Abstract Trusted Declassification High-level policy for a security-typed language (2009)
Boniface Hicks, Dave King, Patrick Mcdaniel
Security-typed languages promise to be a powerful tool with which provably secure software applications may be developed. Programs written in these languages enforce a strong, global policy of...
Abstract Trusted Declassification High-level policy for a security-typed language (2009)
Boniface Hicks, Dave King, Patrick Mcdaniel
Security-typed languages promise to be a powerful tool with which provably secure software applications may be developed. Programs written in these languages enforce a strong, global policy of...
Integrating SELinux with Security-typed Languages (2009)
Boniface Hicks, Ra Rueda, Trent Jaeger, Patrick Mcdaniel
Traditionally, operating systems have enforced MAC and information flow policies with minimal dependence on application programs. However, there are many cases where systems depend on user-level...
Abstract Non-Invasive Methods for Host Certification (2008)
Patrick Traynor, Michael Chien, Scott Weaver, Boniface Hicks, Patrick Mcdaniel
Determining whether a user or system is exercising appropriate security practices is difficult in any context. Such difficulties are particularly pronounced when uncontrolled or unknown hosts join...
Channels: Runtime System Infrastructure for Security-typed Languages (2008)
Security-typed languages (STLs) are powerful tools for provably implementing policy in applications. The programmer maps policy onto programs by annotating types with information flow labels, and the...
Integrating SELinux with Security-typed Languages (2008)
Boniface Hicks, Ra Rueda, Trent Jaeger, Patrick Mcdaniel
Recent advances in the area of security-typed languages have enabled the development of realistic applications aware of information flow security. Traditionally, operating systems have enforced MAC...
Abstract Declassification with Cryptographic Functions in a Security-Typed Language (2008)
Boniface Hicks, David King, Patrick Mcdaniel
Security-typed languages are powerful tools for provably enforcing noninterference. Real computing systems, however, often intentionally violate noninterference by deliberately releasing (or...
Non-Invasive Methods for Host Certification (2008)
Patrick Traynor, Michael Chien, Scott Weaver, Boniface Hicks, Patrick Mcdaniel
Abstract — Determining whether a user or system is exercising appropriate security practices is difficult in any context. Such difficulties are particularly pronounced when uncontrolled or unknown...
From trusted to secure: Building and executing applications that enforce system security (2007)
Boniface Hicks, Ra Rueda, Trent Jaeger, Patrick Mcdaniel
Commercial operating systems have recently introduced mandatory access controls (MAC) that can be used to ensure system-wide data confidentiality and integrity. These protections rely on restricting...
A Logical Specification and Analysis for SELinux MLS (2007)
Boniface Hicks, Sandra Rueda, Luke St. Clair, Trent Jaeger, Patrick Mcdaniel
The SELinux mandatory access control (MAC) policy has recently added a multi-level security (MLS) model which is able to express a fine granularity of control over a subject's access rights. The...
Integrating SELinux with Security-typed Languages (2007)
Boniface Hicks, Sandra Rueda, Trent Jaeger, Patrick Mcdaniel
Traditionally, operating systems have enforced MAC and information flow policies with minimal dependence on application programs. However, there are many cases where systems depend on user-level...
Channels: Runtime system infrastructure for security-typed languages (2007)
Security-typed languages (STLs) are powerful tools for provably implementing policy in applications. The programmer maps policy onto programs by annotating types with information flow labels, and the...
Boniface Hicks, Kiyan Ahmadizadeh, Patrick Mcdaniel
Security-typed languages are an evolving tool for implementing systems with provable security guarantees. However, to date, these tools have only been used to build simple “toy ” programs. As...
Dynamic Updating of Information-Flow Policies (2005)
Michael Hicks Stephen, Stephen Tse, Boniface Hicks, Steve Zdancewic
Applications that manipulate sensitive information should ensure end-to-end security by satisfying two properties: sound execution and some form of noninterference. By the former, we mean the program...
Dynamic updating of information-flow policies (2005)
Michael Hicks, Stephen Tse, Boniface Hicks, Steve Zdancewic
Applications that manipulate sensitive information should ensure end-to-end security by satisfying two properties: sound execution and some form of noninterference. By the former, we mean the program...