Timothy D. Mount, Robert J. Thomas, Christian A. Vossler, Ray D. Zimmerman
The high prices for electricity in California during the summer of 2000 led to a substantial amount of regulatory and political intervention. Price caps were lowered and the Federal Energy Regulatory...
Vossler, Christian A., Poe, Gregory L., Schulze, William D., Segerson, Kathleen
This article considers whether communication can improve the efficacy of incentive mechanisms designed to correct the problem of moral hazard in groups. In particular, we use experimental economics...
Vossler, Christian A., Poe, Gregory L., Schulze, William D., Segerson, Kathleen
This article considers whether communication can improve the efficacy of incentive mechanisms designed to correct the problem of moral hazard in groups. In particular, we use experimental economics...
Vossler, Christian A., Poe, Gregory L., Schulze, William D., Segerson, Kathleen
This article considers whether communication can improve the efficacy of incentive mechanisms designed to correct the problem of moral hazard in groups. In particular, we use experimental economics...
CAN PUBLIC GOODS EXPERIMENTS INFORM ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES? (2005)
Paul Ferraro, Christian A. Vossler
Understanding behavior in experimental public goods games is fundamental to the work of environmental, behavioral, institutional and policy-oriented economists. Although much research has been...
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Externally validating contingent valuation: an open-space survey and referendum in Corvallis, Oregon
Vossler, Christian A., Kerkvliet, Joe, Polasky, Stephen, Gainutdinova, Olesya
Experiments on Damage-Based Ambient Taxes for Nonpoint Source Polluters
Jordan F. Suter, Christian A. Vossler, Gregory L. Poe, Kathleen Segerson
This article presents experimental tests of a linear and a nonlinear ambient tax mechanism that involve modest information requirements for the regulator. When agents are not allowed to communicate,...
Christian A. Vossler, Gregory L. Poe, William D. Schulze, Kathleen Segerson
This article considers whether communication can improve the efficacy of incentive mechanisms designed to correct the problem of moral hazard in groups. In particular, we use experimental economics...
Christian A. Vossler, Robert G. Ethier, Gregory L. Poe, Michael P. Welsh
Two methods for calibrating discrete choice contingent valuation responses—the dichotomous choice with follow-up certainty question method of and the multiple-bounded method of —are evaluated...
Hybrid allocation mechanisms for publicly provided goods
Evans, Mary F., Vossler, Christian A., Flores, Nicholas E.
Motivated by efficiency and equity concerns, public resource managers have increasingly utilized hybrid allocation mechanisms that combine features of commonly used price (e.g., auction) and...
Ambient-based pollution mechanisms: A comparison of homogeneous and heterogeneous groups of emitters
Suter, Jordan F., Vossler, Christian A., Poe, Gregory L.
Over the last two decades, ambient-based tax mechanisms have been offered as a potential solution to the problem of nonpoint source water pollution. Previous theoretical analyses suggest that the...
Incentive compatibility tests of choice experiment value elicitation questions
Collins, Jill P., Vossler, Christian A.
This paper uses laboratory experiments with induced values to address fundamental issues related to the incentive compatibility of choice experiment value elicitation questions. In particular, we...