Cooperation in the Commons (2006)
Polasky, Stephen, Tarui, Nori, Ellis, Gregory, Mason, Charles
"This paper delineates circumstances in which a first-best cooperative solution can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium in a dynamic common property renewable resource game. In a game with...
Alderman, Harold, Allen, Robert, Allingham, Michael, Altavilla, Carlo, Altenburg, Lutz, Anand, Paul, ...
Alderman, Harold, Allen, Robert, Allingham, Michael, Altavilla, Carlo, Altenburg, Lutz, Anand, Paul, ...
x, [11]-233 p.
Stephen Polasky, Nori Tarui, Gregory Ellis, Charles Mason
Common property resource, Cooperation, Dynamic game, D62, Q20,
Cooperation in the Commons with Unobservable Actions
Nori Tarui, Charles Mason, Stephen Polasky, Greg Ellis
We model a dynamic common property resource game with unobservable actions and non-linear stock dependent costs. We propose a strategy profile that generates a worst perfect equilibrium in the...
Strategic Preemption in a Common Property Resource: A Continuous Time Approach
Charles Mason, Stephen Polasky
The threat of future entry affects the exploitation of common property resources in important ways. An incumbent has a strategic incentive to manipulate the resource stock to deter entry or to...
Investigating Risky Choices Over Losses Using Experimental Data
Charles Mason, Jason Shogren, Chad Settle, John List
We conduct a battery of experiments in which agents make choices from several pairs of all-loss-lotteries. Using these choices, we estimate a representation of individual preferences over lotteries....
Experimental Duopoly in the Classroom
This in-class duopoly game experiment allows students to learn about strategies and equilibria. It is appropriate for use in undergraduate and graduate classes and takes about two hours to complete.
Are CEOs Expected Utility Maximizers?
Are individuals expected utility maximizers? This question represents much more than academic curiosity. In a normative sense, at stake are the fundamental underpinnings of the bulk of the last...