Flexibility as an instrument in digital rights management (2009)
Dirk Bergemann, Thomas Eisenbach, Joan Feigenbaum, Scott Shenker
We consider the optimal design of ‡exible use in a digital-rights-management policy. The basic model considers a single distributor of digital goods and a continuum of consumers. Each consumer can...
2007): \Robust Monopoly Pricing (2009)
Dirk Bergemann, Karl Schlag, Dirk Bergemann, Karl Schlag
We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. In the robust version, the seller faces model uncertainty and only knows that the true...
2007a): \Belief Free Incomplete Information Games (2009)
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
We consider the following belief free solution concepts for games with incomplete information: (i) incomplete information rationalizability, (ii) incomplete information correlated equilibrium and...
2006): \Information in Mechanism Design (2009)
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
We survey the recent literature on the role of information in mechanism design. First, we discuss an emerging literature on the role of endogenous payo and strategic information for the design and...
2001): \Robust Mechanism Design (2009)
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying implementation on richer type spaces, with...
2001): \Robust Mechanism Design (2009)
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Eep Baliga, Matt Jackson, ...
The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying implementation on richer type spaces. We ask...
2007): \Robust Monopoly Pricing (2009)
Dirk Bergemann, Karl Schlag, Dirk Bergemann, Karl Schlag
We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. In the robust version of the problem the seller only knows that demand will be in a...
Robust virtual implementation (2009)
Dirk Bergemann; Department Of Economics, Yale University, Stephen Morris; Department Of Economics, Princeton University
In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs...
Robust virtual implementation (2009)
Dirk Bergemann; Department Of Economics, Yale University, Stephen Morris; Department Of Economics, Princeton University
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by...
Dynamic Pricing of New Experience Goods (2008)
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki, Cowles Foundation, Paper No, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki
We develop a dynamic model of experience goods pricing with independent private valuations. We show that the optimal paths of sales and prices can be described in terms of a simple dichotomy. In a...
Venture Capital and Sequential Investments (2008)
Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege, Liang Peng
We analyze sequential investment decisions in an innovative project that depend on the investor’s information about the project failure risk and its potential …nal value. We consider the feedback...
The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism (2008)
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki, David Parkes, Ro Pavan, ...
We consider truthful implementation of the socially e ¢ cient allocation in an independent private-value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable...
Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms (2008)
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with...
STRATEGIC DISTINGUISHABILITY AND ROBUST VIRTUAL IMPLEMENTATION By (2008)
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payo ¤ types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs...
ROBUST IMPLEMENTATION IN DIRECT MECHANISMS By (2008)
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Dirk Bergemann Y, Stephen Morris Z, Ilya Segal, Daniel Spielman, ...
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social...
Dirk Bergemann, Karl H. Schlag, Cowles Foundation, Paper No
complete information and the realized profit under incomplete information. The regret of the seller can be positive for two reasons: (i) the buyer has a low valuation relative to the price and hence...
Dirk Bergemann, Karl H. Schlag, Dirk Bergemann, Karl H. Schlag
We consider the problem of pricing a single object when the seller has only minimal information about the true valuation of the buyer. Speci cally, the seller only knows the support of the possible...
with an application to Robust Virtual Implementation (2007)
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payo ¤ types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs...
The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation (2007)
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
We consider the role of the common prior for robust implementation in an environment with interdependent values. Speci cally, we investigate a model of public good provision which allows for negative...
Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism (2007)
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
We consider truthful implementation of the socially e cient allocation in a dynamic private value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable...
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
We consider an single object auction environment with interdependent valuations and a generalized Vickrey-Clark-Groves allocation mechanism that allocates the object almost e ¢ ciently in a strict...
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. We identify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and- in economic environments-su ¢ cient for...
Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions ∗ (2007)
Dirk Bergemann, Xianwen Shi, Juuso Välimäki, Dirk Bergemann, Xianwen Shi, Juuso Välimäki
We consider an auction environment with interdependent values. Each bidder can learn her payoff type through costly information acquisition. We contrast the socially optimal decision to acquire...
Dynamic pricing of new experience goods (2006)
Bergemann, Dirk, Välimäki, Juuso
We develop a dynamic model of experience goods pricing with independent private valuations. We show that the optimal paths of sales and prices can be described in terms of a simple dichotomy. In a...
Dynamic price competition (2006)
Bergemann, Dirk, Välimäki, Juuso
We consider the model of price competition for a single buyer among many sellers in a dynamic environment. The surplus from each trade is allowed to depend on the path of previous purchases, and as a...
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki
Information in Mechanism Design* We survey the recent literature on the role of information in mechanism design. First, we discuss...
Abstract E cient Recommender Systems (2006)
Dirk Bergemann, Deran Ozmen, Dirk Bergemann
We study the e cient allocation of buyers in the presence of recommender systems. A recommender system a ects the market in two ways: (i) it creates value by reducing product uncertainty for the...
Efficient Dynamic Auctions* (2006)
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki
We consider the truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in a dynamic private...
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki
Bandit Problems* We survey the literature on multiarmed bandit models and their applications in economics. The multiarmed bandit problem is a statistical decision model ...
Abstract Optimal Pricing with Recommender Systems (2006)
Dirk Bergemann, Deran Ozmen, Dirk Bergemann, Deran Ozmen
We study optimal pricing in the presence of recommender systems. A recommender system a ects the market in two ways: (i) it creates value by reducing product uncertainty for the customers and hence...
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Vijay Krishna, Tom Palfrey, ...
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social...
E ¢ cient Dynamic Auctions (2006)
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki
We consider the truthful implementation of the socially e ¢ cient allocation in a dynamic private value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We show that a suitable...
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social...
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
We survey the literature on multi-armed bandit models and their applications in economics. The multi-armed bandit problem is a sta-tistical decision model of an agent trying to optimize his decisions...
www.elsevier.com/locate/geb Ex post implementation ✩ (2006)
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Cowles Foundation, Paper No, Dirk Bergemann A, Stephen Morris B
We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. We identify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and—in economic environments—sufficient...
Robust Monopoly Pricing: The Case of Regret (2005)
BERGEMANN, Dirk, SCHLAG, Karl H.
http://www.iue.it/PUB/ECO2005-10.pdf
Robust Monopoly Pricing: The Case of Regret (2005)
BERGEMANN, Dirk, SCHLAG, Karl H.
http://www.iue.it/PUB/ECO2005-10.pdf
Robust Monopoly Pricing: The Case of Regret (2005)
BERGEMANN, Dirk, SCHLAG, Karl H.
http://www.iue.it/PUB/ECO2005-10.pdf
Robust mechanism design (2005)
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Preliminary and incomplete The implementation literature is often criticized because the mechanisms do not seem to be robust to assumed features of the underlying environment. This paper explores one...
Robust implementation: The role of large type space, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No (2005)
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with a social choice function. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that...
Robust Monopoly Pricing: The Case of Regret (2005)
Dirk Bergemann, Karl Schlag, Dirk Bergemann, Karl Schlag
We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. The robust version of the problem is distinct in two aspects: (i) the seller minimizes...
The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping (2005)
Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege, Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege, Godfrey Keller, Dima Leshchinskii, ...
This paper considers the …nancing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success. We distinguish between two …nancing modes, namely...
Preliminary Comments Welcome (2005)
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki, Cowles Foundation, Discussion Paper No, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
We survey the recent literature on the role of information for mechanism design. We specif-ically consider the role of endogeneity of and robustness to private information in mechanism design. We...
Towards an Economic Analysis of Trusted Systems (2004)
Dirk Bergemann, Scott Shenker, Joan Feigenbaum, Jonathan Smith
this paper was completed while he was at the Univ. of Pennsylvania
Monopoly Pricing of Experience Goods (2004)
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki
In this paper, we develop a model of experience goods pricing with independent private valuations. We show that the optimal paths of sales and prices take qualitatively di¤erent shapes for di¤erent...
Monopoly Pricing of Experience Goods (2004)
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki
We develop a dynamic model of experience goods pricing with independent private valuations. We show that the optimal paths of sales and prices can be described in terms of a simple dichotomy. In a...
Information acquisition and efficient mechanism design (2002)
Bergemann, Dirk, Välimäki, Juuso
We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists that...
Strategic buyers and privately observed prices (2002)
Bergemann, Dirk, Valimaki, Juuso
A model of finitely repeated price competition between two sellers with differentiated goods and a large buyer is analyzed. The set of pure strategy sequential equilibria is investigated under public...
Entry and verticial differentiation (2002)
Bergemann, Dirk, Valimaki, Jusso
This paper analyzes the entry of new products into vertically differentiated markets where an entrant and an incumbent compete in quantities. The value of the new product is initially uncertain and...
The Value of Benchmarking ∗. (2002)
Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege, Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege
The authors would like to thank Dima Leshchinskii and participants at the Tilburg University conference
Information structures in optimal auctions (2001)
Bergemann, Dirk, Pesendorfer, Martin
A seller wishes to sell an object to one of multiple bidders. The valuations of the bidders are privately known. We consider the joint design problem in which the seller can decide the accuracy by...
Information structures in optimal auctions (2001)
Bergemann, Dirk, Pesendorfer, Martin
A seller wishes to sell an object to one of multiple bidders. The valuations of the bidders are privately known. We consider the joint design problem in which the seller can decide the accuracy by...
Stationary multi-choice bandit problems (2001)
Bergemann, Dirk, Valimaki, Juuso
This note shows that the optimal choice of k simultaneous experiments in a stationary multi-armed bandit problem can be characterized in terms of the Gittins index of each arm. The index...
Information structures in optimal auctions (2001)
Dirk Bergemann, Martin Pesendorfer, Dirk Bergemann, Martin Pesendorfer
A seller wishes to sell an object to one of multiple bidders. The valuations of the bidders are privately known. We consider the joint design problem in which the seller can decide the accuracy by...
Experimentation in markets (2000)
Bergemann, Dirk, Valimaki, Juuso
We present a model of entry and exit with Bayesian learning and price competition. A new product of initially unknown quality is introduced in the market, and purchases of the product yield...
Learning and strategic pricing (1996)
Bergemann, Dirk, Valimaki, Juuso
We consider the situation where a single consumer buys a stream of goods from different sellers over time. The true value of each seller's product to the buyer is initially unknown. Additional...
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. Weidentify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and -- in economic environments -- sufficient...
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying implementation on richer type spaces, with...
Flexibility as an Instrument in Digital Rights Management
Dirk Bergemann, Thomas Eisenbach, Joan Feigenbaum, Scott Shenker
We consider the optimal design of flexible use in a digital-rights-management policy. The basic model considers a single distributor of digital goods and a continuum of consumers. Each consumer can...
Entry and Vertical Differentiation
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
This paper analyzes the entry of new products into vertically differentiated markets where an entrant and an incumbent compete in quantities. The value of the new product is initially uncertain and...
The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping
This paper considers the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success. The uncertainty about future success gradually...
We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic model with multiple research stages, where time and investment needed to meet each benchmark are unknown. The allocation of funds is subject...
Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with a social choice function. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that...
Market Experimentation and Pricing
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
We present a continuous-time model of Bayesian learning in a duopolistic market. Initially the value of one product offered is unknown to the market. The market participants learn more about the true...
Market Diffusion with Two-Sided Learning
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
The diffusion of a new product of uncertain value is analyzed in a duopolistic market in continuous time. The two sides of the market, buyers and sellers, learn the true value of the new product over...
Stationary Multi Choice Bandit Problems
This note shows that the optimal choice of k simultaneous experiments in a stationary multi-armed bandit problem can be characterized in terms of the Gittins index of each arm. The index...
Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists which...
The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping
This paper considers the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success. We distinguish between two financing modes, namely...
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
We consider the model of price competition for a single buyer among many sellers in a dynamic environment. The surplus from each trade is allowed to depend on the path of previous purchases, and as a...
Monopoly Pricing of Experience Goods
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
We develop a dynamic model of experience goods pricing with independent private valuations. We show that the optimal paths of sales and prices can be described in terms of a simple dichotomy. In a...
Optimal Pricing with Recommender Systems
We study optimal pricing in the presence of recommender systems. A recommender system affects the market in two ways: (i) it creates value by reducing product uncertainty for the customers and hence...
Information Structures in Optimal Auctions
Bergemann, Dirk, Pesendorfer, Martin
A seller wishes to sell an object to one of multiple bidders. The valuations of the bidders are privately known. We consider the joint design problem in which the seller can decide the accuracy by...
Information in Mechanism Design
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
We survey the recent literature on the role of information for mechanism design. We specifically consider the role of endogeneity of and robustness to private information in mechanism design. We view...
Information in Mechanism Design
Bergemann, Dirk, Välimäki, Juuso
We survey the recent literature on the role of information in mechanism design. First, we discuss an emerging literature on the role of endogenous payoff and strategic information for the design and...
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying mechanism design on richer type spaces....
We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. In the robust version of the problem the seller only knows that demand will be in a...
Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social...
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
We present a model of entry and exit with Bayesian learning and price competition. A new product of initially unknown quality is introduced in the market, and purchases of the product yield...
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying implementation on richer type spaces. We ask...
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
We survey the literature on multi-armed bandit models and their applications in economics. The multi-armed bandit problem is a statistical decision model of an agent trying to optimize his decisions...
Information in Mechanism Design
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
We survey the recent literature on the role of information in mechanism design. First, we discuss an emerging literature on the role of endogenous payoff and strategic information for the design and...
The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping
We consider the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success. We distinguish between two financing modes, namely relationship...
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
We consider the truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in a dynamic private value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We show that a suitable...
We study the efficient allocation of buyers in the presence of recommender systems. A recommender system affects the market in two ways: (i) it creates value by reducing product uncertainty for the...
An Ascending Auction for Independent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
We consider an single object auction environment with interdependent valuations and a generalized Vickrey-Clark-Groves allocation mechanism that allocates the object almost efficiently in a strict ex...
Entry and Innovation in Vertically Differentiated Markets
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
This paper analyzes the optimal entry into experience goods markets with vertically differentiated buyers. We consider the case where the value of the new product is imperfectly know, but common to...
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
We consider a general model of dynamic common agency with symmetric information. We focus on Markov perfect equilibria and characterize theequilibrium set for a refinement of the Markov perfect...
Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms"
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social...
Strategic Distinguishability with an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs...
Dynamic Pricing of New Experience Goods
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki
We develop a dynamic model of experience goods pricing with independent private valuations. We show that the optimal paths of sales and prices can be described in terms of a simple dichotomy. In a...
Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in a dynamic private value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable...
Bergemann, Dirk, Valimaki, Juuso
We present a model of entry and exit with Bayesian learning and price competition. A new product of initially unknown quality is introduced in the market, and purchases of the product yield...
Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists that...
Information Structures in Optimal Auctions
Dirk Bergemann, Martin Pesendorfer
A seller wishes to sell an object to one of multiple bidders. The valuations of the bidders are privately known. We consider the joint design problem in which the seller can decide the accuracy by...
Entry and Vertical Differentiation
Dirk Bergemann, Valimaki Juuso
This paper analyzes the entry of new products into vertically differentiated markets where an entrant and an incumbent compete in quantities. The value of the new product is initially uncertain and...
Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
A model of repeated price competition with large buyers is analyzed. The sellers are allowed to offer different prices to different buyers and the buyers act strategically. The set of subgame perfect...
Entry and Innovation in Vertically Differentiated Markets
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
This paper analyzes the optimal entry into experience goods markets with vertically differentiated buyers. We consider the case where the value of the new product is imperfectly known, but common to...
We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. In the robust version of the problem the seller only knows that demand will be in a...
Dirk Bergemann, Karl H. Schlag
We consider the problem of pricing a single object when the seller has only minimal information about the true valuation of the buyer. Specifically, the seller only knows the support of the possible...
Strategic Distinguishability and Robust Virtual Implementation
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs...
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
We present a model of entry and exit with Bayesian learning and price competition. The value of the new product is initially unknown in the market, but purchases of the product yield information on...
Belief Free Incomplete Information Games
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
We consider the following belief free solution concepts for games with incomplete information: (i) incomplete information rationalizability, (ii) incomplete information correlated equilibrium and...
The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
We consider the role of the common prior for robust implementation in an environment with interdependent values. Specifically, we investigate a model of public good provision which allows for...
Learning and Strategic Pricing
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
We consider the situation where a single consumer buys a stream of goods from different sellers over time. The true value of each seller's product to the buyer is initially unknown. Additional...
Learning and Strategic Pricing.
Bergemann, Dirk, Valimaki, Juuso
The authors consider a single consumer buying a stream of goods from different sellers over time. The true value of each seller's product is initially unknown. Additional information is obtained by...
Market Diffusion with Two-Sided Learning
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
We analyze the diffusion of a new product of uncertain value in a duopolistic market. Both sides of the market, buyers and sellers, learn the true value of the new product from experiments with it....
We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic model with multiple research stages, where time and investment needed to meet each benchmark are unknown. The allocation of funds is subject...
Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard and Learning
We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic agency model. The value of the venture project is initially uncertain and more information arrives by developing the project. The allocation...
The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping
This Paper considers the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success. The uncertainty about future success diminishes...
Robust Monopoly Pricing: The Case of Regret
We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. The robust version of the problem is distinct in two aspects: (i) the seller minimizes...
Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions
Dirk Bergemann, Xianwen Shi, Juuso Valimaki
We consider an auction environment with interdependent values. Each bidder can learn her payoff type through costly information acquisition. We contrast the socially optimal decision to acquire...
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
We consider the model of price competition for a single buyer among many sellers in a dynamic environment. The surplus from each trade is allowed to depend on the path of previous purchases, and as a...
Stephen Morris, Dirk Bergemann
The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying implementation on richer type spaces, with...
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki
We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in an independent private-value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable...
Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with...
Bergemann, Dirk, Morris, Stephen
We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. We identify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and--in economic environments--sufficient for...
The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
We consider the role of the common prior for robust implementation in an environment with interdependent values. Specifically, we investigate a model of public good provision which allows for...
Dirk Bergemann, Karl H. Schlag
We consider the problem of pricing a single object when the seller has only minimal information about the true valuation of the buyer. Specifically, the seller only knows the support of the possible...
We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. In the robust version, the seller faces model uncertainty and only knows that the true...
Venture Capital and Sequential Investments
Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege, Liang Peng
We analyze sequential investment decisions in an innovative project that depend on the investor's information about the project failure risk and its potential final value. We consider the feedback...
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs...
Bergemann, Dirk, Morris, Stephen
In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs...
Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms
Bergemann, Dirk, Stephen Morris
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social...
Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions
Bergemann, Dirk, Shi, Xianwen, Valimaki, Juuso
We consider an auction environment with interdependent values. Each bidder can learn her payoff type through costly information acquisition. We contrast the socially optimal decision to acquire...
Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions
Dirk Bergemann, Xianwen Shi, Juuso Valimaki
We consider an auction environment with interdependent values. Each bidder can learn her payoff type through costly information acquisition. We contrast the socially optimal decision to acquire...
Venture Capital and Sequential Investments
Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege, Liang Peng
We present a dynamic model of venture capital financing, described as a sequential investment problem with uncertain outcome. Each venture has a critical, but unknown threshold beyond which it...
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
This note studies (full) implementation of social choice functions under complete information in (correlated) rationalizable strategies. The monotonicity condition shown by Maskin (1999) to be...
Venture Capital and Sequential Investments
Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege, Liang Peng
We present a dynamic model of venture capital financing, described as a sequential investment problem with uncertain outcome. Each venture has a critical, but unknown threshold beyond which it cannot...
Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms
DIRK BERGEMANN, STEPHEN MORRIS
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages lead to outcomes that agree with the social...