Abstract: Language and Ideology in Congress * (2008)
Daniel Diermeier, Jean-françois Godbout, Bei Yu, Stefan Kaufmann
The paper analyzes legislative speech records in the U.S. Senate from the 101 st-108 th Congresses. We apply a widely-used text classification algorithm- Support Vector Machines (SVM)- to extract the...
Lexical Cohesion Analysis of Political Speech (2008)
Klebanov, Beata Beigman, Diermeier, Daniel, Beigman, Eyal
This article presents a novel automatic method of text analysis aimed at discovering patterns of lexical cohesion in political speech. The unit of analysis are groups of words with related meanings;...
Policy Dynamics and Legislative Bargaining (2007)
(Draft- Preliminary and Incomplete. Please do not distribute without permission) This paper presents a dynamic model of legislative bargaining with an evolving default policy. We show that even with...
Fairness and Entitlement in Majoritarian Decision-Making (2004)
Daniel Diermeier, Sean Gailmard
We experimentally test competing theories of three-player majoritarian bargaining models with fixed, known disagreement values. Subjects are randomly assigned to three roles: a proposer and two types...
The Empirical Content of Adaptive Models (2002)
Jonathan Bendor, Daniel Diermeier, Michael Ting, Jonathan Bendor, Daniel Diermeier, Michael Ting
Columbia University. We would like to thank Adam Meirowitz for his very helpful
Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies (2000)
Daniel Diermeier, Antonio Merlo
In this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation and termi-nation in parliamentary democracies that accounts for the following phenomena: (1) Cabinet terminations due to replacement...
The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies
Daniel Diermeier, Hulya Eraslan, Antonio Merlo
In this article we present an overview of our recent research on the effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies. Our approach is based on the solution and...
A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers
Daniel Diermeier, Michael Keane, Antonio Merlo
Our main goal is to quantify the returns to a career in the United States Congress. We specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of Congress and estimate this model using a newly...
Efficient system-wide coordination in noisy environments
Moreira, André A., Mathur, Abhishek, Diermeier, Daniel, Amaral, Luís A. N.
Many natural and social systems display global organization and coordination without centralized control. The origin of this global coordination is a topic of great current interest. Here we...
Efficient system-wide coordination in noisy environments
Moreira, André A., Mathur, Abhishek, Diermeier, Daniel, Amaral, Luís A. N.
Many natural and social systems display global organization and coordination without centralized control. The origin of this global coordination is a topic of great current interest. Here we...
Bicameralism and Government Formation, Second Version
Daniel Diermeier, Hulya Eraslan, Antonio Merlo
In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model...
An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures
Daniel Diermeier, Antoni Merlo
Models of government formation processes in multi-party democracies are unusually highly sensitive to the rules that govern the selection of formateurs. The formal literature has exclusively focused...
Information and Congressional Hearings
Daniel Diermeier, Timothy J. Feddersen
While Congressional scholars agree that hearings are an important activity there is little consensus on their role in the legislative process. The traditional literature on hearings pplays down their...
Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies
Daniel Diermeier, Antonio Merlo
In this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation and termination in parliamentary democracies. Our analysis accounts for the following observed phenomena: (1) Cabinet reshuffles; (2)...
A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers
Daniel Diermeier, Michael Keane, Antonio Merlo
Theories in political economy depend critically on assumptions about motivations of politicians. Our analysis starts from the premise that politicians, like other economic agents, are rational...
Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy
David P. Baron, Daniel Diermeier
Activist NGOs have increasingly foregone public politics and turned to private politics to change the practices of firms and industries. This paper focuses on private politics, activist strategies,...
A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers
Daniel Diermeier, Michael Keane, Antonio Merlo
Theories in political economy depend critically on assumptions about motivations of politicians. Our analysis starts from the premise that politicians, like other economic agents, are rational...
A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers: Supplementary Materiel
Daniel Diermeier, Michael Keane, Antonio Merlo
This paper contains additional details about the model in our paper “A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers” (Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2004)), as well as the computational methods...
Dynamics of Parliamentary Systems: Selections, Governments, and Parliaments
David P. Baron, Daniel Diermeier
This paper presents a theory of parliamentary systems that incorporates electoral, government formation, and legislative institutions and focuses on the strategic opportunities inherent in those...
Lobbying and Incentives for Legislative Organization
Daniel Diermeier, Roger B. Myerson
Formal theories of the internal organization of legislatures have mainly focused on the United States Congress. While these models have been successful in showing why committee systems should emerge...
Daniel Diermeier, Roger B. Myerson
This paper compares the incentives to create obstructive committee systems under different constitutionally specified requirements for passing legislation. The Shapley value is used to measure the...
A Structural Model of Government Formation
Daniel Diermeier, Hulya Eraslan, Antonio Merlo
In this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies. We use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments aimed at evaluating the...
Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures
Daniel Diermeier, Roger B. Myerson
Theories of organization of legislatures have mainly focused on the U.S. Congress, explaining why committee systems emerge there, but not explaining variance in organization across legislatures of...
Bicameralism and Government Formation
Antonio Merlo, Daniel Diermeier, Hülya Eraslan
In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model...
Elections, Governments, And Parliaments In Proportional Representation Systems
David P. Baron, Daniel Diermeier
This paper presents a theory of parliamentary systems with a proportional representation electoral system, a formateur selected based on party representation in parliament, and parties that cannot...
Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies
Diermeier, Daniel, Merlo, Antonio
government stability; minority coalitions; surplus coalitions
Bendor, Jonathan, Diermeier, Daniel, Ting, Michael M.
The so-called "paradox of voting" is major anomaly for rational choice theories of elections. If voting is costly and citizens are rational then large electorates the expected turnout would be small,...
Institutionalism as a Methodology
Krehbiel, Keith, Diermeier, Daniel
We provide a definition of institutionalism and a schematic account that distinguishes between institutional theories (in which institutions are exogenous) and theories of institutions (in which...
The Empirical Content of Adaptive Models
Bendor, Jonatahn, Diermeier, Daniel, Ting, Michael M.
Models with adaptive agents have become increasingly popular in computational sociology (e.g. Macy 1991, Macy and Flache 2002). In this paper we show that at least two important kinds of such models...
Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy
Baron, David P., Diermeier, Daniel
Activist NGOs have increasingly foregone public politics and turned to private politics to change the practices of firms and industries. This paper focuses on private politics, activist strategies,...
Policy Dynamics and Inefficiency in a Parliamentary Democracy with Proportional Representation
Baron, David P., Diermeier, Daniel, Fong, Pohan
This paper presents a dynamic model of election, government formation, and legislation in a parliamentary democracy with proportional representation in which the policy chosen in one period becomes...
Government turnover in parliamentary democracies
Diermeier, Daniel, Merlo, Antonio
In this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation and termination in parliamentary democracies. Our analysis accounts for the following observed phenomena: (1) Cabinet reshuffles; (2)...
Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power
We present a dynamic model of legislative bargaining in which policy making proceeds until the proposer has no more incentive to make a new proposal to replace the previously approved policy. We...
Price dynamics in political prediction markets
Majumder, Saikat Ray, Diermeier, Daniel, Rietz, Thomas A., Amaral, Luís A. Nunes
Prediction markets, in which contract prices are used to forecast future events, are increasingly applied to various domains ranging from political contests to scientific breakthroughs. However, the...