Drew Fudenberg

2007b] “A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays,” mimeo (2008)

www.elsevier.com/locate/artint We comment on the Shoham, Powers, and Grenager survey of multi-agent learning and game theory, emphasizing that some of their categories are important for economics and...

2006] “Perfect Public Equilibrium when Players are Patient,” forthcoming (2008)

1 We thank Mihai Manea for careful proofreading. NSF grants SES-03-14713 and SES-04-26199 provided

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Satoru Takahashi

ABSTRACT. The limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game as the discount factor goes to one is characterized, with examples, even when the full-dimensionality condition fails.

Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 1 (2008)

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Eduardo Faingold, Yuliy Sannikov

Abstract: In a repeated game with imperfect public information, the set of equilibria depends on the way that the distribution of public signals varies with the players ’ actions. Recent research...

An economists perspective on multi-agent learning (2008)

Promises & Partnership (2007)

In their wide-ranging and provocative discussion, Shoham, Powers and Grenager (SPG) survey several large literatures from computer science and game theory, and identify five categories of questions...

Gary Charness, Martin Dufwenberg, Guillaume Frechette, Dan Friedman, Drew Fudenberg, Simon Gächter, ...

Abstract: We examine, experimentally and theoretically, how communication within a partnership may mitigate the problem (highlighted in contract theory) of hidden action. What is the form and content...

EFFICIENCY AND OBSERVABILITY WITH LONG-RUN AND (2007)

Learning to Play Bayesian Games 1 (2007)

We present a general algorithm for computing the limit, as- 1, of the set of payoffs of perfect public equilibria of repeated games with long-run and short-run players, allowing for the possibility...

An Easier Way to Calibrate 1 (2007)

This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of Bayesian games. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations where players are learning about...

Plenary talk: 1994 Society for Economic Dynamics and Control Meetings Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play* (2007)

Jel Classification C, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine

Abstract: We study a variation of fictitious play, in which the probability of each action is an exponential function of that action’s utility against the historical frequency of opponents ’...

Conditional Universal Consistency 1 (2007)

Learning to Play Bayesian Games 1 (2007)

When is Reputation Bad? (2007)

This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of Bayesian games. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations where players are learning about...

Jeffrey Ely Drew, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine

In traditional reputation theory, reputation is good for the longrun player. In "Bad Reputation," Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper...

When is Reputation Bad? (2007)

Jeffrey Ely Drew, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine

In traditional reputation theory, reputation is good for the long-run player. In "Bad Reputation," Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper...

The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With (2007)

Communication And Approximate, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine

This paper shows how communication can yield to a Nash-threats folk theorem in two-player games with "almost public" information but without independent signals

Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi (2007)

Drew Fudenberg And, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine

The code of Hammurabi specified a "trial by surviving in the river" as a way of deciding whether an accusation was true. This system is puzzling for two reasons. First, it is based on a...

Eddie Dekel; Northwestern University And Tel Aviv University, Drew Fudenberg; Harvard University, Stephen Morris; Princeton University

[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] This paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, and shows that all types that...

Repeated Games with Frequent Signals (2007)

Self-Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique 1 (2007)

Abstract: We study repeated games with imperfect public information when the public signal corresponds to the aggregate of many discrete events such as sales over a small time period. The set of...

Topologies on types (2006)

Abstract: We examine the role of off-path “superstitions ” in macro-economics, and show how a false belief about off-path play is the key element underlying both the Lucas Critique and the...

Eddie Dekel; Northwestern University And Tel Aviv University, Drew Fudenberg; Harvard University, Stephen Morris; Princeton University

[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We define and analyze a "strategic topology'' on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where...

Editorial (2006)

Ted Bergstrom, Jeffrey C. Ely, Drew Fudenberg, Edward J. Green, David K. Levine, Barton L. Lipman, ...

Self Control, Risk Aversion, and the Allais Paradox (2006)

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Glenn Harrison, John Kagel, Drazen Prelec

We thank Daniel Benjamin and Jesse Shapiro for helpful comments and a very

Learning and Belief-Based Trade (2005)

Learning and Belief-Based Trade (2005)

A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 1 (2004)

Stability in Supply Chain Networks (2004)

Abstract: We propose that a simple “dual-self ” model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regularities, including the apparent time-inconsistency that has motivated models of...

Michael Ostrovsky, Ariel Pakes, Drew Fudenberg, Parag Pathak

This paper studies matching in vertical networks, generalizing the theory of matching in two-sided markets. It gives sufficient conditions for the existence of stable networks and presents an...

Stochastic Evolution as a Generalized Moran Process (2004)

Drew Fudenberg, Lorens Imhof, Martin A. Nowak, Christine Taylor

This paper proposes and analyzes a model of stochastic evolution in finite populations. The expected motion in our model resembles the standard replicator dynamic when the population is large, but is...

Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions. Working paper (2003)

Drew Fudenberg, Markus Mobius, Adam Szeidl

We show the existence of a pure strategy, symmetric, increasing equilibrium in dou-ble auction markets with correlated, conditionally independent private values and many participants. The equilibrium...

When are nonanonymous players negligible (1998)

Drew Fudenberg, David Levine, Wolfgang Pesendorfer

Maintaining a reputation against a patient opponent (1996)

Celentani, Marco [celentan], Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David K., Pesendorfer, Wolfgang

Publicado

Learning to Play Bayesian Games 1 (1996)

BalancedBudget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information,” mimeo (1995)

This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of games with a move by Nature. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations where players are...

Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term (1995)

Abstract: We examine mechanism design with transferable utility and budget balance, using techniques we developed for the study of repeated games. We show that with independent types, budget balance...

Alvin E. Roth, Ido Erev, Drew Fudenberg, John Kagel, Jack Emilie, Roth Xiaolin Xing

This paper considers the behavior observed in experiments with three different two-stage sequential games; a public goods provision game, a market game, and an "ultimatum" bargaining game,...

Game theory / Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole (1991)

Strategic behavior in economic rivalry / (1981)

Incluye bibliografía e índice

Fudenberg, Drew.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 1981.

Maintaining a reputation against a long-lived opponent (1966)

Marco Celentani, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine

Learning-by-Doing and Market Performance

A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents

This article studies the implications of learning-by-doing for market conduct and performance. We use a general continuous-time model to show that output increases over time in the absence of...

FUDENBERG, Drew, TIROLE, Jean

A Theory of Exit in Duopoly.

Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player.

Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts.

A single, long-run player plays a simultaneous-move stage game against a sequence of opponents who only play once, but observe all previous play. If there is a positive prior probability that the...

Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships

The authors modify the standard principal-agent model with oral hazard by allowing the contract to be renegotiated after the agent's choice of action and before the observation of the action's...

Fudenberg, Drew, Holmstrom, Bengt, Milgrom, Paul

Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty

Dekel, Eddie, Fudenberg, Drew

On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games

Fudenberg, Drew, Maskin, Eric

Interim Correlated Rationalizability

Glenn Ellison, Drew Fudenberg, Markus Möbius

Competing Auctions

This paper shows that larger auctions are more efficient than smaller ones, but that despite this scale effect, two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can...

Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient

Drew Fudenberg, David K Levine, Satoru Takahashi

Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization: An introduction and overview

Fudenberg, Drew, Tirole, Jean, R. Schmalensee, R. Willig

Rules of Thumb for Social Learning.

Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, Drew

This paper studies agents who consider the experiences of their neighbors in deciding which of two technologies to use. The authors analyze two learning environments, one in which the same technology...

A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents.

Superstition and Rational Learning

Income smoothing is the process of manipulating the time profile of earnings or earnings reports to make the reported income stream less variable. This paper builds a theory of income smoothing based...

A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control

Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad

Jeffrey Ely, Drew Fudenberg, David K Levine

Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks

FUDENBERG, Drew, HARRIS, Christopher

Rules of Thumb for Social Learning

ELLISON, Glenn, FUDENBERG, Drew

Evolutionary cycles of cooperation and defection

Imhof, Lorens A., Fudenberg, Drew, Nowak, Martin A.

The main obstacle for the evolution of cooperation is that natural selection favors defection in most settings. In the repeated prisoner's dilemma, two individuals interact several times, and, in...

Upgrades, Trade-Ins and BuyBacks

Learning to Play Bayesian Games

This paper studies the monopoly pricing of overlapping generations of a durable good. We focus on two sorts of goods: those with an active second-hand market and anonymous consumers, such as...

Glenn Allison, Drew Fudenberg

This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of Bayesian games. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations where players are learning about...

Competing Auctions

This paper studies the conditions under which two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium, without the larger one attracting all of...

The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games

Jeffrey Ely, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine

Abstract Not Available At This Time

When is Reputation Bad?

In traditional reputation theory, reputation is good for the long-run player. In "Bad Reputation," Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper characterizes...

Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions

Drew Fudenberg, Markus M. Mobius, Adam Szeidl

We show the existence of a pure strategy, symmetric, increasing equilibrium in double auction markets with correlated private valuations and many participants. The equilibrium we find is arbitrarily...

Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi

Jeffrey Ely, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine

The code of Hammurabi specified a “trial by surviving in the river” as a way of deciding whether an accusation was true. This system is puzzling for two reasons. First, it is based on a...

When is Reputation Bad?

In traditional reputation theory, reputation is good for the long-run player. In “Bad Reputation,” Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper...

A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control

Imitation Processes with Small Mutations

We propose that a simple “dual-self” model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regularities, including the apparent time-inconsistency that has motivated models of hyperbolic...

Drew Fudenberg, Lorens A. Imhof

This note characterizes the impact of adding rare stochastic muta- tions to an "imitation dynamic," meaning a process with the properties that any state where all agents use the same strategy is...

Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Satoru Takahashi

The limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game as the discount factor goes to one is characterized, with examples, even when the full-dimensionality condition fails.

Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents

Robert M. Anderson, Glenn Ellison, Drew Fudenberg

Consider a model of location choice by two sorts of agents, called “buyers”and “sellers:”In the first period agents simultaneously choose between two identical possible locations; following...

Interim Rationalizability

This paper proposes the solution concept of interim rationalizability, and shows that all type spaces that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim rationalizable outcomes....

Topologies on Types

A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control

We define and analyze "strategic topologies" on types, under which two types are close if their strategic behavior will be similar in all strategic situations. To oper- ationalize this idea, we adopt...

Superstition and Rational Learning

We propose that a simple “dual-self” model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regularities, including the apparent time-inconsistency that has motivated models of hyperbolic...

We argue that some but not all superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players are patient, and illustrate our argument with an example inspired by the code of Hammurabi. The code...

In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to...

Imitation processes with small mutations

ract: In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond...

Fudenberg, Drew, Imhof, Lorens A.

Evolutionary cycles of cooperation and defection

Imhof, Lorens A., Fudenberg, Drew, Nowak, Martin A.

The main obstacle for the evolution of cooperation is that natural selection favors defection in most settings. In the repeated prisoner's dilemma, two individuals interact several times, and, in...

The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games

Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

Random matching in adaptive dynamics

In a repeated game with imperfect public information, the set of equilibria depends on the way that the distribution of public signals varies with the players' actions. Recent research has focused on...

Glenn Ellison, Drew Fudenberg, Lorens A. Imhof

Interim correlated rationalizability

Dekel, Eddie, Fudenberg, Drew, Morris, Stephen

This paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, and shows that all types that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of...

Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions

Fudenberg, Drew, Mobius, Markus, Szeidl, Adam

Superstition and Rational Learning

Jeffery Ely, Drew Fudenberg, David Levine

We argue that some, but not all, superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players are patient, and illustrate our argument with an example inspired by the Code of Hammurabi. The code...

When is Reputation Bad?

Learning to Play Bayesian Games

Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique

Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg

Topologies on Type

We define and analyze a "strategic topology" on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens- Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic...

Self Control, Risk Aversion, and the Allais Paradox

Knife Edge of Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?

Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players.

This paper studies whether agents must agglomerate at a single location in a class of models of two-sided interaction. In these models there is an increasing returns effect that favors agglomeration,...

Fudenberg, Drew, Kreps, David M, Maskin, Eric S

Preemption and Rent Equilization in the Adoption of New Technology.

The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information.

Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David I, Maskin, Eric

The authors study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly signals the actions played. They provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible, individually rational...

Self-Confirming Equilibrium.

Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games.

In a self-confining equilibrium, each player's strategy is a best response to his beliefs about the play of his opponents and each player's beliefs are correct along the equilibrium path of play....

Fudenberg, Drew, Maskin, Eric

Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization.

Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction

Dekel, Eddie, Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David K.

Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria

Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, Drew

Dekel, Eddie, Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David K.

When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?

Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David, Pesendorfer, Wolfgang

An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information

Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium

On the robustness of equilibrium refinements

Fudenberg, Drew, Kreps, David M., Levine, David K.

Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players

Limit games and limit equilibria

Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David

Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility

Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games,

Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David

Pricing a Network Good to Deter Entry.

Learning to play Bayesian games

This paper develops a model of pricing to deter entry by a sole supplier of a network good. We show that the installed user base of a network good can serve a preemptive function similar to that of...

Dekel, Eddie, Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David K.

Word-of-mouth learning

Banerjee, Abhijit, Fudenberg, Drew

Conditional Universal Consistency

An Easier Way to Calibrate

Consistency and cautious fictitious play

Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics

Drew Fudenberg

This essay discusses the field of behavioral economics, with a focus on the papers in Advances in Behavioral Economics. These papers show that there is a body of “behavioral facts” that is both...

Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring"

A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control

Learning and Belief-Based Trade

We propose that a simple ?dual-self? model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regularities, including the apparent time inconsistency that has motivated models of quasi-hyperbolic...

When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible?

We use the theory of learning in games to show that no-trade results do not require that gains from trade are common knowledge nor that play is a Nash Equilibrium.

Drew Fudenberg

We examine games played by a single large player and a large number of opponents who are small, but not anonymous. If the play of the small players is observed with noise, and if the number of...

Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient

Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David K., Takahashi, Satoru

Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed.

Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents.

This paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long-run player whose choice of stage-game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents. The authors obtain lower and upper bounds on...

Fudenberg, Drew, Kreps, David M

Imagine that one player, the "incumbent," competes with several "entrants." Each entrant competes only with the incumbent, but obs erves play in all contests. Previous work shows that as more and...

Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information.

Manual for Econometrica Authors, Revised

Drew Fudenberg, Dorothy Hodges

Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium.

The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information.

The authors study the steady states of a system in which players learn about the strategies their opponents are playing by updating their Bayesian priors in light of their observations. Players are...

Fudenberg, Drew, Maskin, Eric

The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look.

Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David

Learning in games

Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races

Fudenberg, Drew, Gilbert, Richard, Stiglitz, Joseph, Tirole, Jean

Topologies on types

Dekel, Eddie, Fudenberg, Drew, Morris, Stephen

We define and analyze a "strategic topology'' on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic...

The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry

Customer Poaching and Brand Switching

We examine two reasons why a monopoly supplier of software may introduce more upgrades than is socially optimal when the upgrade is backward but not forward compatible, so users who upgrade reduce...

Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks

Firms sometimes try to "poach" the customers of their competitors by offering them inducements to switch. We analyze duopoly poaching under both short-term and long-term contracts assuming either...

A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation

We study monopoly pricing of overlapping generations of a durable good. We consider two sorts of goods: those with an active secondhand market and anonymous consumers, such as textbooks, and those...

Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

We propose a new theory of predation based on "signal-jamming." In our model the predator's characteristics are common knowledge, while the entrant is uncertain of his own future profitability. The...

Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria

In this paper we consider a number of different ways that a sequence of discrete-time repeated games can approach a continuous-time limit. Our purpose is to clarify the effects of three different...

Knife-Edge Or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?

better understand when mixed equilibria might arise within populations of interact acting agents, we examine a model of smoothed fictitious play that is designed to capture Harsanyi's "Purification",...

Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games.

This paper studies whether agents must agglomerate at a single location in a class of models of two-sided interaction. In these models there is an increasing returns effect that favors agglomeration,...

Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning.

In some experiments, rational players who understand the structure of the game could improve their payoff. The authors bound the size of the observed losses in several such experiments. To do this,...

Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, Drew

This paper studies the way that word-of-mouth communication aggregates the information of individual agents. The authors find that the structure of the communication process determines whether all...

Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities.

Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David K, Tirole, Jean

Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers

Drew Fudenberg, David Levine, Jean Tirole

Predation Without Reputation

Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview

Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player

Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium

Peter Diamond, Drew Fudenberg

Reputation in the Simulation Play of Multiple Opponents

Drew Fudenberg, David M. Kreps

On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games

Drew Fudenberg, Eric Maskin

Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships

Drew Fudenberg, Bengt Holmstrom, Paul Milgrom

Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty

Drew Fudenberg, Eddie Dekel

Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players

Drew Fudenberg, David Kreps, Eric Maskin

Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales

Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts

Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibria: A Clarifying Note

Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains

Drew Fudenberg, Eric Maskin

Learning-Theoretic Foundations for Equilibrium Analysis

Ely, Jeffrey, Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David K.

When is reputation bad?

In traditional reputation models, the ability to build a reputation is good for the long-run player. In [Ely, J., Valimaki, J., 2003. Bad reputation. NAJ Econ. 4, 2; http://www.najecon.org/v4.htm....

Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations

Fudenberg, Drew, Imhof, Lorens A.

We analyze a class of imitation dynamics with mutations for games with any finite number of actions, and give conditions for the selection of a unique equilibrium as the mutation rate becomes small...

Repeated Games with Frequent Signals

An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning

Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent

Marco Celentani, Drew Fudenberg, David K Levine, Wolfgang Pesendorfer

Learning and Belief Based Trading

Jeffrey Ely, Drew Fudenberg, David K Levine

When is Reputation Bad

The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games

Learning to Play Bayesian Games

Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, David K Levine

Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction

Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, David K Levine

Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players

Conditional Universal Consistency

Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information

Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games

When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Wolfgang Pesendorfer

An Easier Way to Calibrate

The Theory of Learning in Games

Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play

Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent

Marco Celentani, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Wolfgang Pesendorfer

Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player

The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information

The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information

Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium

Self-Confirming Equilibrium

Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players

On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements

Drew Fudenberg, David Kreps, David K. Levine

Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Jean Tirole

Limit Games and Limit Equilibria

Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Jean Tirole

Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Paul Ruud

Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games

A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays

Interim Rationalizability

Abhijit Banerjee, Drew Fudenberg

Word of Mouth Learning

Topologies on Types

Knife-Edge or Plateau: When do Market Models Tip?

Glenn Ellison, Drew Fudenberg, Markus Mobius

Competing Auctions

Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play

Drew Fudenberg, Satoru Takahashi

On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements

Drew Fudenberg, David M. Kreps, David K. Levine

Limit Games and Limit Equilibria

Sequential Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games

Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games

Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction.

Diamond, Peter, Fudenberg, Drew

Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium.

Diamond, Peter, Fudenberg, Drew

The authors examine the rational expectations equilibrium paths of the model of search and barter in Peter A. Diamond's "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium" (1982). For some initial...

Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information'

Drew Fudenberg, David K Levine, Eric Maskin

A Long Run Collaboration on Long Run Games

Repeated Games with Frequent Signals-super-*

The Theory of Learning in Games

We study repeated games with frequent actions and frequent imperfect public signals, where the signals are aggregates of many discrete events, such as sales or tasks. The high-frequency limit of the...

In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and why equilibrium arises is...

Game Theory