the social choice function to depend on more than just the prole of preferences of the agents and by allowing agents to support their statements with hard...
EDDIE DEKEL, BARTON L. LIPMAN, ALDO RUSTICHINI
"My own behaviour baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe." Saint Paul Copyright Copyright © 2009 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
Switching costs in infinitely repeated games
We show that small switching costs can have surprisingly dramatic effects in infinitely repeated games if these costs are large relative to payoffs in a single period. This shows that the results in...