David C. Parkes

Decentralized, Adaptive Resource Allocation for Sensor Networks (2008)

It is useful to prove that an implementation correctly follows a specification. But even with a provably correct implementation, given a choice, would a node choose to follow it? This paper explores...

Geoffrey Mainl, David C. Parkes, Matt Welsh

This paper addresses the problem of resource allocation in sensor networks. We are concerned with how to allocate limited energy, radio bandwidth, and other resources to maximize the value of each...

CS286r Computational Mechanism Design: Project Suggestions Spring, 2005 1 Class Projects (2008)

David C. Parkes, Deas Maxwell-dworkin, Satinder Singh, Dimah Yanovsky

The goal of the final project is to develop a deep understanding of an important research area, and, to the extent possible, to work on an open problem. You may also review an existing area of the...

Abstract (2008)

Online mechanism design (OMD) addresses the problem of sequential decision making in a stochastic environment with multiple self-interested agents. The goal in OMD is to make value-maximizing...

Research Note On the Optimality of Greedy Meta-Deliberation (2008)

Research Statement (2008)

We present a unified notation that captures many common models of deliberation for a resourcebounded agent in a time-critical environment. We analyze a greedy time-slicing meta-deliberation procedure...

An Options-Based Solution to the Sequential Auction Problem 1 (2008)

The Internet embodies a new paradigm of distributed open computer networks, in which entities—users and computational devices—are not cooperative, but self-interested, with private information...

Adam I. Juda, David C. Parkes

ICE: An Expressive Iterative Combinatorial Exchange ‡ (2008)

Benjamin Lubin, Adam I. Juda, Ruggiero Cavallo, Sébastien Lahaie, Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes

We present the design and analysis of the first fully expressive, iterative combinatorial exchange (ICE). The exchange incorporates a tree-based bidding language (TBBL) that is concise and expressive...

ABSTRACT (2008)

David C. Parkes, Combinenet Inc

Ad auctions are generating massive amounts of revenue for online search engines such as Google. Yet, the level of expressiveness provided to participants in ad auctions could be significantly...

Models for iterative multiattribute procurement auctions (2008)

David C. Parkes, Jayant Kalagnanam

Abstract (2008)

David C. Parkes, Deas Maxwell-dworkin, Satinder Singh, Dimah Yanovsky

Online mechanism design (OMD) addresses the problem of sequential decision making in a stochastic environment with multiple self-interested agents. The goal in OMD is to make value-maximizing...

On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values (2008)

Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes

Abstract. In a dynamic market, being able to update one’s value based on information available to other bidders currently in the market can be critical to having profitable transactions. This is...

An Economically-Principled Generative Model of AS Graph Connectivity ABSTRACT (2008)

Jacomo Corbo, Shaili Jain, Michael Mitzenmacher, David C. Parkes

We explore the problem of modeling Internet connectivity at the Autonomous System (AS) level and present an economically-principled dynamic model that reproduces key features of the AS graph...

Decentralized, Adaptive Resource Allocation for Sensor Networks (2008)

Geoffrey Mainl, David C. Parkes, Matt Welsh

This paper addresses the problem of resource allocation in sensor networks. We are concerned with how to allocate limited energy, radio bandwidth, and other resources to maximize the value of each...

Cooperative Multiagent Search for Portfolio Selection (2008)

Multi-Item Vickrey-Dutch Auctions (2008)

We present a new multiagent model for the multi-period portfolio selection problem. Individual agents receive a share of initial wealth, and follow an investment strategy that adjusts their portfolio...

The Tragedy of the Commons: Pricing Social Welfare in Multiagent Systems (2007)

Descending price auctions are adopted for goods that must be sold quickly and in private values environments, for instance in flower, fish, and tobacco auctions. In this paper, we introduce ex post...

The Santa Fe Bar Problem: A Study in Multiagent Learning (2007)

Markets offer an efficient and decentralized method of coordinating the actions of autonomous, self-interested agents. However, they fail in the presence of incentive conflicts between individual...

David C. Parkes, Debbie Steinig

We study the process of multiagent learning in the context of the "Santa Fe Bar Problem" (Arthur 1994). We imagine a system of bounded rational agents taking decisions within a repeated...

Margo Seltzer (2007)

Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes

We consider the problem of designing fast and strategyproof exchanges for dynamic resource allocation problems in distributed systems. The exchange is implemented as a sequence of auctions, with...

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION NOTICE (2007)

University of Pennsylvania, (2007)

This report has been submitted for publication outside of IBM and will probably be copyrighted if accepted for publication. It has been issued as a Research Report for early dissemination of its...

Abstract Cooperative Multiagent Search for Portfolio Selection (2007)

The generalized Vickrey auction (GVA) is a strategy-proof combinatorial auction, in which truthful bidding is the optimal strategy for an agent. In this paper we address a fundamental problem with...

Using Primal-Dual Algorithms ∗ (2007)

We present a new multiagent model for the multiperiod portfolio selection problem. Individual agents receive a share of initial wealth, and follow an investment strategy that adjusts their portfolio...

Mechanisms for Options: Solving the Composability Problem (2007)

The direct Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism requires solving underlying optimization problems of the main economy and of every “marginal ” economy. We show that VCG outcome can be...

Adam I. Juda, David C. Parkes

Abstract. Current auctions often expose bidding agents to two difficult, yet common, problems. First, bidding agents often have the opportunity to participate in successive auctions selling the same...

Approximately-Strategyproof and Tractable (2007)

Multi-unit Auctions, Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, Subhash Suri

We present an approximately-efficient and approximately-strategyproof auction mechanism for a single-good multi-unit allocation problem. The bidding language allows marginaldecreasing piecewise...

and (2007)

Harvard University, (2007)

We present a new multiagent model for the multiperiod portfolio selection problem. A system of cooperative agents divide initial wealth and follow individual worst-case optimal investment strategies...

ABSTRACT Faithfulness in Internet Algorithms (2007)

berg.

Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes, Laurent Massoulié

Proving or disproving faithfulness (a property describing robustness to rational manipulation in action as well as information revelation) is an appealing goal when reasoning about distributed...

General Terms (2007)

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION NOTICE (2007)

It is useful to prove that an implementation correctly follows a specification. But even with a provably correct implementation, given a choice, would a node choose to follow it? This paper explores...

ABSTRACT An Auction-Based Method for Decentralized Train Scheduling (2007)

This report has been submitted for publication outside of IBM and will probably be copyrighted if accepted for publication. It has been issued as a Research Report for early dissemination of its...

Chain: A dynamic double auction framework for matching patient agents (2007)

We present a computational study of an auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling. The method is well suited to the natural information and control structure of modern railroads. We...

Jonathan Bredin, David C. Parkes, Quang Duong

In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, two-sided market. A single commodity, such as a resource or a task, is...

Chain: A dynamic double auction framework for matching patient agents (2007)

Jonathan Bredin, David C. Parkes, Quang Duong

In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, two-sided market. A single commodity, such as a resource or a task, is...

Multi-Item Vickrey-Dutch Auctions (2007)

Chain: A dynamic double auction framework for matching patient agents (2007)

Descending price auctions are adopted for goods that must be sold quickly and in private values environments, for instance in flower, fish, and tobacco auctions. In this paper, we introduce ex post...

Jonathan Bredin, David C. Parkes, Quang Duong

In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, two-sided market. A single commodity, such as a resource or a task, is...

Efficient online mechanisms for persistent, periodically inaccessible self-interested agents (2007)

Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes, Satinder Singh

We consider the problem of implementing a system-optimal decision policy in the context of self-interested agents with private state in an uncertain world. Unique to our model is that we allow both...

Specifying and Monitoring Economic Environments using Rights and Obligations ∗ (2007)

Loizos Michael, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer

We provide a formal scripting language to capture the semantics of economic environments. The language is based on a set of well-defined design principles and makes explicit an agent’s rights, as...

An ironing-based approach to adaptive online mechanism design in single-valued domains (2007)

David C. Parkes, Quang Duong

Online mechanism design considers the problem of sequential decision making in a multi-agent system with self-interested agents. The agent population is dynamic and each agent has private information...

Cryptographic securities exchanges (2007)

Christopher Thorpe, David C. Parkes

Abstract. While transparency in financial markets should enhance liquidity, its exploitation by unethical and parasitic traders discourages others from fully embracing disclosure of their own...

Research Statement (2007)

1 Summary Research Statement (2007)

My research bridges between computer science and microeconomic theory, specifically around the intersections among multi-agent systems, game theory and optimization. The area of multiagent systems...

Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions (2006)

My research bridges between computer science and microeconomics, specifically around the intersections among multi-agent systems, game theory and optimization. The area of multi-agent systems, a...

David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Stuart M. Shieber, Christopher Thorpe

We present a practical protocol based on homomorphic cryptography for conducting provably fair sealed-bid auctions. The system preserves the secrecy of the bids, even after the announcement of...

Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions (2006)

David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Stuart M. Shieber, Christopher Thorpe

We present a practical protocol based on homomorphic cryptography for conducting provably fair sealed-bid auctions. The system preserves the secrecy of the bids, even after the announcement of...

MDPOP: Faithful distributed implementation of efficient social choice problems (2006)

Adrian Petcu, Boi Faltings, David C. Parkes

In the efficient social choice problem, the goal is to assign values, subject to side constraints, to a set of variables to maximize the total utility across a population of agents, where each agent...

Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions (2006)

David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Stuart M. Shieber, D. C. Parkes, M. O. Rabin, S. M. Shieber, ...

We present a practical system for conducting sealed-bid auctions that preserves the secrecy of the bids while providing for verifiable correctness and trustworthiness of the auction. The auctioneer...

Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions (2006)

David C. Parkes, David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Stuart M. Shieber, Christopher Thorpe, Michael O. Rabin, ...

Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions.

Auction design with costly preference elicitation (2005)

Auction design with costly preference elicitation (2005)

Abstract. We consider auction design in a setting with costly preference elicitation. We motivate the role of proxy agents, that are situated between bidders and the auction, and maintain partial...

Mirage: A Microeconomic Resource Allocation System for Sensornet Testbeds (2005)

Abstract. We consider auction design in a setting with costly preference elicitation. Well designed auctions can help to avoid unnecessary elicitation while determining efficient allocations. Careful...

Brent N. Chun, Philip Buonadonna, Alvin Auyoung, Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Jeffrey Shneidman, ...

technical challenges of wireless SensorNets. As the size and demand for these testbeds grow, resource management will become increasingly important to the effectiveness of these environments. In this...

Why Markets Could (But Don't Currently) Solve Resource Allocation Problems in Systems (2005)

Jeffrey Shneidman, Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Alvin Auyoung, Alex C. Snoeren, Amin Vahdat, ...

Using market mechanisms for resource allocation in distributed systems is not a new idea, nor is it one that has caught on in practice or with a large body of computer science research. Yet, projects...

Mirage: A Microeconomic Resource Allocation System for Sensornet Testbeds (2005)

Brent N. Chun, Philip Buonadonna, Alvin Auyoung, Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Jeffrey Shneidman, ...

resource specifications allow users to specify constraints on the types of resources they seek to acquire. For example, testbed users often need to specify constraints on per-node attributes. In...

TBBL: A Tree-Based Bidding Language for Iterative Combinatorial Exchanges (2005)

Ruggiero Cavallo David, David C. Parkes, Adam I. Juda, Adam Kirsch, Alex Kulesza, Sébastien Lahaie, ...

We present a novel tree-based logical bidding language, TBBL, for preference elicitation in combinatorial exchanges (CEs). TBBL provides new expressiveness for two-sided markets with agents that are...

More on the power of demand queries in combinatorial auctions: Learning atomic languages and handling incentives (2005)

Sébastien Lahaie, Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes

Query learning models from computational learning theory (CLT) can be adopted to perform elicitation in combinatorial auctions. Indeed, a recent elicitation framework demonstrated that the...

ICE: An iterative combinatorial exchange (2005)

David C. Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Adam Juda, Sébastien Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin, ...

We present the first design for a fully expressive iterative combinatorial exchange (ICE). The exchange incorporates a tree-based bidding language that is concise and expressive for CEs. Bidders...

An options-based method to solve the composability problem in sequential auctions (2004)

Adam I. Juda, David C. Parkes

Abstract. Current auctions often expose bidding agents to two difficult, yet common, problems. First, bidding agents often have the opportunity to participate in successive auctions selling the same...

Distributed implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms (2004)

Computational Resource Exchanges for Distributed Resource Allocation (2004)

Mechanism design (MD) provides a useful method to implement outcomes with desirable properties in systems with self-interested computational agents. One drawback, however, is that computation is...

Brent N. Chun, Chaki Ng, Jeannie Albrecht, David C. Parkes, Amin Vahdat

Appropriate abstractions, mechanisms, and policies for resource allocation is quickly emerging as the fundamental problem facing emerging computation and communication environments such as PlanetLab...

Trust-based mechanism design (2004)

Rajdeep K. Dash, Nicholas R. Jennings, David C. Parkes

developed powerful tools for analyzing decision making in systems with multiple autonomous actors. These tools, when tailored to computational settings, provide a foundation for building multiagent...

Using virtual markets to program global behavior in sensor networks (2004)

Geoff Mainl, Laura Kang, Sebastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes, Matt Welsh

This paper presents market-based macroprogramming (MBM), a new paradigm for achieving globally efficient behavior in sensor networks. Rather than programming the individual, low-level behaviors of...

Adaptive limited-supply online auctions (2004)

Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi, Robert Kleinberg, David C. Parkes

We study a limited-supply online auction problem, in which an auctioneer has k goods to sell and bidders arrive and depart dynamically. We suppose that agent valuations are drawn independently from...

Trust-based mechanism design (2004)

Rajdeep K. Dash, Nicholas R. Jennings, David C. Parkes

developed powerful tools for analyzing decision making in systems with multiple autonomous actors. These tools, when tailored to computational settings, provide a foundation for building multiagent...

Trust-based mechanism design (2004)

Rajdeep K. Dash, Nicholas R. Jennings, David C. Parkes

developed powerful tools for analyzing decision making in systems with multiple autonomous actors. These tools, when tailored to computational settings, provide a foundation for building multiagent...

Faithfulness in Internet Algorithms (2004)

Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes, Laurent Massoulie

Proving or disproving faithfulness (a property describing robustness to rational manipulation in action as well as information revelation) is an appealing goal when reasoning about distributed...

Hard-to-Manipulate VCG-Based Auctions (2004)

Saurabh Sanghvi David, David C. Parkes

Mechanism design provides a framework to solve distributed optimization problems in systems of self-interested agents. The combinatorial auction is one such problem, in which there is a set of...

GROWRANGE: Anytime VCG-Based Mechanisms (2004)

David Parkes Division, David C. Parkes

We introduce anytime mechanisms for distributed optimization with self-interested agents. Anytime mechanisms retain good incentive properties even when interrupted before the optimal solution is...

Specifying and Monitoring Market Mechanisms (2004)

Using Rights And, Loizos Michael, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer

We provide a formal scripting language to capture the semantics of market mechanisms. The language is based on a set of welldefined principles, and is designed to capture an agent's rights, as...

Applying Learning Algorithms to Preference Elicitation (2004)

Sebastien M. Lahaie, David C. Parkes

We consider the parallels between the preference elicitation problem in combinatorial auctions and the problem of learning an unknown function from learning theory. We show that learning algorithms...

Adaptive Limited-Supply Online Auctions (2004)

Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi, Robert Kleinberg, David C. Parkes

We study a limited-supply online auction problem, in which an auctioneer has k goods to sell and bidders arrive and depart dynamically. We suppose that agent valuations are drawn independently from...

Specifying and Monitoring Market Mechanisms (2004)

Using Rights And, Loizos Michael, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer

We provide a formal scripting language to capture the semantics of market mechanisms. The language is based on a set of welldefined principles, and is designed to capture an agent's rights, as...

A Simple Ascending Generalized Vickrey Auction (2004)

David Parkes Debasis, David C. Parkes, Debasis Mishra, Lyle H. Ungar

We design a simple ascending Vickrey auction for the combinatorial allocation problem.

Challenge Problem: Agent-Mediated Decentralized Information Mechanisms,” Agentcities: Challenges in Open Agent Environments (2003)

Strategyproof mechanisms for ad hoc network formation (2003)

Abstract. Pervasive computing, driven by faster, cheaper and smaller devices, and wireless networking technology, promises to make people perpetual users of a massive and decentralized computational...

C. Jason Woodard, David C. Parkes

Agents in a peer-to-peer system typically have incentives to influence its network structure, either to reduce their costs or to increase their ability to capture value. The problem is compounded...

Using redundancy to improve robustness of distributed mechanism implementations (2003)

Virtual Worlds: Fast and Strategyproof Auctions for Dynamic Resource Allocation (2003)

This paper introduces computation compatibility and communication compatibility as requirements for a distributed mechanism implementation. Just as payments are used to create incentive compatible...

Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Margo Seltzer

We consider the problem of designing fast and strategyproof auction mechanisms for dynamic resource allocation problems in distributed systems. We propose a scalable design for an exchange for data...

Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions (2003)

Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, Subhash Suri

We present an approximately-efficient and approximatelystrategyproof auction mechanism for a single-good multi-unit allocation problem. The bidding language in our auctions allows marginal-decreasing...

Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions (2003)

Aditya V. Sunderam, David C. Parkes

We consider the problem of minimizing preference elicitation in efficient multiattribute auctions, that support dynamic negotiation over non-price based attributes such as quality, time-of-delivery,...

Pricing WiFi at starbucks: issues in online mechanism design (2003)

Eric J. Friedman, David C. Parkes

We consider the problem of designing mechanisms for online problems in which agents arrive over time and the mechanism is unaware of the agent until the agent announces her arrival. Problems of this...

Rationality and Self-Interest in Peer to Peer Networks (2003)

Virtual Worlds: Fast and Strategyproof Auctions for Dynamic Resource Allocation (2003)

Much of the existing work in peer to peer networking assumes that users will follow prescribed protocols without deviation. This assumption ignores the user's ability to modify the behavior of...

Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Margo Seltzer

We consider the problem of designing fast and strategyproof auction mechanisms for dynamic resource allocation problems in distributed systems. We propose a scalable design for an exchange for data...

Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions (2003)

Aditya V. Sunderam, David C. Parkes

We consider the problem of preference elicitation in multiattribute auctions. Multiattribute auctions allow multilateral negotiation over non-price based attributes such as quality, timeof-delivery,...

Strategyproof Computing: Systems infrastructures for self-interested parties (2003)

Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Margo Seltzer

The widespread deployment of high-speed internet access is ushering in a new era of distributed computing, in which parties both contribute to a global pool of shared resources and access the pooled...

Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions (2003)

Aditya V. Sunderam, David C. Parkes

We consider the problem of preference elicitation in multiattribute auctions. Multiattribute auctions allow multilateral negotiation over non-price based attributes such as quality, timeof-delivery,...

Pricing WiFi at starbucks: issues in online mechanism design (2003)

Eric J. Friedman, David C. Parkes

We consider the problem of designing mechanisms for online problems in which agents re'rive over time and truthfully announce their an'ival. These problems are becoming extremely common in...

Strategyproof mechanisms for ad hoc network formation (2003)

C. Jason Woodard, David C. Parkes

Agents in a peer-to-peer system typically have incentives to influence its network structure, either to reduce their costs or to increase their ability to capture value. The problem is compounded...

Virtual Worlds: Fast and Strategyproof Auctions for Dynamic Resource Allocation (2003)

Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes

We consider the problem of designing fast and strategyproof exchanges for dynamic resource allocation problems in distributed systems. The exchange is implemented as a sequence of auctions, with...

An MDP-based approach to Online Mechanism Design (2003)

David C. Parkes, Satinder Singh

Online mechanism design (MD) considers the problem of providing incentives to implement desired system-wide outcomes in systems with self-interested agents that arrive and depart dynamically. Agents...

Overcoming rational manipulation in distributed mechanism implementations (2003)

Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes, Margo Seltzer

Distributed systems are increasingly made up of nodes governed by disparate self-interested parties. These parties can be modeled as rational (in a game theoretic sense) utility-maximizing players...

Computational Mechanism Design : A Call to Arms (2003)

Rajdeep K. Dash, Nicholas R. Jennings, David C. Parkes

ents adopt. Against this background, we examine the field of computational-mechanism design. CMD provides an elegant mathematical framework in which to study protocols that give the agents incentive...

An MDP-Based Approach to Online Mechanism Design (2003)

David C. Parkes, Satinder Singh

Online mechanism design considers the problem of providing incentives to implement desired system-wide outcomes in dynamic systems of selfinterested agents. An agent has private information about its...

Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Strategy Nash (2003)

William Walsh David, David C. Parkes, Rjarshi Das

Auctions define games of incomplete information for which it is often too hard to compute the exact Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Instead, the infinite strategy space is often populated with heuristic...

An MDP-Based Approach to Online Mechanism Design (2003)

David C. Parkes, Satinder Singh

Online mechanism design (MD) considers the problem of providing incentives to implement desired system-wide outcomes in systems with self-interested agents that arrive and depart dynamically.

An ascending-price generalized Vickrey auction (2002)

Price-based information certificates for minimal-revelation combinatorial auctions (2002)

A simple characterization of the equilibrium conditions required to compute Vickrey payments in the Combinatorial Allocation Problem leads to an ascending price Generalized Vickrey Auction. The...

Notes on indirect and direct implementations of core outcomes (2002)

Abstract. The equilibrium of the direct-revelation Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for combinatorial auctions requires every agent to provide complete information about its preferences. Not...

Approximately-Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Auctions (2002)

This note presents a partial characterization of the core outcome implemented in the ascendingproxy combinatorial auction, which is demonstrated to terminate at a core point intermediate between...

Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, Subhash Suri

We present a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for the single-good multi-unit auction problem. Our scheme is both approximately e#cient and approximately strategyproof. We consider both a...

Notes on indirect and direct implementations of core outcomes (2002)

An Ascending-Price Generalized Vickrey Auction,” Discussion paper (2002)

draft, comments very welcome!

Achieving budget-balance with vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges (2001)

A simple characterization of the equilibrium conditions required to compute Vickrey payments in the Combinatorial Allocation Problem leads to an ascending price Generalized Vickrey Auction. The...

Approximate and compensate: A method for risk-sensitive metadeliberation and continual computation (2001)

Generalized Vickrey mechanisms have received wide attention in the literature because they are efficient and strategyproof, i.e. truthful bidding is optimal whatever the bids of other agents. However...

Achieving budget-balance with vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges (2001)

We present a flexible procedure for a resource-bounded agent to allocate limited computational resources to on-line problem solving. Our APPROXIMATE AND COMPENSATE methodology extends a well-known...

Achieving budget-balance with vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges (2001)

Generalized Vickrey mechanisms have received wide attention in the literature because they are efficient and strategyproof, i.e. truthful bidding is optimal whatever the bids of other agents. However...

Achieving budget-balance with vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges (2001)

Generalized Vickrey mechanisms have received wide attention in the literature because they are efficient and strategyproof, i.e. truthful bidding is optimal whatever the bids of other agents. However...

An auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling (2001)

Generalized Vickrey mechanisms have received wide attention in the literature because they are efficient and strategyproof, i.e. truthful bidding is optimal whatever the bids of other agents. However...

Approximate and compensate: A method for risk-sensitive metadeliberation and continual computation (2001)

We present a computational study of an auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling. The method is well suited to the natural information and control structure of modern railroads. We...

Approximate and compensate: A method for risk-sensitive metadeliberation and continual computation (2001)

We present a flexible procedure for a resourcebounded agent to allocate limited computational resources to on-line problem solving. Our AP-PROXIMATE AND COMPENSATE methodology extends a well-known...

Multi-agent cooperative search for portfolio selection (2001)

We present a flexible procedure for a resourcebounded agent to allocate limited computational resources to on-line problem solving. Our AP-PROXIMATE AND COMPENSATE methodology extends a well-known...

Approximate and compensate: A method for risk-sensitive metadeliberation and continual computation (2001)

We present a new multiagent model for the multiperiod portfolio selection problem. A system of cooperative agents divide initial wealth and follow individual worst-case optimal investment strategies...

Approximate and compensate: A method for risk-sensitive metadeliberation and continual computation (2001)

We present a flexible procedure for a resourcebounded agent to allocate limited computational resources to on-line problem solving. Our AP-PROXIMATE AND COMPENSATE methodology extends a well-known...

Preventing strategic manipulation in iterative auctions: Proxy agents and price-adjustment (2000)

We present a flexible procedure for a resourcebounded agent to allocate limited computational resources to on-line problem solving. Our AP-PROXIMATE AND COMPENSATE methodology extends a well-known...

Iterative combinatorial auctions: theory and practice (2000)

Iterative auctions have many computational advantages over sealed-bid auctions, but can present new possibilities for strategic manipulation. We propose a two-stage technique to make iterative...

Optimal auction design for agents with hard valuation problems (1999)

Combinatorial auctions, which allow agents to bid directly for bundles of resources, are necessary for optimal auction-based solutions to resource allocation problems with agents that have...

Accounting for Cognitive Costs in On-line Auction Design (1999)

Abstract. As traditional commerce moves on-line more business transactions will be mediated by software agents, and the ability of agentmediated electronic marketplaces to e ciently allocate...

iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction (1999)

Abstract. Many auction mechanisms, including first and second price ascending and sealed bid auctions, have been proposed and analyzed in the economics literature. We compare the usefulness of...

Optimal auction design for agents with hard valuation problems (1999)

dparkes(unagi.cis.upenn.edu Standard auction mechanisms often break down in important e-commerce applications, where agents demand bundles of complementary resources, i.e. "I only want B if...

Accounting for Cognitive Costs in On-line Auction Design (1999)

Abstract. As traditional commerce moves on-line more business transactions will be mediated by software agents, and the ability of agentmediated electronic marketplaces to e ciently allocate...

David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar, Dean P. Foster

Many auction mechanisms, including first and second price ascending and sealed bid auctions, have been proposed and analyzed in the economics literature. We compare the usefulness of different...

Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems (1999)

iBundle: An Efficient Ascending Price Bundle Auction (1999)

As traditional commerce moves on-line more business transactions will be mediated by software agents, and the ability of agentmediated electronic marketplaces to efficiently allocate resources will...

Bounded Rationality (1999)

Standard auction mechanisms often break down in important e-commerce applications, where agents demand bundles of complementary resources, i.e. "I only want B if I also get A". This paper...

Cost and Trust Issues in On-Line Auctions (1998)

Russell and Wefald (Russell & Wefald 1991) propose that the study of resource-bounded intelligent systems should be central to artificial intelligence. A resource-bounded agent acting in a...

Lyle H. Ungar, David C. Parkes, Dean P. Foster

Abstract. Many auction mechanisms, including rst and second-price ascending and sealed-bid auctions, have been proposed and analyzed in the economics literature. We compare the usefulness of di erent...

Cost and Trust Issues in On-Line Auctions (1998)

Lyle H. Ungar, David C. Parkes, Dean P. Foster

Many auction mechanisms, including first and second-price ascending and sealed-bid auctions, have been proposed and analyzed in the economics literature. We compare the usefulness of different...

Rediscovering Cooperative Work'. Keynote Address (1989)

Rediscovering Cooperative Work'. Keynote Address (1989)

We consider an economy with one seller and m selfish buyers. The seller has n indivisible heterogeneous items to sell and each buyer wants at most one of those items. Buyers have private, independent...

Multiagent Cooperative Search for Portfolio Selection

Descending price auctions are adopted for goods that must be sold quickly and in private values environments, for instance in flower, fish, and tobacco auctions. In this paper, we introduce ex post...

Multiagent Cooperative Search for Portfolio Selection

We present a new multiagent model for the multiperiod portfolio selection problem. Individual agents each receive a share of initial wealth, and follow a worst-case optimal sequence of portfolio...

Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions

We present a new multiagent model for the multiperiod portfolio selection problem. Individual agents each receive a share of initial wealth, and follow an investment strategy to adjust their...