For Oxford Handbook on the Philosophy of Biology ed. Michael Ruse EVOLUTION OF MORAL NORMS (2008)
Moral norms are the rules of morality, those that people actually follow, and those that we feel people ought to follow, even when they don’t. Historically, the social sciences have been primarily...
In species capable of learning, including our own, individuals can modify their
Dynamics of Conformist Bias (2008)
Abstract: We compare replicator dynamics for some simple games with and without the addition of conformist bias. The addition of conformist bias can create equilibria, it can change the stability...
Evolutionary Dynamics of Lewis Signaling Games: Signaling Systems vs. Partial Pooling (2007)
Huttegger, Simon, Skyrms, Brian, Smead, Rory, Zollman, Kevin
In Lewis signaling games [Lewis 1969], nature picks one of N possible states of the world at random and a player, the sender, observes the state and selects one of N signals to send to a receiver....
A Dynamic Model of Social Network Formation (2004)
Skyrms, Brian, Pemantle, Robin
We consider a dynamic social network model in which agents play repeated games in pairings determined by a stochastically evolving social network. Individual agents begin to interact at random, with...
Network formation by reinforcement learning: the long and medium run (2004)
Pemantle, Robin, Skyrms, Brian
We investigate a simple stochastic model of social network formation by the process of reinforcement learning with discounting of the past. In the limit, for any value of the discounting parameter,...
Time to absorption in discounted reinforcement models (2004)
Pemantle, Robin, Skyrms, Brian
Reinforcement schemes are a class of non-Markovian stochastic processes. Their non-Markovian nature allows them to model some kind of memory of the past. One subclass of such models are those in...
Network formation by reinforcement learning: the long and medium run (2003)
We investigate a simple stochastic model of social network formation by the process of reinforcement learning with discounting of the past. In the limit, for any value of the discounting parameter,...
Network formation by reinforcement learning: the long and medium run (2003)
We investigate a simple stochastic model of social network formation by the process of reinforcement learning with discounting of the past. In the limit, for any value of the discounting parameter,...
Time to Absorption in Discounted Reinforcement Models (2003)
Reinforcement schemes are a class of non-Markovian stochastic processes. Their non-Markovian nature allows them to model some kind of memory of the past. One subclass of such models are those in...
Sanjeev Goyal, Edited G. Demange, M. Wooders, William Brock, Gabrielle Demange, Leigh Tesfatsion, ...
Vega-Redondo for useful comments on an earlier version of the paper.
Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information (2002)
Abstract: Pre-play signals which cost nothing are sometimes thought to be of no significance in interactions which are not games of pure common interest. We investigate the effect of pre-play signals...
The Stag Hunt, Brian Skyrms, U. C. Irvine, I The, Stag Hunt
The Stag Hunt is a story that became a game. The game is a prototype of the social contract. The story is briefly told by Rousseau, in A Discourse on Inequality: If it was a matter of hunting a deer,...
forthcoming in Proceeding and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (2001)
The Stag Hunt, Brian Skyrms, U. C. Irvine, I The, Stag Hunt
The Stag Hunt is a story that became a game. The game is a prototype of the social contract. The story is briefly told by Rousseau, in A Discourse on Inequality: If it was a matter of hunting a deer,...
The (spatial) evolution of the equal split (1999)
Alexander, Jason, Skyrms, Brian
The replicator dynamics have been used to study the evolution of a population of rational agents playing the Nash bargaining game, where an individual's "fitness" is determined by an individual's...
The (spatial) evolution of the equal split (1999)
Alexander, Jason, Skyrms, Brian
The replicator dynamics have been used to study the evolution of a population of rational agents playing the Nash bargaining game, where an individual's "fitness" is determined by an individual's...
"Essays on probability and conditionals is intended to honor Professor Ernest W. Adams"
Dynamic models of deliberation and the theory of games (1990)
Deliberation can be modeled as a dynamic process. Where deliberation generates new information relevant to the decision under consideration, a rational decision maker will (processing costs...
A dynamic model of social network formation
Skyrms, Brian, Pemantle, Robin
We consider a dynamic social network model in which agents play repeated games in pairings determined by a stochastically evolving social network. Individual agents begin to interact at random, with...
A dynamic model of social network formation
Skyrms, Brian, Pemantle, Robin
We consider a dynamic social network model in which agents play repeated games in pairings determined by a stochastically evolving social network. Individual agents begin to interact at random, with...
Evolution of signalling systems with multiple senders and receivers
Sender–receiver games are simple, tractable models of information transmission. They provide a basic setting for the study the evolution of meaning. It is possible to investigate not only the...