Previous research on collusion in procurement markets uses static mechanism design theory to address the limitations on collusive activity imposed by asymmetric information, but in most instances it...
Design and analysis of an improved apparatus for the study of mixing and coagulation / (1999)
Thesis (M.S.)--Auburn University, 1999.
USING RESERVE PRICES TO DETER COLLUSION IN PROCUREMENT COMPETITION
To enhance our understanding of collusion in procurement settings, this paper quantitatively evaluates how the buyer's choice of a reserve price influences the sustainability of two previously...
Verifiable Offers and the Relationship Between Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations
Charles J. Thomas, Bart J. Wilson
We use the experimental method to compare second-price auctions with 'verifiable' multilateral negotiations in which the sole buyer can credibly reveal to sellers the best price offer he currently...
A Comparison of Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations
Charles J. Thomas, Bart J. Wilson
We compare first-price auctions to an exchange process that we term ``multilateral negotiations.'' In multilateral negotiations, a buyer solicits price offers for a homogeneous product from sellers...