Software Patent Citations: A Consistent Weighted Ranking (2005)
Version 5 In recent years, economists have begun asking whether incentive schemes like the patent system provide proper incentives for firms to invest in path-breaking research and development. Such...
Jay Pil Choi, Chaim Fershtman, Neil G
In this paper, we examine how software vulnerabilities affect firms that sell software and consumers that purchase software. In particular, we model three decisions of the firm: (I) an upfront...
Public Policy with Endogenous Preferences (2004)
Bar-Gill, Oren, Fershtman, Chaim
Public policy may influence norms and preferences. By altering the payoffs associated with different preferences, public policy may influence the distribution of these preferences in the population....
Public Policy with Endogenous Preferences (2004)
Bar-Gill, Oren, Fershtman, Chaim
Public policy may influence norms and preferences. By altering the payoffs associated with different preferences, public policy may influence the distribution of these preferences in the population....
Bar-Gill, Oren, Fershtman, Chaim
Legal rules do more than provide incentives; they change people. When preferences and norms are endogenously determined via a process of imitation and learning, legal rules, by affecting the market...
Bar-Gill, Oren, Fershtman, Chaim
Legal rules do more than provide incentives; they change people. When preferences and norms are endogenously determined via a process of imitation and learning, legal rules, by affecting the market...
Bar-Gill, Oren, Fershtman, Chaim
Legal rules do more than provide incentives, they change people. When preferences and norms are endogenously determined via a process of imitation and learning, legal rules, by affecting the market...
A Dynamic Oligopoly Model with Assymetric Information. (incomplete, work in progress) (2002)
In considering the stability of price fixing arrangement the emphasis in the literature is on the incentives that each firm has to deviate from the price
Discrimination and Nepotism: the efficiency of the anonymity rule (2002)
Chaim Fershtman, Uri Gneezy, Frank Verboven
The paper considers two categories of discrimination: “discrimination against” and “discrimination in favor”, which Becker coins “nepotism”. The paper develops an experimental test to...
Cultural Diversity, Status Concerns and the Organization of Work
Fershtman, Chaim, Hvide, Hans K, Weiss, Yoram
A well-documented human tendency is to compare outcomes with others, trying to outperform them. These tendencies vary across cultures and among different individuals in a given society. The workplace...
Internet Security, Vulnerability Disclosure and Software Provision
Choi, Jay-Pil, Fershtman, Chaim, Gandal, Neil
In this paper, we examine how software vulnerabilities affect firms that license software and consumers that purchase software. In particular, we model three decisions of the firm: (i) an upfront...
Public Policy with Endogenous Preferences
OREN BAR-GILL, CHAIM FERSHTMAN
Public policy may influence norms and preferences. By altering the payoffs associated with different preferences, public policy may influence the distribution of these preferences in the population....
Price Cycles and Booms: Dynamic Search Equilibrium.
Fershtman, Chaim, Fishman, Arthur
Search theory has been extensively and successfully applied to explain the persistence of price dispersion. This paper presents an explicitly dynamic search model that is able to account for cyclical...
Social Status, Education, and Growth.
Fershtman, Chaim, Murphy, Kevin M, Weiss, Yoram
This paper investigates the implications of social rewards on the allocation of talent in society and consequently on the process of economic growth. The authors consider two sources of heterogeneity...
Patents, Imitation and Licensing in an Asymmetric Dynamic R&D Race
Fershtman, Chaim, Markovich, Sarit
R&D is an inherently dynamic process which involves different intermediate steps that need to be developed before the completion of the final invention. Firms are not necessarily symmetric in their...
Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Computational Framework
We present a simple algorithm for computing an intuitive notion of MPE for ?nite state dynamic games with asymmetric information. The algorithm does not require; storage and updating of posterior...
Network Security: Vulnerabilities and Disclosure Policy
Choi, Jay-Pil, Fershtman, Chaim, Gandal, Neil
Software security is a major concern for vendors, consumers, and regulators since attackers that exploit vulnerabilities can cause substantial damages. When vulnerabilities are discovered after the...
A Consistent Weighted Ranking Scheme with an Application to NCAA College Football Rankings
Fainmesser, Itay, Fershtman, Chaim, Gandal, Neil
The NCAA college football ratings, in which the "so-called" national champion is determined, has been plagued by controversies the last few years. The difficulty arises because there is a need to...
The Effects of Insider Trading on Insiders' Choice Among Risky Investment Projects
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Chaim Fershtman
This paper studies certain effects of insider trading on the principal-agent problem in corporations. Specifically, we focus on insiders' choice among investment projects. Other things equal, insider...
The Effect of Insider Trading on Insiders' Reaction to Opportunities to 'Waste' Corporate Value
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Chaim Fershtman
This paper analyzes certain effects of insider trading on the principal-agent problem in corporations. Specifically, we focus on those managerial choices that confront managers with the need to...
Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly.
Fershtman, Chaim, Judd, Kenneth L
The authors examine the incentives which competing principals give their agents, focusing on two oligopoly models where owners write incentive contracts with the ir managers. Under Cournot quantity...
Turnpike Properties in a Finite-Horizon Differential Game: Dynamic Duopoly with Sticky Prices.
Fershtman, Chaim, Kamien, Morton I
The authors study the equilibrium price paths of a finite-horizon dynamic duopoly model in which the market price does not have to adjust instantaneously in response to changes in the quantity...
Read My Lips, Watch for Leaps: Preference Equilibrium and Political Instability
Chaim Fershtman, Aviad Heifetz
As norms and tastes adapt to the social conditions shaped by policy variables, voters' opinions about these policies may evolve as well. We show how this process can lead to political instability....
Survival of Small Firms: Guerrilla Warfare
Duopolistic interaction between a small firm and a large established firm is considered and compared to guerrilla warfare, The paper investigates a "hit and run" equilibrium in which the small firm...
Microstructure of Collaboration: The 'Social Network' of Open Source Software
Fershtman, Chaim, Gandal, Neil
The open source model is a form of software development with source code that is typically made available to all interested parties. At the core of this process is a decentralized production process:...
Open source software: Motivation and restrictive licensing
Open source software, Intrinsic motivation, Professional status, Signaling, Restrictive licenses, D20, L86,
A common feature of recent growth models is the existence of externalities associated with human capital. Each worker, in choosing his level of schooling or occupation, ignores the impact of his...
The paper describes situations where commitment via delegation is beneficial, even when the delegation is unobservable and the players have the option to play the game themselves. The potentiual for...
Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices.
Fershtman, Chaim, Kamien, Morton I
The authors study duopolistic competition in a homogeneous good through time under the assumption that its current desirability is an exponentially-weighted function of accumulated past consumption....
On the Value of Incumbency: Managerial Reference Point and Loss Aversion
In discussing the market entry decision and the strategic interaction between an incumbent firm and an entrant the focus in the literature is on the different asymmetries that exist between the...
Inflation and Efficiency in a Search Economy
Chaim Fershtman, Arthur Fishman, Avi Simhon
We present a model in which purely monetary inflation systematically affects efficiency, welfare, and relative prices. The model focuses on the microeconomics of trade in search markets under...
This paper describes situations where commitment via delegation is beneficial, even when the delegation is unobservable and the players have the option to play the game themselves. The potential for...
Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation.
Fershtman, Chaim, Judd, Kenneth L, Kalai, Ehud
The role of commitments in noncooperative games is well acknowledged and documented. One way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game. In this paper, the authors...
The Effect of the Arab Boycott on Israel: The Automobile Market
Recent progress towards a comprehensive peace in the Middle East has led to a relaxation of the enforcement of the Arab economic boycott of Israel. This in turn has led to the entry of all the major...
Social Status, Culture and Economic Performance.
Fershtman, Chaim, Weiss, Yoram
Cultural differences among societies may translate into different social status of occupations and can, therefore, affect the workers' choice of education and occupation and, consequently, the...
Strategic Delegation: An Experiment.
We examine the effects of strategic delegation in a simple ultimatum game experiment. Specifically, we show that when the proposer uses a delegate, his share increases. Since in such a case the...
A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars
We provide a collusive framework with heterogeneity among firms, investment, entry, and exit. It is a symmetric-information model in which it is hard to sustain collusion when there is an active firm...
The Effect of the Arab Boycott on Israel: The Automobile Market
Recent progress toward a comprehensive peace in the Middle East has led to a relaxation of the enforcement of the Arab economic boycott of Israel. This in turn has led to the entry of all the major...
Complexity Considerations and Market Behavior
The article is concerned with market behavior when firms have limited ability to handle effectively the complexity of changing market conditions and strategic interaction . Modelling the managerial...
Capital Investments and Price Agreements in Semicollusive Markets
We consider a semicollusive market where firms compete in a long-run variable, such as investment in capital or capacity, and collude with respect to a short-run variable, such as price or market...
Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Computational Framework.
This paper develops a relatively simple method for computing the Markov Perfect Equilibria of dynamic games with asymmetric information (see Maskin and Tirole (1992, 2001)). We consider a class of...
Estimating the Effects of Tax Reform in Differentiated Product Oligopolistic Markets
Fershtman, Chaim, Gandal, Neil, Markovich, Sarit
The incidence of taxation and the design of an optimal tax system have been extensively discussed in the public finance literature but mainly within a competitive market setting or within a...
Discrimination and Nepotism: The Efficiency of the Anonymity Rule
Fershtman, Chaim, Gneezy, Uri, Verboven, Frank
The Paper considers two categories of discrimination: ‘discrimination against’ and ‘discrimination in favour’, which Becker coins ‘nepotism’. The Paper develops an experimental test to...
The Determinants of Output Per Contributor in Open Source Projects: An Empirical Examination
Fershtman, Chaim, Gandal, Neil
Using a unique dataset we examine empirically which factors explain output per contributor in open source projects. We find that the output per contributor of open source programmes is much higher...
Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Applied Work
Fershtman, Chaim, Pakes, Ariel
We present a framework for the applied analysis of dynamic games with asymmetric information. The framework consists of a definition of equilibrium, and an algorithm to compute it. Our definition of...
Discrimination In A Segmented Society: An Experimental Approach
This paper proposes an experimental approach to studying different aspects of discrimination. We let participants play various games with opponents of distinct ethnic affiliation. Strategies based...
Fershtman, Chaim, Gneezy, Uri, List, John
Models of inequity aversion and fairness have dominated the behavioural economics landscape in the last decade. This study gathers data from 240 subjects exposed to variants of two of the major...
Taboos: Considering the Unthinkable
Fershtman, Chaim, Gneezy, Uri, Hoffman, Moshe
A taboo is an "unthinkable" action, that is, even the thought of violating it triggers social punishment. Taboos are the social "thought police," discouraging individuals from considering certain...
A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars
Most of the theoretical work on collusion and price wars assumes identical firms and an unchanging environment, assumptions which are at odds with what we know about most industries. Further that...
The Effect of Insider Trading on Insiders' Reaction to Opportunities to "Waste" Corporate Value
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Chaim Fershtman
This paper analyzes certain effects of insider trading on the principal-agent problem in corporations. Specifically, we focus on those managerial choices that confront managers with the need to...
The Effects of Insider Trading on Insiders' Choice Among Risky Investment Projects
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Chaim Fershtman
This paper studies certain effects of insider trading on the principal-agent problem in corporations. Specifically, we focus on insiders' choice among investment projects. Other things equal, insider...
Discrimination and Nepotism: The Efficiency of the Anonymity Rule
Chaim Fershtman, Uri Gneezy, Frank Verboven
We develop an experimental test to distinguish between discrimination against and nepotism. The experiment compares the behavior toward individuals of different groups with the behavior toward...
Microstructure of Collaboration: The Network of Open Source Software
The open source model is a form of software development with source code that is typically made available to all interested parties. At the core of this process is a decentralized production process:...
Insider Trading and the Managerial Choice among Risky Projects
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, Fershtman, Chaim
The concern of this paper is with the effects of insider trading on ex ante managerial behavior. Specifically, the paper focuses on how insider trading affects insiders' choice among investment...
Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Applied Work
Fershtman, Chaim, Pakes, Ariel
With applied work in mind, we define an equilibrium notion for dynamic games with asymmetric information which does not require a specification for players' beliefs about their opponent types. This...
Political Support and Tax Compliance: A Social Interaction Approach
Fershtman, Chaim, Lipatov, Vilen
People may express their political opinion by adopting different measures of civil disobedience. Tax compliance is an example of an economic decision that may be affected by anti-goverment sentiment....