Lawrence Blume, Eddie Dekel, Adam Brandenburger
This overview focuses on lexicographic choice under conditions of uncertainty. First, lexico-graphic versions of traditional (von Neumann-Morgenstern) expected utility theory are described where the...
Friday Mar 07 2008 11:56 AM JPE v116n2 32396 VML Vote Buying: General Elections (2008)
Eddie Dekel, Matthew O. Jackson, Asher Wolinsky
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via...
Federico Echenique, Eddie Dekel, Juan Dubra, Matt Jackson, Ivana Komunjer, Andy Mclennan, ...
suggestions. I also thank seminar audiences in a number of institutions for their comments. 1 2 F. ECHENIQUE Abstract. I present a simple and fast algorithm that finds all the purestrategy Nash...
Eddie Dekel, Matthew O. Jackson, Asher Wolinsky, David Baron, Elchanan Ben Porath, Jon Eguia, ...
We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two “lobbyists ” compete for the votes of legislators by offering up-front...
private-value first-price discrete auctions. 1 (2007)
Rationalizable outcomes of large independent
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 1 (2007)
Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of Bayesian games. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations where players are learning about...
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 1 (2007)
Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of Bayesian games. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations where players are learning about...
Eddie Dekel, Matthew O. Jackson, Asher Wolinsky, David Baron, Elchanan Ben Porath, Jon Eguia, ...
We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this prac-tice were allowed and free of stigma. Two “lobbyists ” compete for the votes of legislators by o¤ering up-front...
Jump Bidding and Budget Constraints in All-Pay Auctions and Wars of Attrition (2006)
Eddie Dekel, Matthew O. Jackson, Asher Wolinsky Y
We study all-pay auctions (or wars of attrition), where the highest bidder wins an object, but all bidders pay their bids. We consider such auctions when two bidders alternate in raising their bids...
Theory of Reputational Cheap (2003)
Marco Ottaviani A, Markus Brunnermeier, Vincent Crawford, Eddie Dekel, ...
This paper studies strategic communication by an expert who is concerned about appearing to be well informed. The expert is assumed to observe a private signal with a simple and particularly...
Causal Assessment in Finite-Length (2003)
Extensive-form Games, Jose Penalva-zuasti, Colin Camerer, David M. Chickering, Eddie Dekel, ...
workshops, the Stanford SITE and Stonybrook theory conferences, three anonymous referees and
Theory of Reputational Cheap (2003)
Marco Ottaviani A, Markus Brunnermeier, Vincent Crawford, Eddie Dekel, ...
This paper studies strategic communication by an expert who is concerned about appearing to be well informed. The expert is assumed to observe a private signal with a simple and particularly...
Marital Investments, Time Consistency, And Emotions (1999)
Martin Dufwenberg, Eric Van Damme, Eddie Dekel, Tone Dieckmann, David Frankel, Uri Gneezy, ...
: I study a married couple's investment in education when the monetary rewards from this activity accrue asymmetrically to the spouses across time and there is a possibility of unilateral...
On the Evolution of Attitudes towards Risk in Winner-Take-All Games (1999)
Eddie Dekel, Suzanne Scotchmer
this paper we explore an evolutionary model where preferences, in particular attitudes toward risk, are endogenously determined. In economics, preferences are simply rules for choosing among feasible...
Barton L. Lipman, Luca Anderlini, Jim Bergin, Eddie Dekel, Itzhak Gilboa, Joe Halpern, ...
for helpful suggestions and conversations. Financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged. A preliminary version of this paper was...
A Unique Subjective State Space for Unforeseen Contingencies (1997)
Eddie Dekel, Barton L. Lipman, Aldo Rustichini, Ranispiegler Andnumerousseminaraudiencesforhelpfulcomments Dekelandrustichinithankthensfand
We axiomatically characterize a representation of preferences over opportunity sets which exhibit a preference for exibility, interpreted as a model of unforeseen contingencies. In this...
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 1 (1996)
Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of games with a move by Nature. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations where players are...
An overview of lexicographic choice under uncertainty (1989)
Blume, Lawrence E., Brandenburger, Adam, Dekel, Eddie
This overview focuses on lexicographic choice under conditions of uncertainty. First, lexicographic versions of traditional (von Neumann-Morgenstern) expected utility theory are described where the...
Dekel, Eddie, Ely, Jeffrey, Yilankaya, Okan
We model, using evolutionary game theory, the implications of endogenous determination of preferences over the outcomes of any given two-player normal form game, G. We consider a large population...
Eddie Dekel, Barton L. Lipman, Aldo Rustichini
“My own behavior baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe.” Saint Paul What behavior can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent...
Correlated Equilibrium with Generalized Information Structures
Adam Brandenburger, Eddie Dekel
We study the "generalized correlated equilibria" of a game when players make information processing errors. It is shown that the assumption of information processing errors is equivalent to that of...
Learning to Play Bayesian Games
Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of Bayesian games. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations where players are learning about...
Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, Stephen Morris
This paper proposes the solution concept of interim rationalizability, and shows that all type spaces that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim rationalizable outcomes....
Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, Stephen Morris
We define and analyze "strategic topologies" on types, under which two types are close if their strategic behavior will be similar in all strategic situations. To oper- ationalize this idea, we adopt...
Temptation–Driven Preferences1
“My own behavior baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe.” Saint Paul What behavior can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent...
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium
Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to...
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium
Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
ract: In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond...
Interim correlated rationalizability
Dekel, Eddie, Fudenberg, Drew, Morris, Stephen
This paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, and shows that all types that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of...
On the Equivalence of Simultaneous and Sequential Binary Elections
We explore sequential voting in symmetric two-option environments. We show that the (informative) symmetric equilibria of the simultaneous voting game are also equilibria in any sequential voting...
A Unique Subjective State Space for Unforeseen Contingencies
We axiomatically characterize a representation of preferences over opportunity sets which exhibit a preference for flexibility, interpreted as a model of unforeseen contingencies. In this...
Vote Bying I: General Elections
Eddie Dekel, Matthew O. Jackson, Asher Wolinksy
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al- lowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via...
Vote Buying II: Legislatures and Lobbying
Eddie Dekel, Matthew O. Jackson, Asher Wolinksy
We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this prac- tice were allowed and free of stigma. Two "lobbyists" compete for the votes of legislators by offering up-front payments...
Eddie Dekel, Barton Lipman, Aldo Rustichini
What behavior can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent faces temptation but is otherwise a “standard rational agent”? In earlier work, Gul–Pesendorfer [2001] use a set betweenness...
Non-Bayesian Testing of a Stochastic Prediction
We propose a method to test a prediction of the distribution of a stochastic process. In a non-Bayesian non-parametric setting, a predicted distribution is tested using a realization of the...
We define and analyze a "strategic topology" on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens- Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic...
Eddie Dekel, Matthew O. Jackson, Asher Wolinsky
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties competing in a binary election may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via...
A True Expert Knows which Question Should be Asked.
We suggest a test for discovering whether a potential expert is informed of the distribution of a stochastic process. In a non-Bayesian non-parametric setting, the expert is asked to make a...
Eddie Dekel, Barton L. Lipman, Aldo Rustichini
“My own behavior baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe.” Saint Paul What behavior can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent...
Jump Bidding and Budget Constraints in All-Pay Auctions and Wars of Attrition
Eddie Dekel, Matthew Jackson, Asher Wolinsky
We study all-pay auctions (or wars of attrition), where the highest bidder wins an object, but all bidders pay their bids. We consider such auctions when two bidders alternate in raising their bids...
The Econometric Society Annual Reports Report of the Editors 2002-2003
Eddie Dekel, Glenn Ellison, Joel Horowitz, Costas Meghir, Andrew Postlewaite
Asset Demands without the Independence Axiom.
An important application of the theory of choice under uncertainty is to asset markets, and an important property in these markets is a preference for portfolio diversification. If an investor is an...
Jackson, Matthew O., Dekel, Eddie, Wolinsky, Asher
vote buying, political economy, campaign promises
EDDIE DEKEL, JEFFREY C. ELY, OKAN YILANKAYA
We endogenize preferences using the "indirect evolutionary approach". Individuals are randomly matched to play a two-person game. Individual (subjective) preferences determine their behaviour and may...
Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space: A Corrigendum -super-1
Eddie Dekel, Barton L Lipman, Aldo Rustichini, Todd Sarver
Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) (henceforth DLR) axiomatically characterized three representations of preferences that allow for a desire for flexibility and/or commitment. In one of these...
Non-Bayesian Testing of a Stochastic Prediction
We propose a method to test a prediction of the distribution of a stochastic process. In a non-Bayesian, non-parametric setting, a predicted distribution is tested using a realization of the...
Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements.
Blume, Lawrence, Brandenburger, Adam, Dekel, Eddie
This paper develops a decision-theoretic approach to normal-form refinements of Nash equilibrium and provides characterizations of (normal-form) perfect equilibrium and proper equilibrium. The...
Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice under Uncertainty.
Blume, Lawrence, Brandenburger, Adam, Dekel, Eddie
Conventional Bayesian theory of choice under uncertainty, subjective expected utility theory, fails to satisfy the properties of admissibility and existence of well-defined conditional probabilities;...
Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria.
Brandenburger, Adam, Dekel, Eddie
The authors discuss the unity between the two standard approaches to noncooperative solution concepts for games. The decision-theoretic approach starts from the assumption that the rationality of the...
Eddie Dekel, Matthew O. Jackson, Asher Wolinsky
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties competing in a binary election may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via...
Dekel, Eddie, Fudenberg, Drew, Morris, Stephen
We define and analyze a "strategic topology'' on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic...
A True Expert Knows which Question Should Be Asked
We suggest a test for discovering whether a potential expert is informed of the distribution of a stochastic process. In a non-Bayesian non-parametric setting, the expert is asked to make a...
Vote Buying: General Elections
Eddie Dekel, Matthew O. Jackson, Asher Wolinsky
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via...
EDDIE DEKEL, BARTON L. LIPMAN, ALDO RUSTICHINI
"My own behaviour baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe." Saint Paul Copyright Copyright © 2009 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.