An economists perspective on multi-agent learning (2008)
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
www.elsevier.com/locate/artint We comment on the Shoham, Powers, and Grenager survey of multi-agent learning and game theory, emphasizing that some of their categories are important for economics and...
All the Interesting Questions, Almost All the Wrong Reasons (2008)
Michele Boldrin, David K. Levine
Here is the bottomline: JMK got his economic theory wrong, and the facts too. But, and not a minor feat, he got all his questions and his guess about the future right. This may prove that while the...
2007b] “A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays,” mimeo (2008)
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
1 We thank Mihai Manea for careful proofreading. NSF grants SES-03-14713 and SES-04-26199 provided
Michele Boldrin, David K. Levine
The only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to put its hands on. [Dissent by Jackson J. in
2006] “Perfect Public Equilibrium when Players are Patient,” forthcoming (2008)
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Satoru Takahashi
ABSTRACT. The limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game as the discount factor goes to one is characterized, with examples, even when the full-dimensionality condition fails.
CAN A TURING PLAYER IDENTIFY ITSELF? (2008)
David K. Levine, Balázs Szentes, Jel Classification
ABSTRACT. We show that the problem of whether two Turing Machines are functionally equivalent is undecidable and explain why this is significant for the theory of repeated play and evolution.
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 1 (2008)
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Eduardo Faingold, Yuliy Sannikov
Abstract: In a repeated game with imperfect public information, the set of equilibria depends on the way that the distribution of public signals varies with the players ’ actions. Recent research...
An economists perspective on multi-agent learning (2008)
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
In their wide-ranging and provocative discussion, Shoham, Powers and Grenager (SPG) survey several large literatures from computer science and game theory, and identify five categories of questions...
Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions (2008)
Thomas J. Holmes, David K. Levine, James A. Schmitz
When considering the incentive of a monopolist to adopt an innovation, the textbook model assumes that it can instantaneously and seamlessly introduce the new technology. In fact, firms often face...
Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game 1 (2007)
Phillip Johnson, David K. Levine, Wolfgang Pesendorfer
Abstract: In an environment of anonymous random matching, Kandori [1992] showed that with a sufficiently rich class of simple information systems the folk theorem holds. We specialize to a...
Evolution and Information in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 1 (2007)
Phillip Johnson, David K. Levine, Wolfgang Pesendorfer
Abstract: In an environment of anonymous random matching, Kandori [1992] showed that with a sufficiently rich class of simple information systems the folk theorem holds. We specialize to the...
The Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation 1 (2007)
David K. Levine, Wolfgang Pesendorfer
random innovations into a model of evolutionary adjustment enables selection among Nash equilibria. Key to this result is that poorly performing strategies may be introduced in sufficient numbers...
and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (2007)
Michele Boldrin, David K. Levine
ABSTRACT __________________________________________________________________________ We construct a competitive model of innovation and growth under constant returns to scale. Previous models of...
EFFICIENCY AND OBSERVABILITY WITH LONG-RUN AND (2007)
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
We present a general algorithm for computing the limit, as- 1, of the set of payoffs of perfect public equilibria of repeated games with long-run and short-run players, allowing for the possibility...
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 1 (2007)
Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of Bayesian games. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations where players are learning about...
2002), “Factor Saving Innovation (2007)
Michele Boldrin, David K. Levine
It has been argued that concave models exhibit less “endogeneity of growth ” than models with increasing returns to scale. Here we study a simple model of factor saving technological improvement...
Reputation with Noisy Precommitment 1 (2007)
David K. Levine, Cesar Martinelli
Abstract: We investigate a game in which there is a long-run player who has private information about how long will the game last, who must precommit to an action, and who faces a sequence of...
Proposed Running Head: Castle on the Hill Forthcoming: Review of Economic Dynamics (2007)
Abstract: A simple example of a stochastic game with irreversibility is studied and it is shown that the folk theorem fails in a robust way. In this game of Castle on the Hill, for a broad range of...
Learning and the Stock Flow Model 1 (2007)
it electronically or in print, provided it is distributed in its entirety, including this copyright notice. prepared for Trento Conference in honor of Robert Clower Abstract: We consider an...
Reputation and Distribution in a Gift Giving Game 1 (2007)
it electronically or in print, provided it is distributed in its entirety, including this copyright notice. Abstract: The folk theorem allows a very unequal division between players. In nonrepeated...
An Easier Way to Calibrate 1 (2007)
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
© This document is copyrighted by the authors. You may freely reproduce and distribute it electronically or in print, provided it is distributed in its entirety, including this copyright notice. 1...
Jel Classification C, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
Abstract: We study a variation of fictitious play, in which the probability of each action is an exponential function of that action’s utility against the historical frequency of opponents ’...
Conditional Universal Consistency 1 (2007)
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
© This document is copyrighted by the authors. You may freely reproduce and distribute it electronically or in print, provided it is distributed in its entirety, including this copyright notice....
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (2007)
Michele Boldrin, David K. Levine
Market booms are often followed by dramatic falls. To explain this requires an asymmetry in the underlying shocks. A straightforward model of technological progress generates asymmetries that are...
Running Title: Growth and Market Crashes (2007)
Bill Zame, Jose Wynne, Jose Wynne, Michele Boldrin, Michele Boldrin, David K. Levine, ...
9617899 and the UCLA Academic Senate for support. The paper benefited greatly from comments by two
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 1 (2007)
Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of Bayesian games. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations where players are learning about...
When is Reputation Bad? (2007)
Jeffrey Ely Drew, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
In traditional reputation theory, reputation is good for the longrun player. In "Bad Reputation," Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper...
Risk Sharing And Market Incompleteness (2007)
David Levine And, David K. Levine, R. Zame
This version fixes several errors in the published version.
When is Reputation Bad? (2007)
Jeffrey Ely Drew, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
In traditional reputation theory, reputation is good for the long-run player. In "Bad Reputation," Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper...
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With (2007)
Communication And Approximate, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
This paper shows how communication can yield to a Nash-threats folk theorem in two-player games with "almost public" information but without independent signals
Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi (2007)
Drew Fudenberg And, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
The code of Hammurabi specified a "trial by surviving in the river" as a way of deciding whether an accusation was true. This system is puzzling for two reasons. First, it is based on a...
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals (2007)
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
Abstract: We study repeated games with imperfect public information when the public signal corresponds to the aggregate of many discrete events such as sales over a small time period. The set of...
Self-Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique 1 (2007)
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
Abstract: We examine the role of off-path “superstitions ” in macro-economics, and show how a false belief about off-path play is the key element underlying both the Lucas Critique and the...
The Paradox of Voter Participation: A Laboratory Study (2006)
David K. Levine, Thomas R. Palfrey
It is widely believed that rational choice theory is grossly inconsistent with empirical observations about voter turnout. We report the results of an experiment designed to test the voter turnout...
Self Control, Risk Aversion, and the Allais Paradox (2006)
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Glenn Harrison, John Kagel, Drazen Prelec
We thank Daniel Benjamin and Jesse Shapiro for helpful comments and a very
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, (2006)
Timothy J. Kehoe, David K. Levine
Typical models of bankruptcy and collateral rely on incomplete asset markets. In fact, bankruptcy and collateral add contingencies to asset markets. In some models, these contingencies can be used by...
andUniversityofMinnesota (2005)
Michele Boldrin, David K. Levine
Intellectual property protection involves a trade-off between the undesirability of monopoly and the desirable encouragement of creation and innovation. As the scale of the market increases, due...
Department of Economics, UCLA, and Canyon Analysts. (2005)
David K. Levine, Robert A. Levine
14713 for financial support.
Why Mickey Mouse is Not Subject to Congestion: A Letter on 'Eldred and Fair Use' (2004)
Boldrin, Michele, Levine, David K
In "Eldred and Fair Use," Posner comments that awarding a monopoly over Mickey Mouse avoids the congestion problem that occurs with open access highways. Is the public domain a commons like an open...
Why Mickey Mouse is Not Subject to Congestion: A Letter on 'Eldred and Fair Use' (2004)
Boldrin, Michele, Levine, David K
In "Eldred and Fair Use," Posner comments that awarding a monopoly over Mickey Mouse avoids the congestion problem that occurs with open access highways. Is the public domain a commons like an open...
Why Mickey Mouse is Not Subject to Congestion: A Letter on 'Eldred and Fair Use' (2004)
Boldrin, Michele, Levine, David K
In "Eldred and Fair Use," Posner comments that awarding a monopoly over Mickey Mouse avoids the congestion problem that occurs with open access highways. Is the public domain a commons like an open...
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 1 (2004)
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
Abstract: We propose that a simple “dual-self ” model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regularities, including the apparent time-inconsistency that has motivated models of...
The Brother in Law Effect 1 (2004)
David K. Levine, Federico Weinschelbaum, Felipe Zurita
Abstract: Ordinarily labor market equilibrium implies that the marginal worker is indifferent to employment, and that the employer is indifferent between equally productive employees. When the...
Rent-Seeking and Innovation (2003)
Michele Boldrin, David K. Levine
Innovations and their adoption are the keys to growth and development. Innovations are less socially useful, but more profitable for the innovator, when they are adopted slowly and the innovator...
The Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation (2002)
We study when cooperation and conflict emerge in a class of "folk theorem" games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma. We make use of two simple ideas: existing strategies are more likely to be imitated...
Lotteries, Sunspots, and Incentive Constraints (2002)
Timothy J. Kehoe, David K. Levine, Edward C. Prescott
We study a prototypical class of exchange economies with private information and indivisibilities. We establish an equivalence between lottery equilibria and sunspot equilibria and show that the...
Does market incompleteness matter (2002)
David K. Levine, William R. Zame, We Thank Fern, O Alvarez, Patrick Bolton, Jacques Dreze, ...
four referees for comments. We are especially indebted to a referee who found many slips and to Kichool Park who helped us fix them. We thank the National Science Foundation and the UCLA Academic...
Perfectly Competitive Innovation (2002)
Michele Boldrin, David K. Levine
We construct a competitive model of innovation and growth under constant returns to scale. Previous models of growth under constant cannot model technological innovation. Current models of endogenous...
The Case Against Intellectual Property (2002)
Michele Boldrin And, Michele Boldrin, David K. Levine
Introduction According to a common argument, the presence of strong intellectual property rights spurs innovation, which leads to higher economic growth and increasing benefits for all. The argument...
Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population (2000)
David K. Levine, Wolfgang Pesendorfer
: Kandori, Mailath and Rob [1993] and Young [1993] showed how introducing random innovations into a model of evolutionary adjustment enables selection among Nash equilibria. Key to this result is...
The Slippery Slope of Concession 1 (2000)
Jack Hirshleifer, Michele Boldrin, David K. Levine
Abstract: We show that with common knowledge and a common rate of time preference, the potential loser can always avoid wasteful conflict through a time-consistent series of small concessions. We...
Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game (1999)
Phillip Johnson, David K. Levine, Wolfgang Pesendorfer
: In an environment of anonymous random matching with a sufficiently rich class of information systems, Kandori [1992] showed that the folk theorem holds. We examine a similar setting with a...
Maintaining a reputation against a patient opponent (1996)
Celentani, Marco [celentan], Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David K., Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
Publicado
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 1 (1996)
Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of games with a move by Nature. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations where players are...
BalancedBudget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information,” mimeo (1995)
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Eric Maskin
Abstract: We examine mechanism design with transferable utility and budget balance, using techniques we developed for the study of repeated games. We show that with independent types, budget balance...
Cesar Martinelli, Cesar Martinelli, Jack Hirshleifer, Joseph Ostroy, Mariano Tommasi, Michael Wallerstein, ...
Maintaining a reputation against a long-lived opponent (1966)
Marco Celentani, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
© This document is copyrighted by the authors. You may freely reproduce and distribute it electronically or in print, provided it is distributed in its entirety, including this copyright notice. 1.
Superstition and Rational Learning
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
We argue that some, but not all, superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players are patient, and illustrate our argument with an example inspired by the Code of Hammurabi. The code...
A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
We propose that a simple ?dual-self? model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regularities, including the apparent time inconsistency that has motivated models of quasi-hyperbolic...
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals-super-*
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
We study repeated games with frequent actions and frequent imperfect public signals, where the signals are aggregates of many discrete events, such as sales or tasks. The high-frequency limit of the...
THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF CONCESSION
JACK HIRSHLEIFER, MICHELE BOLDRIN, DAVID K LEVINE
"We show that with common knowledge and a common rate of time preference, the potential loser can always avoid wasteful conflict through a time-consistent series of small concessions. We examine how...
The Theory of Learning in Games
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and why equilibrium arises is...
MARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
Michele Boldrin, David K. Levine
Intellectual property (IP) protection involves a trade-off between the undesirability of monopoly and the desirable encouragement of creation and innovation. Optimal policy depends on the relative...
Boldrin,Michele, Levine,David K.
‘Intellectual property’ – patents and copyrights – have become controversial. We witness teenagers being sued for ‘pirating’ music – and we observe AIDS patients in Africa dying due to...
Why Mickey Mouse is Not Subject to Congestion: A Letter on 'Eldred and Fair Use'
Michele Boldrin, David K. Levine
In “Eldred and Fair Use,” Posner comments that awarding a monopoly over Mickey Mouse avoids the congestion problem that occurs with open access highways. Is the public domain a commons like an...