Federico Echenique

Profit maximization and supermodular technology (2009)

Chambers, Christopher P., Echenique, Federico

A dataset is a list of observed factor inputs and prices for a technology; profits and production levels are unobserved. We obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for a dataset to be consistent...

Testing Models With Multiple Equilibria by Quantile Methods (2009)

Echenique, Federico, Komunjer, Ivana

This paper proposes a method for testing complementarities between explanatory and dependent variables in a large class of economic models. The proposed test is based on the monotone comparative...

Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets (2009)

Boyle, Elette, Echenique, Federico

We study sequential bargaining in many-to-one matching markets. We show that there is an advantage to entering late in the market, and that the last agent to enter the market will receive his or her...

Ordinal notions of submodularity (2008)

Chambers, Christopher P., Echenique, Federico

We consider several ordinal formulations of submodularity, defined for arbitrary binary relations on lattices. Two of these formulations are essentially due to Kreps [Kreps, D.M., 1979. A...

What matchings can be stable? The testable implications of matching theory (2008)

Echenique, Federico

This paper studies the falsifiability of two-sided matching theory when agents' preferences are unknown. A collection of matchings is rationalizable if there are preferences for the agents involved...

English auctions and the Stolper–Samuelson theorem (2008)

Dubra, Juan, Echenique, Federico, Manelli, Alejandro M.

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for...

COMPARATIVE STATICS, ENGLISH AUCTIONS, AND THE STOLPER-SAMUELSON THEOREM (2008)

Federico Echenique, M. Manelli

Abstract. We introduce a comparative-statics observation; we prove that the English auction is efficient in a model with interdependent valuations and n bidders; we generalize the Stolper-Samuelson...

A WEAK CORRESPONDENCE PRINCIPLE FOR MODELS WITH COMPLEMENTARITIES (2008)

Federico Echenique, F. Echenique

Abstract. I prove that, in models with complementarities, some non-monotone comparative statics must select unstable equilibria; and, under additional regularity conditions, that monotone comparative...

SEQUENTIAL ENTRY IN MANY-TO-ONE MATCHING MARKETS (2008)

Elette Boyle, Federico Echenique

Abstract. We study sequential bargaining in many-to-one matching markets. We show that there is an advantage to entering late in the market, and that the last agent to enter the market will receive...

requested from the American Economic Association Business Office. Permissions may be requested from the American Economic Association Business (2008)

Federico Echenique, Roland G. Fryer, Alex Kaufman

Association publications for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not distributed for profit or direct commercial advantage and that copies show this notice on...

ON BEHAVIORAL COMPLEMENTARITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (2008)

Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique, Eran Shmaya

Abstract. We study the behavioral definition of complementary goods: if the price of one good increases, demand for a complementary good must decrease. We obtain its full implications for observable...

Acknowledgments: Many thanks to Rabah Amir, Kate Antonovics, Andrés Aradillas-López, (2008)

Federico Echenique, Ivana Komunjer, Patrick Bajari, Peter Bossaerts, Colin Camerer, Chris Chambers, ...

Abstract. This paper proposes a method for testing complementarities between explanatory and dependent variables in a large class of economic models. The proposed test is based on the monotone...

Theoretical Economics 1 (2006), 233–273 1555-7561/20060233 A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets (2008)

Federico Echenique, Jorge Oviedo

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm....

A TEST FOR MONOTONE COMPARATIVE STATICS (2008)

Federico Echenique, Ivana Komunjer

Abstract. In this paper we design an econometric test for monotone comparative statics (MCS) often found in models with multiple equilibria. Our test exploits the observable implications of the MCS...

COMPARATIVE STATICS, ENGLISH AUCTIONS, AND THE STOLPER-SAMUELSON THEOREM (2008)

Federico Echenique, M. Manelli

Abstract. We introduce a comparative-statics observation; we prove that the English auction is efficient in a model with interdependent valuations and n bidders; we generalize the Stolper-Samuelson...

SEQUENTIAL ENTRY IN MANY-TO-ONE MATCHING MARKETS (2008)

Elette Boyle, Federico Echenique

Abstract. We study sequential bargaining in many-to-one matching markets. We show that there is an advantage to entering late in the market, and that the last agent to enter the market will receive...

Running Title: Finding All Equilibria. I am grateful to an associate editor and two referees for their comments. I thank Gerard (2008)

Federico Echenique, Eddie Dekel, Juan Dubra, Matt Jackson, Ivana Komunjer, Andy Mclennan, ...

suggestions. I also thank seminar audiences in a number of institutions for their comments. 1 2 F. ECHENIQUE Abstract. I present a simple and fast algorithm that finds all the purestrategy Nash...

FINDING ALL EQUILIBRIA IN GAMES OF STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTS (2007)

Federico Echenique

Abstract. I present a simple and fast algorithm that finds all the purestrategy Nash equilibria in games with strategic complementarities. This is the first non-trivial algorithm for finding all...

Finding All Equilibria (2007)

Federico Echenique, Federico Echenique, Federico Echenique

I present a simple and fast algorithm that finds all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria in games with strategic complementarities. This is the first non-trivial algorithm for finding all pure-strategy...

Tarski’s (2007)

Federico Echenique, Federico Echenique, Federico Echenique, Jorge Oviedo, Jorge Oviedo

We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our...

COUNTING COMBINATORIAL CHOICE RULES (2007)

Federico Echenique

I count the number of combinatorial choice rules that satisfy certain properties: Kelso-Crawford substitutability, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The results are important for two-sided...

A Weak Correspondence Principle For (2007)

Models With Complementarities, Federico Echenique

I prove that, in models with complementarities, some non-monotone comparative statics must select unstable equilibria; and, under additional regularity conditions, that monotone comparative statics...

English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (2007)

Dubra, Juan, Echenique, Federico, Manelli, Alejandro

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for...

Cohesion, Insurance and Redistribution (2007)

Echenique, Federico, Eguia, Jon X.

Governments use redistributive policies to favor relatively unproductive economic sectors. Traditional economic wisdom teaches that the government should instead buy out the agents in these sectors,...

A Test For Monotone Comparative Statics (2007)

Komunjer, Ivana, Echenique, Federico

In this paper we design an econometric test for monotone comparative statics (MCS) often found in models with multiple equilibria. Our test exploits the observable implications of the MCS prediction:...

A Measure of Segregation Based on Social Interactions (2007)

Echenique, Federico

We develop an index of segregation based on two premises: (1) a measure of segregation should disaggregate to the level of individuals, and (2) an individual is more segregated the more segregated...

Supermodularity and Preferences ∗ (2007)

Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique

Supermodularity of utility has long been understood as capturing the notion of complementarities in consumption behavior. The notion dates to the nineteenth century; Edgeworth and Pareto were two of...

Ordinal notions of submodularity (2007)

Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique

We consider several ordinal formulations of submodularity, defined for arbitrary binary relations on lattices. Two of these formulations are essentially due to David Kreps (A Representation Theorem...

Ordinal notions of submodularity (2007)

Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique

We consider several ordinal formulations of submodularity, defined for arbitrary binary relations on lattices. Two of these formulations are essentially due to David Kreps (A Representation Theorem...

Profit Maximization and Supermodular Technology (2007)

Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique

A dataset is a list of observed factor inputs and prices for a technology; profits and production levels are unobserved. We obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for a dataset to be consistent...

Supermodularity and Preferences ∗ (2007)

Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique, Yves Sprumont, Leeat Yariv, Bill Zame

Supermodularity of utility has long been understood as capturing the notion of complementarities in consumption behavior. The notion dates to the nineteenth century; Edgeworth and Pareto were two of...

Ordinal notions of submodularity (2007)

Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique

We consider several ordinal formulations of submodularity, defined for arbitrary binary relations on lattices. Two of these formulations are essentially due to David Kreps (A Representation Theorem...

Profit Maximization and Supermodular Technology (2007)

Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique

A dataset is a list of observed factor inputs and prices for a technology; profits and production levels are unobserved. We obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for a dataset to be consistent...

A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets (2006)

Federico Echenique; California Institute Of Technology, Jorge Oviedo; Universidad Nacional De San Luis, Argentina

[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the...

A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets (2006)

Echenique, Federico, Oviedo, Jorge

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm....

Is school segregation good or bad? (2006)

Echenique, Federico, Kaufman, Alex

It has been well documented that segregation across schools — denying access to resources, inferior educational production functions, and so on — exacerbates racial differences in achievement....

Supermodularizability ∗ (2006)

Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique

We study the ordinal content of assuming supermodularity, including conditions under which a binary relation can be represented by a supermodular function. When applied to revealed-preference...

CORRESPONDENCE PRINCIPLE (2006)

Federico Echenique, Federico Echenique

The Correspondence Principle is the relation, which exists in certain economic models, between comparative statics of equilibria and the properties of out-of-equilibrium dynamics. The Correspondence...

Games and Economic Behavior 46(2) Feb. 2004 pp. 325-347 A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities ∗ (2006)

Federico Echenique, Bob Anderson, Juan Dubra, Paul Milgrom, Stephen Morris, ...

I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have...

CORRESPONDENCE PRINCIPLE (2006)

Federico Echenique, Federico Echenique

The Correspondence Principle is the relation, which exists in certain economic models, between comparative statics of equilibria and the properties of out-of-equilibrium dynamics. The Correspondence...

A short and constructive proof of Tarski’s fixed-point theorem (2005)

Federico Echenique

Abstract. I give short and constructive proofs of Tarski's fixedpoint theorem, and of Zhou's extension of Tarski's fixed-point theorem to set-valued maps. 1.

A short and constructive proof of Tarski’s fixed-point theorem (2005)

Federico Echenique

Abstract. I give short and constructive proofs of Tarski’s fixedpoint theorem, and of Zhou’s extension of Tarski’s fixed-point theorem to set-valued maps. 1.

Counting combinatorial choice rules (2005)

Federico Echenique

This article was originally published in a journal published by Elsevier, and the attached copy is provided by Elsevier for the author’s benefit and for the benefit of the author’s institution,...

Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements (2004)

Echenique, Federico, Edlin, Aaron S.

In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria - equilibria that are not in pure strategies - are unstable for broad class of learning dynamics.

A characterization of strategic complementarities (2004)

Federico Echenique, Federico Echenique, Federico Echenique

I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have...

A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets (2004)

Federico Echenique, Jorge Oviedo, John Duggan, Hideo Konishi, Utku Unver For, ...

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwisestable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm....

A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets (2004)

Federico Echenique, Jorge Oviedo, Di Tella, Facultad De

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwisestable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm....

Counting Combinatorial Choice Rules (2004)

Federico Echenique, Federico Echenique, Federico Echenique

I count the number of combinatorial choice rules that satisfy certain properties: KelsoCrawford substitutability, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The results are important for two-sided...

Counting Combinatorial Choice Rules (2004)

Federico Echenique

I count the number of combinatorial choice rules that satisfy certain properties: Kelso-Crawford substitutability, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The results are important for two-sided...

A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many - Matching Markets (2003)

Ö Ó ��ò�õù, Federico Echenique, Federico Echenique, Jorge Oviedo, Jorge Oviedo

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under wich the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm....

Comparative Statics, English Auctions, and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem (2003)

Federico Echenique, Alejandro M. Manelli

Changes in the parameters of an n-dimensional system of equations induce changes in its solutions. For a class of such systems, we determine the qualitative change in solutions given certain...

Mixed Equilibria are Unstable in Games of Strategic Complements (2003)

Federico Echenique, Aaron Edlin, Vince Crawford, Glenn Ellison, Jeff Ely, ...

In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria--- equilibria that are not in pure strategies---are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics. Journal of...

Mathematical Social Sciences 47(2), March 2004, pp. 177-185. Information Is Not About Measurability ∗ (2003)

Juan Dubra, Federico Echenique, Jel Classification C, David Levine, Jim Pitman, Maxwell Stinchcombe, ...

We present a simple example where the use of σ-algebras as a model of information leads to a paradoxical conclusion: a decision maker prefers less information to more. We then explain that the...

Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable (2002)

Echenique, Federico, Edlin, Aaron S.

In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria--equilibria that are not in pure strategies--are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.

Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable (2002)

Echenique, Federico, Edlin, Aaron S.

In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria--equilibria that are not in pure strategies--are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.

Caltech (2002)

Federico Echenique

I am very grateful to my advisers, Ilya Segal and Chris Shannon, for many helpful 1 discussions. I also wish to thank Bob Anderson, Rabah Amir, and Matthew Rabin for their comments. The paper is...

Core Many-to-one Matchings by Fixed-Point Methods, Caltech Social Science Working Paper 1140 (2002)

Federico Echenique, Jorge Oviedo

We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our...

Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and The Correspondence Principle (2002)

Federico Echenique, Juan Dubra, Néstor G, López Córdova, Marcelo Moreira, ...

This paper formalizes the relation between comparative statics and the out-of-equilibrium explanation for how a system evolves after a change in parameters. The paper has two main results. First, an...

Monotone Preferences over Information (2001)

Dubra, Juan, Echenique, Federico

We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states...

Monotone Preferences over Information (2001)

Dubra, Juan, Echenique, Federico

We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states...

Monotone Preferences over Information (2001)

Dubra, Juan, Echenique, Federico

We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states...

Monotone Preferences over Information (2001)

Dubra, Juan, Echenique, Federico

We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states...

A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities (2001)

Echenique, Federico

I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have...

Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and The Correspondence Principle (2000)

Federico Echenique, Juan Dubra, Néstor G, López Córdova, Marcelo Moreira, ...

This paper formalizes the relation between comparative statics and the out-of-equilibrium explanation for how a system evolves after a change in parameters. The paper has two main results. First, an...

Comparative Statics, English Auctions, and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem (1891)

Ö Ó ��ò�õù, Federico Echenique, Federico Echenique, Alejandro M. Manelli, Alejandro M. Manelli

Changes in the parameters of an n-dimensional system of equations induce changes in its solutions. For a class of such systems, we determine the qualitative change in solutions given certain...

A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues

Federico Echenique, Mehmet B. Yenmez

We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that...

An explanation of inefficient redistribution: Transfers insure cohesive groups

Echenique, Federico, Eguia, Jon X.

inefficient redistribution, cohesion, insurance, sectoral subsidies, trade policy, collective action

Measurability Is Not about Information

Juan Dubra, Federico Echenique

We comment on the relation between models of information based on signals/partitions, and those based on sigma-algebras. We show that more informative signals need not generate finer sigma-algebras,...

Monotone Preferences over Information

Juan Dubra, Echenique, Federico

We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states...

Comparative Statics, English Auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem

Federico Echenique, Alejandro Manelli

Changes in the parameters of an n-dimensional system of equations induce changes in its solutions. For a class of such systems, we determine the qualitative change in solutions given certain...

Comparative Statics, English Auctions, and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem

Echenique, Federico, Manelli, Alejandro M.

Changes in the parameters of an n-dimensional system of equations induce changes in its solutions. For a class of such systems, we determine the qualitative change in solutions given certain...

Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities

Federico Echenique

The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the...

A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets

Echenique, Federico, Oviedo, Jorge

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm....

A Test For Monotone Comparative Statics

Ivana Komunjer, Federico Echenique

In this paper we design an econometric test for monotone comparative statics (MCS) often found in models with multiple equilibria. Our test exploits the observable implications of the MCS prediction:...

Testing Models with Multiple Equilibria by Quantile Methods

Ivana Komunjer, Federico Echenique

In this paper, we present methods for deriving testable implication from models with multiple equilibria. Our framework includes many economic models with a one-dimensional endogenous...

On Behavioral Complementarity and its Implications

Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique, Eran Shmaya

We study the behavioral denition of complementary goods: if the price of one good increases, demand for a complementary good must decrease. We obtain its full implications for observable demand...

A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues

Echenique, Federico, Yenmez, Mehmet B.

We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that...

Counting Combinatoral Choice Rules

Echenique, Federico

I count the number of combinatorial choice rules that satisfy certain properties: Kelso-Crawford substitutability, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The results are important for two-sided...

A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets

Echenique, Federico, Oviedo, Jorge

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm....

Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable

Federico Echenique, Aaron Edlin

In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria--equilibria that are not in pure strategies--are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.

Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities

Federico Echenique

(less than 25 lines) I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a...

Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complementarities

Federico Echenique

The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the...

Core Many-to-one Matchings by Fixed-point Methods

Federico Echenique, Jorge Oviedo

We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our...

Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable

Federico Echenique, Aaron Edlin

In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria--equilibria that are not in pure strategies--are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.

A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets

Federico Echenique, Jorge Oviedo

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm....

Counting Combinatorial Choice Rules

Federico Echenique

I count the number of combinatorial choice rules that satisfy certain properties: Kelso-Crawford substitutability, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The results are important for two-sided...

A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues

Federico Echenique

We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that...

A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities

Federico Echenique

I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have...

A Short And Constructive Proof of Tarski's Fixed-Point Theorem

Federico Echenique

I give short and constructive proofs of Tarski's fixed-point theorem, and of a much-used extension of Tarski's fixed-point theorem to set- valued maps.

Comparative Statics, English Auctions, and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem

Federico Echenique, Alejandro Manelli

Changes in the parameters of an $n$-dimensional system of equations induce changes in its solutions. For a class of such systems, we determine the qualitative change in solutions given certain...

On the Measurement of Segregation

Federico Echenique, Roland G. Fryer Jr.

This paper develops a measure of segregation based on two premises: (1) a measure of segregation should disaggregate to the level of individuals, and (2) an individual is more segregated the more...

A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities

Federico Echenique

I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have...

Are stabilization programs expansionary?

Federico Echenique, Alvaro Forteza

The empirical evidence presented in this paper casts doubts on the by now widely accepted “fact’’ that exchange rate based stabilization programs are expansionary. Even though these programs...

A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities.

Federico Echenique.

I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have...

Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and The Correspondence Principle.

Federico Echenique.

Federico Echenique JEL#: C61, C62, C72, C73 Keywords: Monotone comparative statics, supermodularity, strategic complements, learning, correspondence principle This paper formalizes the relation...

Are stabilization programs expansionary?

Federico Echenique, Alvaro Forteza

The empirical evidence presented in this paper casts serious doubts on the by now widely accepted "stylized facts" of the exchange rate based stabilization programs (ERBS) as they are stated in...

Are Stabilization Programs Expansionary?

Federico Echenique, Alvaro Forteza

The empirical evidence presented in this paper casts doubts on the by now widely accepted "fact"that the exchange rate based stabilization programs are expansionary. Even though these programs were...

Comparative Statics by Adaptative Dynamics and the Correspondence Principle

Federico Echenique

This paper formalizes the relation between comparative statics and the out-of-equilibrium explanation for how a system evolves after a change in parameters. The paper has two main results. First, an...

A Full Characterization of Representable Preferences

Juan Dubra, Federico Echenique

We fully characterize the preference relations that can be represented by a utility. Representation is equivalent to the condition that preferences do not have too many \jumps". A characterization of...

Extensive-Form Games and Strategic Complementarities

Federico Echenique

I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a non-empty, complete lattice....

Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complementarities

Federico Echenique

The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the...

A characterization of strategic complementarities

Federico Echenique

I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualications, games with a unique equilibrium have...

The equilibrium set of two-player games with complementarities is a sublattice

Federico Echenique

I prove that the equilibrium set in a two-player game with complementarities, and totally ordered strategy spaces, is a sublattice of the joint strategy space. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin...

Monotone Preferences over Information

Juan Dubra, Federico Echenique

We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states...

Monotone Preferences Over Information

Juan Dubra, Federico Echenique

We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states...

A short and constructive proof of Tarski’s fixed-point theorem

Federico Echenique

Tarski’s fixed-point theorem, games of strategic complimentarities, supermodular games,

A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets

Federico Echenique, Jorge Oviedo

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under wich the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm....

Counting Combinatorial Choice Rules

Federico Echenique

I count the number of combinatorial choice rules that satisfy certain properties: Kelso-Crawford substitutability, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The results are important for two-sided...

On the Measurement of Segregation

Federico Echenique

This paper develops a measure of segregation based on two premises: (1) a measure of segregation should disaggregate to the level of individuals, and (2) an individual is more segregated the more...

English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem

Dubra, Juan, Echenique, Federico, Manelli, Alejandro

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for...

Ordinal notions of submodularity

Chambers, Christopher P., Echenique, Federico

We consider several ordinal formulations of submodularity, defined for arbitrary binary relations on lattices. Two of these formulations are essentially due to Kreps [Kreps, D.M., 1979. A...

English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem

Dubra, Juan, Echenique, Federico, Manelli, Alejandro M.

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for...

Profit maximization and supermodular technology

Christopher Chambers, Federico Echenique

Complementarity, Afriat’s theorem, Factor demands, Revealed preference, D21, D24,

Testing Models With Multiple Equilibria by Quantile Methods

Federico Echenique, Ivana Komunjer

This paper proposes a method for testing complementarities between explanatory and dependent variables in a large class of economic models. The proposed test is based on the monotone comparative...

Supermodularity and preferences

Chambers, Christopher P., Echenique, Federico

We uncover the complete ordinal implications of supermodularity on finite lattices under the assumption of weak monotonicity. In this environment, we show that supermodularity is ordinally equivalent...