Gary Charness

Cooperation and Competition in Intergenerational Experiments in the Field and in the Laboratory (2009)

There is economic pressure towards the postponement of the retirement age, but employers are still reluctant to employ older workers. We investigate the comparative behavior of juniors and seniors in...

Hidden Information, Bargaining Power and Efficiency: An Experiment (2009)

There is economic pressure towards the postponement of the retirement age, but employers are still reluctant to employ older workers. We investigate the comparative behavior of juniors and seniors in...

Cabrales, Antonio, Charness, Gary, Villeval, Marie Claire

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of bargaining power on the design and the selection of contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each...

2007): “Individual and Group Decision Making Under Risk: An Experimental Study of Bayesian Updating and Violations of First-order Stochastic Dominance (2008)

Gary Charness, Edi Karni, Dan Levin

In this paper, we report the results of experiments designed to test whether individuals and groups abide by the axioms of monotonicity, with respect to first-order stochastic dominance and Bayesian...

"Optimal Contracts with Team Production and Hidden Information: An Experiment" (2008)

Competition and the Ratchet Effect (2008)

It is standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. Yet it may be useful to consider social...

Charness, Gary, Villeval, Marie-Claire, Kuhn, Peter

The ratchet effect refers to a situation where a principal uses private information that is revealed by an agents early actions to the agents later disadvantage, in a context where binding...

Competition and the Ratchet Effect (2008)

Charness, Gary, Villeval, Marie-Claire, Kuhn, Peter

The ‘ratchet effect’ refers to a situation where a principal uses private information that is revealed by an agent’s early actions to the agent’s later disadvantage, in a context where...

Promises & Partnership (2007)

Gary Charness, Martin Dufwenberg, Guillaume Frechette, Dan Friedman, Drew Fudenberg, Simon Gächter, ...

Abstract: We examine, experimentally and theoretically, how communication within a partnership may mitigate the problem (highlighted in contract theory) of hidden action. What is the form and content...

Cooperation, Competition, and Risk Attitudes: An Intergenerational Field and Laboratory Experiment (2007)

Cooperation, Competition, and Risk Attitudes: An Intergenerational Field and Laboratory Experiment (2007)

The population of most developed societies is graying. As life expectancy increases and the large baby-boom generation approaches retirement age, this has critical consequences for maintaining a...

The Role of Responsibility in Strategic Risk-Taking (2007)

The population of most developed societies is graying. As life expectancy increases and the large baby-boom generation approaches retirement age, this has critical consequences for maintaining a...

Gary Charness, Matthew O. Jackson

Abstract: We explore play between groups where one member of each 2-person group dictates the play of that group and is therefore responsible for the payoff of the other group member. We compare this...

Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment (2007)

Brandts, Jordi, Cabrales, Antonio [acabrale], Charness, Gary

The Dixit (Econ J 90:95–106, 1980) hypothesis that incumbents use investment in capacity to deter potential entrants has found little empirical support. Bagwell and Ramey (J Econ 27:660–680,...

Competition, hidden information, and efficiency : an experiment (2006)

Cabrales, Antonio [acabrale], Charness, Gary, Villeval, Marie-Claire

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent...

Retribution in a cheap-talk experiment. (2006)

Competition, Hidden information, and Efficiency: an Experiment (2006)

We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people choose to punish or reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person’s payoff. One player sends a...

Competition, Hidden Information and Efficiency: An Experiment (2006)

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent...

Cabrales, Antonio, Charness, Gary, Villeval, Marie-Claire

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent...

Competition, Hidden Information and Efficiency: An Experiment (2006)

Cabrales, Antonio, Charness, Gary, Villeval, Marie-Claire

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent...

Competition, Hidden information, and Efficiency: an Experiment (2006)

Expressed Preferences and Behavior in Experimental Games (2004)

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent...

When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity, and Affect (2003)

It is traditional in experimental games to allow participants to choose only actions or possibly communicate intended play. In sequential two-person games, we require first movers to express a...

Charness, Gary, Levin, Dan

We examine decision-making under risk and uncertainty in a laboratory experiment. The heart of our design examines how one's propensity to use Bayes' rule is affected by whether this rule is aligned...

They are watching you: Social facilitation in institutions (2003)

Charness, Gary, Rigotti, Luca, Rustichini, Aldo

Social facilitation describes the effect on performance due to the mere presence of others. Here we study the effect of the mere presence of an audience on the behavior of people involved in a...

Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation (2003)

Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation (2003)

While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long argued that excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firms...

Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation (2003)

While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long argued that excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firms...

Brandts, Jordi, Cabrales, Antonio [acabrale], Charness, Gary

While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long argued that excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firms...

The Road to Hell: An Experimental Study of Intentions (2003)

How New Is the "New Employment Contract"? (2003)

Do people care about intentions? Good intentions often do not produce good results when a person tries to do something nice for someone else. In this paper, we ask under what circumstances do people...

Levine, David I, Belman, Dale, Charness, Gary, Groshen, Erica L, O'Shaughnessy, K C

Forward Induction and the Excess Capacity Puzzle: An Experimental Investigation (2003)

An Experiment on Nash Implementation (2003)

While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long argued that excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firms...

Cabrales, Antonio [acabrale], Charness, Gary, Corchón, Luis C. [lcorchon]

We perform an experimental test of a modification of the controversial canonical mechanism for Nash implementation, using three subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as three outcomes, states of...

Do Market Conditions Affect Gift Exchange? Evidence from Experimental Markets (2003)

Portfolio Choice and Risk Attitudes: An Experiment (2003)

We study whether behavior in experimental gift-exchange markets with repeated interaction is affected by market conditions. One issue we consider is the impact of competitive imbalance, by varying...

Charness, Gary, Gneezy, Uri

We study the following basic intuition: when faced with a decision how to split their investment between a risky lottery and an asset with a fixed return, people increase the proportion invested in...

Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation. (2003)

How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange? (2002)

While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long argued that excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firms...

Charness, Gary, Frechette, Guillaume R, Kagel, John H

The gift-exchange game is a form of sequential prisoner's dilemma, developed by Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993), and popularized in a series of papers by Ernst Fehr and co-authors. While the...

Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests (2002)

Do market conditions affect gift exchange? Evidence from experimental markets with excess supply and excess demand (2001)

Departures from self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We design a range of simple experimental games that test these theories more directly than...

Cheap Talk, Information, and Coordination -Experimental Evidence (2001)

We study whether people's behavior in unbalanced gift exchange markets with repeated interaction are affected by whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market....

Cheap Talk, Information, and Coordination -Experimental Evidence (2001)

Costless and non-binding pre-play communication (cheap talk) has been found to often be effective in achieving efficient outcomes in experimental games. However, in previous two-player experimental...

Social Distance and Reciprocity: The Internet vs. the Laboratory (2001)

Costless and non-binding pre-play communication (cheap talk) has been found to often be effective in achieving efficient outcomes in experimental games. However, in previous two-player experimental...

Charness, Gary, Haruvy, Ernan, Sonsino, Doron

We explore the effects of social distance on reciprocal behavior in an experiment conducted over the Internet on three continents and in classroom laboratory sessions conducted in Israel and Spain....

Social Distance and Reciprocity: The Internet vs. the Laboratory (2001)

Charness, Gary, Haruvy, Ernan, Sonsino, Doron

We explore the effects of social distance on reciprocal behavior in an experiment conducted over the Internet on three continents and in classroom laboratory sessions conducted in Israel and Spain....

Do market conditions affect gift exchange? Evidence from experimental markets with excess supply and excess demand (2001)

PREFERENCES WITH SIMPLE TESTS * (2001)

We study whether people's behavior in unbalanced gift exchange markets with repeated interaction are affected by whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market....

What's in a Name? Anonymity and Social Distance in Dictator and Ultimatum Games (2000)

Departures from self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of “social preferences”. We design a range of simple experimental games that test these theories more directly...

Charness, Gary, Gneezy, Uri

The standard procedure in experimental economics maintains anonymity among laboratory participants. Yet, many field interactions are conducted with neither complete anonymity nor complete...

Bargaining on Networks: An Experiment (2000)

Charness, Gary, Corominas Bosch, Margarida

While markets are often decentralized, in many other cases agents in one role can only negotiate with a proper subset of the agents in the complementary role. There may be proximity issues or...

Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model (2000)

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment (2000)

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary...

Do Market Conditions Affect Preferences? Evidence from Experimental Markets with Excess Supply and Excess Demand (2000)

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly...

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment (2000)

We study whether people's preferences in an unbalanced market are affected by whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market. Our analysis is based on the...

Cabrales, Antonio [acabrale], Charness, Gary

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentivecompatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly...

What’s in a Name? Anonymity and Social (2000)

Ultimatum Games, Gary Charness, Uri Gneezy, Ultimatum Games, Gary Charness, Uri Gneezy

The standard procedure in experimental economics maintains anonymity among laboratory participants. Yet, many field interactions are conducted with neither complete anonymity nor complete...

Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model First (2000)

Gary Charness, Acknowledgments We, Jordi Br, Antonio Cabrales, Colin Camerer, Chris Shannon

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with...

Relative Payoffs and Happiness: An Experimental Study (2000)

Social Preferences: (2000)

Some current utility models presume that people are concerned with their relative standing in a reference group. If this is true, do certain types care more about this than others? Using simple...

Some Simple Tests, Gary Charness, Matthew Rabin

: Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with...

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment (2000)

Bargaining on Networks: An Experiment (2000)

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly...

Gary Charness And, Gary Charness, Margarida Corominas-bosch, Antoni Calvó-armengol, Vince Crawford

While markets are often decentralized, in many other cases agents in one role can only negotiate with a proper subset of the agents in the complementary role. There may be proximity issues or...

Retribution in a Cheap-talk Experiment (1999)

Retribution In A Cheap-Talk Experiment (1999)

We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people choose to punish or reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person's payoff. One player sends a...

Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model (1999)

This paper is part of the EU-TMR Research Network ENDEAR (FMRX-CT98—0238).

Relative Payoffs and Happiness: An Experimental Study (1999)

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary...

Altruism, Equity, and Reciprocity in a Gift-Exchange Experiment: An Encompassing Approach (1999)

Some current utility models presume that people are concerned with their relative standing in a reference group. If this is true, do certain types care more about this than others? Using simple...

Charness, Gary, Haruvy, Ernan

Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motives must be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recent models of non-pecuniary motives can be classified as...

When are Layoffs Acceptable? Evidence from a Quasi-experiment (1999)

Self-serving Biases: Evidence from a Simulated Labor Relationship (1999)

Many authors have discussed a decline in internal labor markets and an apparent shift to a new employment contract, characterized by less commitment between employer and employee and more portable...

Charness, Gary, Haruvy, Ernan

Previous studies have found evidence of a self-serving bias in bargaining and dispute resolution. We use experimental data to test for this effect in a simulated labor relatonship. We find a...

Retribution In A Cheap-Talk Experiment (1999)

Responsibility-Allevation and Effort Provision in a Gift-Exchange Experiment (1998)

We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people choose to punish or reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person's payoff. One player sends...

Reputation and Honesty in a Market for Information (1998)

Previous indirect evidence suggests that impulses towards pro-social behavior are diminished when an external authority is responsible for an outcome. The responsibility-alleviation effect states...

Charness, Gary, Garoupa, Nuno

Previous works on asymmetric information in asset markets tend to focus on the potential gains in the asset market itself. We focus on the market for information and conduct an experimental study to...

Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games (1998)

Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games (1998)

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our hot treatment the second player...

Pre-Play Communication and Credibility: A Test of Aumann's Conjecture (1998)

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our “hot” treatment the second player...

An Experiment on Nash Implementation (1998)

The effectiveness of pre-play communication in achieving efficient outcomes has long been a subject of controversy. In some environments, cheap talk may help to achieve coordination. However, Aumann...

An Experiment on Nash Implementation (1998)

We perform an experimental test of Maskin's canonical mechanism for Nash implementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We find...

Cabrales, Antonio [acabrale], Charness, Gary, Corchón, Luis C. [lcorchon]

We perform an experimental test of Maskin's canonical mechanism for Nash implementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We nd...

Bargaining Efficiency and Screening: An Experimental Investigation (1998)

Attribution and Reciprocity in a Simulated Labor Market: An Experimental Investigation (1996)

This paper investigates whether information about fairness types can be useful in lowering dispute costs and enhancing bargaining efficiency. An experiment was conducted in which subjects were first...

Expressed preferences and behavior in experimental games

While papers such as Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and Rabin (1993) argue that psychological considerations such as fairness and reciprocity are important in individual decision-making, there is little...

"Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation"

Attribution and Reciprocity in an Experimental Labor Market

While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long argued that excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firms...

Competition, Hidden Information, and Efficiency: an Experiment

The gift-exchange game has established that, in the laboratory, higher wages offered by an employer lead to considerably more costly effort provision. However, it is unclear whether this behavior...

Antonio Cabrales, Gary Charness, Marie-Claire Villeval

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent...

Attribution and Reciprocity in a Simulated Labor Market: An Experimental Investigation

Bargaining Efficiency and Screening: An Experimental Investigation

While papers such as Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and Rabin (1993) argue that psychological considerations such as fairness and reciprocity are important in individual decision-making, there is little...

Pre-Play Communication and Credibility: A Test of Aumann's Conjecture

This paper investigates whether information about fairness types can be useful in lowering dispute costs and enhancing bargaining efficiency. An experiment was conducted in which subjects were first...

An Experiment on Nash Implementation

The effectiveness of pre-play communication in achieving efficient outcomes has long been a subject of controversy. In some environments, cheap talk may help to achieve coordination. However, Aumann...

Antonio Cabrales, Gary Charness, Luis Corchón

We perform an experimental test of Maskin's canonical mechanism for Nash implementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We find...

Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games

Responsibility-Allevation and Effort Provision in a Gift-Exchange Experiment

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our “hot” treatment the second player...

Reputation and Honesty in a Market for Information

Previous indirect evidence suggests that impulses towards pro-social behavior are diminished when an external authority is responsible for an outcome. The responsibility-alleviation effect states...

Gary Charness, Nuno Garoupa

Previous works on asymmetric information in asset markets tend to focus on the potential gains in the asset market itself. We focus on the market for information and conduct an experimental study to...

Altruism, Equity, and Reciprocity in a Gift-Exchange Experiment: An Encompassing Approach

When are Layoffs Acceptable? Evidence from a Quasi-experiment

Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motives must be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recent models of non-pecuniary motives can be classified as...

Self-serving Biases: Evidence from a Simulated Labor Relationship

Many authors have discussed a decline in internal labor markets and an apparent shift to a new employment contract, characterized by less commitment between employer and employee and more portable...

Relative Payoffs and Happiness: An Experimental Study

Previous studies have found evidence of a self-serving bias in bargaining and dispute resolution. We use experimental data to test for this effect in a simulated labor relatonship. We find a...

Retribution in a Cheap-talk Experiment

Some current utility models presume that people are concerned with their relative standing in a reference group. If this is true, do certain types care more about this than others? Using simple...

Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model

We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people choose to punish or reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person's payoff. One player sends a...

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary...

Do Market Conditions Affect Preferences? Evidence from Experimental Markets with Excess Supply and Excess Demand

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly...

Bargaining on Networks: An Experiment

We study whether people's preferences in an unbalanced market are affected by whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market. Our analysis is based on the...

Gary Charness, Margarida Corominas

While markets are often decentralized, in many other cases agents in one role can only negotiate with a proper subset of the agents in the complementary role. There may be proximity issues or...

Social distance and reciprocity: An Internet experiment

Charness, Gary, Haruvy, Ernan, Sonsino, Doron

Competition, hidden information, and efficiency : an experiment

Antonio Cabrales, Gary Charness, Marie-Claire Villeval

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent...

Competition, Hidden information, and Efficiency: an Experiment

Forward Induction and the Excess Capacity Puzzle: An Experimental Investigation

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent...

How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange?

While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long argued that excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firms...

Gary Charness, Guillaume R. Frechette, John H. Kagel

The gift-exchange game is a form of sequential prisoner's dilemma, developed by Fehr et al. (1993), and popularized in a series of papers by Ernst Fehr and co-authors. While the European studies...

Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games

Intention and Stochastic Outcomes: An Experimental study

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our â€œhotâ€ treatment the second...

Endogenous Transfers in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game: An Experimental Test Of Cooperation And Coordination

Do people care about intentions - even when good intentions do not produce good results? In our experiments we find that rates of punishment and reward react strongly to intentions (the wage a firm...

Gary Charness, Cheng-Zhong Qin

We study experimentally a two-stage compensation mechanism for promoting cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games. In stage 1, players simultaneously choose binding non-negative amounts to pay their...

When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity, and Affect

They are watching you: Social facilitation in institutions

We examine decision-making under risk and uncertainty in a laboratory experiment. The heart of our design examines how one's propensity to use Bayes' rule is affected by whether this rule is aligned...

Gary Charness, Luca Rigotti, Aldo Rustichini

Social facilitation describes the effect on performance due to the mere presence of others. Here we study the effect of the mere presence of an audience on the behavior of people involved in a...

Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation

The Road to Hell: An Experimental Study of Intentions

While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long argued that excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firms...

Gary Charness, David Levine

Do people care about intentions? Good intentions often do not produce good results when a person tries to do something nice for someone else. In this paper, we ask under what circumstances do people...

"Optimal Contracts with Team Production and Hidden Information: An Experiment"

Do Market Conditions Affect Gift Exchange? Evidence from Experimental Markets

It is standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. Yet it may be useful to consider social...

Portfolio Choice and Risk Attitudes: An Experiment

We study whether behavior in experimental gift-exchange markets with repeated interaction is affected by market conditions. One issue we consider is the impact of competitive imbalance, by varying...

How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange?

We study the following basic intuition: when faced with a decision how to split their investment between a risky lottery and an asset with a fixed return, people increase the proportion invested in...

Gary Charness, Guillaume Frechette, John Kagel

The gift-exchange game is a form of sequential prisoner's dilemma, developed by Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993), and popularized in a series of papers by Ernst Fehr and co-authors. While the...

Cheap Talk, Information, and Coordination -Experimental Evidence

Social Distance and Reciprocity: The Internet vs. the Laboratory

Costless and non-binding pre-play communication (cheap talk) has been found to often be effective in achieving efficient outcomes in experimental games. However, in previous two-player experimental...

Gary Charness, Ernan Haruvy, Doron Sonsino

We explore the effects of social distance on reciprocal behavior in an experiment conducted over the Internet on three continents and in classroom laboratory sessions conducted in Israel and Spain....

What's in a Name? Anonymity and Social Distance in Dictator and Ultimatum Games

When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity, and Affect

The standard procedure in experimental economics maintains anonymity among laboratory participants. Yet, many field interactions are conducted with neither complete anonymity nor complete...

Erratum to "Changes in the employment contact? Evidence from a quasi-experiment" [Econ. Behav. Org. 47 (2002) 391-405]

An experiment on Nash implementation

Cabrales, Antonio, Charness, Gary, Corchon, Luis C.

Changes in the employment contract?: Evidence from a quasi-experiment

Relative payoffs and happiness: an experimental study

Bargaining efficiency and screening: an experimental investigation

Responsibility and effort in an experimental labor market

An investment game with third-party intervention

Gary Charness, Ramón Cobo-Reyes, Natalia Jiménez

This paper explores the effect of the possibility of third-party intervention on behavior in a variant of the Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) “Investment Game”. A third-party’s material...

Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation

Charness, Gary, Jackson, Matthew O.

We study games played between groups of players, where a given group decides which strategy it will play through a vote by its members. When groups consist of two voting players, our games can also...

Altruism, equity, and reciprocity in a gift-exchange experiment: an encompassing approach

Charness, Gary, Haruvy, Ernan

Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test Of Aumann's Conjecture

Reputation, Honesty, and Efficiency with Insider Information: an Experiment

Gary Charness, Nuno Garoupa

We conduct an experimental study of sales of insider information about an asset's future value, where the insiders cannot purchase the underlying asset. We examine whether such information is...

Individual and group decision making under risk: An experimental study of Bayesian updating and violations of first-order stochastic dominance

Gary Charness, Edi Karni, Dan Levin

Decision making under risk, Group decisions, Bayesian updating, First-order stochastic dominance, D80, C91, C92,

Bargaining and network structure: An experiment

Charness, Gary, Corominas-Bosch, Margarida, Frechette, Guillaume R.

Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation

Charness, Gary, Jackson, Matthew O.

Individual Behavior and Group Membership

Gary Charness, Luca Rigotti, Aldo Rustichini

People who are members of a group and identify with it behave differently from people who perceive themselves as isolated individuals. This paper shows that group membership affects preferences over...

Endogenous transfers in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An experimental test of cooperation and coordination

Charness, Gary, Frechette, Guillaume R., Qin, Cheng-Zhong

When are layoffs acceptable? Evidence from a quasi-experiment.

When are layoffs acceptable? Evidence from a quasi-experiment.

If, as has been widely suggested, internal labor markets are declining and a new employment contract with reduced employer-employee commitment is emerging, the criteria by which employees judge...

Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model

If, as has been widely suggested, internal labor markets are declining and a new employment contract with reduced employer-employee commitment is emerging, the criteria by which employees judge...

Bargaining and Network Structure: An Experiment

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary...

Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation

Abstract: We consider bargaining in a bipartite network of buyers and sellers, who can only trade with the limited number of people with whom they are connected. Such networks could arise due to...

Matthew Jackson, Gary Charness

We study games played between groups of players, where a given group decides which strategy it will play through a vote by its members. When groups consist of two voting players, our games can also...

Promises and Partnership

Do Co-Workers’ Wages Matter? Theory and Evidence on Wage Secrecy, Wage Compression and Effort

We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with people striving to live...

Charness, Gary, Kuhn, Peter

We study worker and firm behavior in an environment where worker effort could depend on co-workers’ wages. Theoretically, we show that an increase in workers’ ‘concerns’ with coworkers’...

Competition, Hidden Information and Efficiency: An Experiment

Antonio Cabrales, Gary Charness, Marie-Claire Villeval

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent...

Cooperation, Competition, and Risk Attitudes: An Intergenerational Field and Laboratory Experiment

Do market conditions affect gift exchange? Evidence from experimental markets with excess supply and excess demand

The population of most developed societies is ‘graying’. As life expectancy increases and the large baby-boom generation approaches retirement age, this has critical consequences for maintaining...

What makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence

We study whether people's behavior in unbalanced gift exchange markets with repeated interaction are affected by whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market....

When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity, and Affect

They are watching you: Social facilitation in institutions

We examine decision-making under risk and uncertainty in a laboratory experiment. The heart of our design examines how one's propensity to use Bayes' rule is affected by whether this rule is aligned...

Gary Charness, Luca Rigotti, Aldo Rustichini

Social facilitation describes the effect on performance due to the mere presence of others. Here we study the effect of the mere presence of an audience on the behavior of people involved in a...

Do Market Conditions Affect Gift Exchange? Evidence from Experimental Markets

Portfolio Choice and Risk Attitudes: An Experiment

We study whether behavior in experimental gift-exchange markets with repeated interaction is affected by market conditions. One issue we consider is the impact of competitive imbalance, by varying...

Cheap Talk, Information, and Coordination -Experimental Evidence

We study the following basic intuition: when faced with a decision how to split their investment between a risky lottery and an asset with a fixed return, people increase the proportion invested in...

Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model

Costless and non-binding pre-play communication (cheap talk) has been found to often be effective in achieving efficient outcomes in experimental games. However, in previous two-player experimental...

Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary...

Expressed Preferences and Behavior in Experimental Games

Departures from self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We design a range of simple experimental games that test these theories more directly than...

Do Labour Market Conditions Affect Gift Exchange? Some Experimental Evidence

It is traditional in experimental games to allow participants to choose only actions or possibly communicate intended play. In sequential two-person games, we require first movers to express a...

An Experimental Test of Risk-Sharing Arrangements

We study how two dimensions of market conditions affect behaviour in experimental gift-exchange markets with repeated interaction. First, we consider the impact of competitive imbalance, by varying...

Garance Genicot, Gary Charness

We investigate risk sharing without commitment by designing an experiment to match a simple model of voluntary insurance between two agents when aggregate income is constant. Participants are matched...

Promises & Partnership

Charness, Gary, Dufwenberg, Martin

We examine, experimentally and theoretically, how communication within a partnership may mitigate the problem (highlighted in contract theory) of hidden action. What is the form and content of the...

Expressed Preferences and Behavior in Experimental Games

Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests

It is traditional in experimental games to allow participants to choose only actions or possibly communicate intended play. In sequential two-person games, we require first movers to express a...

Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model

Departures from self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We design a range of simple experimental games that test these theories more directly than...

Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary...

The Road to Hell: An Experimental Study of Intentions

While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long argued that excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firms...

Gary Charness, David Levine

Do people care about intentions? Good intentions often do not produce good results when a person tries to do something nice for someone else. In this paper, we ask under what circumstances do people...

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection & Social Preferences: An Experiment

How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange?

It is standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. Yet it may be useful to consider social...

Gary Charness, Guillaume Frechette, John Kagel

The gift-exchange game is a form of sequential prisoner's dilemma, developed by Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993), and popularized in a series of papers by Ernst Fehr and co-authors. While the...

Social Distance and Reciprocity: The Internet vs. the Laboratory

Gary Charness, Ernan Haruvy, Doron Sonsino

We explore the effects of social distance on reciprocal behavior in an experiment conducted over the Internet on three continents and in classroom laboratory sessions conducted in Israel and Spain....

What's in a Name? Anonymity and Social Distance in Dictator and Ultimatum Games

Understanding Social Preferences With Simple Tests

The standard procedure in experimental economics maintains anonymity among laboratory participants. Yet, many field interactions are conducted with neither complete anonymity nor complete...

Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment

Departures from self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences." We design a range of simple experimental games that test these theories more directly than...

What's in a Name? Anonymity and Social Distance in Dictator and Ultimatum Games

Entry, Capacity investment, Experiment, Forward induction, Equilibrium selection, First-mover advantage, C70, C91, D42, L11, L12,

Social Distance and Reciprocity: The Internet vs. the Laboratory

Gary Charness, Ernan Haruvy, Doron Sonsino

We explore the effects of social distance on reciprocal behavior in an experiment conducted over the Internet on three continents and in classroom laboratory sessions conducted in Israel and Spain....

Cheap Talk, Information, and Coordination- Experimental Evidence

An investment game with third-party intervention

Charness, Gary, Cobo-Reyes, Ramón, Jiménez, Natalia

What's in a name? Anonymity and social distance in dictator and ultimatum games

Charness, Gary, Gneezy, Uri

Competition, Hidden information, and Efficiency: an Experiment

Competition, Hidden Information and Efficiency: An Experiment

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent...

Antonio Cabrales, Gary Charness, Marie-Claire Villeval

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent...

Cooperation, Competition, and Risk Attitudes: An Intergenerational Field and Laboratory Experiment

An Experimental Test of Risk-Sharing Arrangements

The population of most developed societies is ‘graying’. As life expectancy increases and the large baby-boom generation approaches retirement age, this has critical consequences for maintaining...

Gary Charness, Santa Barbara And Garance Genicot

We investigate risk-sharing without commitment by designing an experiment to match a simple model of voluntary insurance between two agents when aggregate income is constant. Participants are matched...

Bargaining on Networks: An Experiment

Gary Charness, Margarida Corominas-Bosch

While markets are often decentralized, in many other cases agents in one role can only negotiate with a proper subset of the agents in the complementary role. There may be proximity issues or...

The Origin of the Winner’s Curse: A Laboratory Study

Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation

Gary Charness, Matthew O. Jackson

Promises and Partnership

Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation

Bayesian Updating vs. Reinforcement and Affect: A Laboratory Study

Pay Inequality, Pay Secrecy, and Effort: Theory and Evidence

Gary Charness, Peter Kuhn

We study worker and firm behavior in an efficiency-wage environment where co-workers' wages may potentially influence a worker's effort. Theoretically, we show that an increase in workers'...

Does Pay Inequality Affect Worker Effort? Experimental Evidence

Gary Charness, Peter Kuhn

We study worker behavior in an efficiency-wage environment in which coworkers’ wages can influence a worker’s effort. Theoretically, we show that an increase in workers’ responsiveness to...

Competition, Hidden Information and Efficiency: An Experiment

Antonio Cabrales, Gary Charness, Marie-Claire Villeval

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent...

Cooperation, Competition, and Risk Attitudes: An Intergenerational Field and Laboratory Experiment

Hidden Information, Competition and Efficiency

The population of most developed societies is ‘graying’. As life expectancy increases and the large baby-boom generation approaches retirement age, this has critical consequences for maintaining...

Antonio Cabrales, Gary Charness, Marie-Claire Villeval

hidden information; competition; efficiency

Competition and Adverse Selection

Antonio Cabrales, Gary Charness, Marie-Claire Villeval

competition; adverse selection

Three Field Experiments on Procrastination and Willpower

Nicholas Burger, Gary Charness, John Lynham

Competition and the Ratchet Effect

Gary Charness, Marie-Claire Villeval, Peter Kuhn

The ‘ratchet effect’ refers to a situation where a principal uses private information that is revealed by an agent’s early actions to the agent’s later disadvantage, in a context where...

Competition and the Ratchet Effect

Charness, Gary, Kuhn, Peter J., Villeval, Marie-Claire

The 'ratchet effect' refers to a situation where a principal uses private information that is revealed by an agent's early actions to the agent's later disadvantage, in a context where binding...

Competition and the Ratchet Effect

Gary Charness, Peter Kuhn, Marie-Claire Villeval

The ‘ratchet effect’ refers to a situation where a principal uses private information that is revealed by an agent’s early actions to the agent’s later disadvantage, in a context where...

Attribution and Reciprocity in an Experimental Labor Market

Hidden Information, Bargaining Power and Efficiency: An Experiment

The gift-exchange game has established that, in the laboratory, higher wages offered by an employer lead to considerably more costly effort provision. However, it is unclear whether this behavior...

Gary Charness, Marie Claire Villeval, Antonio Cabrales

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of bargaining power on the design and the selection of contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each...

The Origin of the Winner's Curse: A Laboratory Study

The role of responsibility in strategic risk-taking

The Winner's Curse (WC) is a robust and persistent deviation from theoretical predictions established in experimental economics and claimed to exist in field environments. Recent attempts to...

Charness, Gary, Jackson, Matthew O.

We explore play between groups where one member of each 2-person group dictates the play of that group and is therefore responsible for the payoff of the other group member. We compare this to play...

Informal Risk Sharing in an Infinite-Horizon Experiment

Gary Charness, Garance Genicot

Our laboratory study of risk sharing without commitment captures the main features of a simple model of voluntary insurance. Participants are paired in matches with stochastic endings. Each period...

BARGAINING EFFICIENCY AND SCREENING: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION

Strong Evidence for Gender Differences in Investment

This paper investigates whether information about generosity or fairness can be useful in lowering dispute costs and enhancing bargaining efficiency. Subjects were first screened using a dictator...

Individual and Group Decision Making Under Risk: An Experimental Study of Bayesian Updating and Violations of First-order Stochastic Dominance

Are men more willing to take financial risks than women? The answer to this question has immediate relevance for many economic issues. We propose a novel approach in which we assemble the data from...

Gary Charness, Edi Karni

This paper reports the results of experiments designed to test whether individuals and groups abide by monotonicity with respect to first-order stochastic dominance and Bayesian updating, when making...

The Role of Responsibility in Strategic Risk-Taking

Gary Charness, Matthew Jackson

We explore play between groups where one member of each 2-person group dictates the play of that group and is therefore responsible for the payoff of the other group member. We compare this to play...

Broken Promises: An Experiment

Cheap Talk, Information, and Coordination -Experimental Evidence

We test whether promises per se are effective in enhancing cooperative behavior in a form of trust game. In a new treatment, rather than permitting free-form messages, we instead allow only a bare...

WHEN IS EMPLOYEE RETALIATION ACCEPTABLE AT WORK? EVIDENCE FROM QUASI-EXPERIMENTS

Costless and non-binding pre-play communication (cheap talk) has been found to often be effective in achieving efficient outcomes in experimental games. However, in previous two-player experimental...

ATTRIBUTION AND RECIPROCITY IN AN EXPERIMENTAL LABOR MARKET

When is employee retaliation acceptable in the workplace? We use a quasi-experimental design to study the acceptability of several forms of retaliatory behavior at work, gathering data in this...

Papers such as Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and Rabin (1993) argue that considerations such as fairness and reciprocity are important in individual decision-making. The gift-exchange game (Fehr,...

Promises & Partnership

Expressed Preferences and Behavior in Experimental Games

We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with people striving to live...

The Origin of the Winner's Curse: A Laboratory Study

Participants in experimental games typically can only choose actions, without making comments about other participants' future actions. In sequential two-person games, we allow first movers to...

OPTIMAL CONTRACTS WITH TEAM PRODUCTION AND HIDDEN INFORMATION: AN EXPERIMENT

The Winner's Curse (WC) is one of the most robust and persistent deviations fromtheoretical predictions that has been established in experimental economics and claimed to exist in many field...

Gary Charness, Antonio Cabrales

It is standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. Yet it may be useful to consider social forces...

On the Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment: New Experimental Evidence

Gary Charness, Dan Levin, Edi Karni

This paper reports the results of a series of experiments designed to test whether and to what extent individuals succumb to the conjunction fallacy. Using an experimental design of Kahneman and...

Endogenous Group Formation and Public Goods Provision: Exclusion, Exit, Mergers, and Redemption

Gary Charness, Chun-Lei Yang

We test a mechanism whereby groups are formed endogenously, through the use of voting. Once formed, groups play a public-goods game, where there are economies of scale: in two treatments the social...

COMPETITION, HIDDEN INFORMATION, AND EFFICIENCY: AN EXPERIMENT

Gary Charness, Antonio Cabrales, MARIE-CLAIRE VILLEVAL

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent...

Instituto de AnÃ¡lisis EconÃ³mico

Gary Charness, Jordi Brandts

This paper presents evidence that the willingness to punish an unfair action is sensitive to whether this action was preceded by a deceptive message. One player first sends a message indicating an...

MINIMUM ADVERTISED-PRICE POLICY RULES AND RETAILER BEHAVIOR: AN EXPERIMENT BY HEWLETT-PACKARD

Gary Charness, Kay-Yut Chen

We tested the effects of various of policy rules on retailer behavior in laboratory experiments conducted at Hewlett-Packard Laboratories. Our experimental design models the multifaceted contemporary...

ALTRUISM, EQUITY, AND RECIPROCITY IN A GIFT-EXCHANGE EXPERIMENT: AN ENCOMPASSING APPROACH

CHANGES IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT? EVIDENCE FROM A QUASI-EXPERIMENT

Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motives must be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recent models of non-pecuniary motives can be classified as...

PRE-PLAY COMMUNICATIONS AND CREDIBILITY: A TEST OF AUMANN'S CONJECTURE

Many authors have discussed an apparent shift to a new employment contract characterized by less commitment between employer and employee, and closer ties between wages within the enterprise and...

SELF-SERVING BIASES: EVIDENCE FROM A SIMULATED LABOUR RELATIONSHIP

The effectiveness of pre-play communication in achieving efficient outcomes has long been a subject of controversy. In some environments, cheap talk may help to achieve coordination. However, Aumann...

REPUTATION AND HONESTY IN A MARKET FOR INFORMATION

A self-serving bias occurs when people subconsciously alter their perceptions about what is fair or right in a manner that serves their own interests. Perceptions of what is "a fair day's work for a...

Gary Charness, Nuno Garoupa

Previous works on asymmetric information in asset markets tend to focus on the potential gains in the asset market itself. We focus on the market for information and conduct an experimental study to...

RESPONSIBILITY AND EFFORT IN AN EXPERIMENTAL LABOR MARKET

WHEN ARE LAYOFFS ACCEPTABLE? EVIDENCE FROM A QUASI-EXPERIMENT

Previous indirect evidence suggests that impulses towards pro-social behavior are diminished when an external authority is responsible for an outcome. The responsibility-alleviation effect states...

RELATIVE PAYOFFS AND HAPPINESS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

Many authors have discussed a decline in internal labor markets and an apparent shift to a new employment contract, characterized by less commitment between employer and employee and more portable...

Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games

Some current utility models presume that people are concerned with their relative standing in a reference group. If this is true, do certain types care more about this than others? Using simple...

Gary Charness, Jordi Brandts

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our 'hot' treatment the second player...

UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL PREFERENCES WITH SIMPLE TESTS

An Experiment on Nash Implementation

Departures from self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We design a range of simple experimental games that test these theories more directly than...

Gary Charness, Antonio Cabrales, Luis Corchon

We perform an experimental test of a modification of the controversial canonical mechanism for Nash implementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 outcomes, states of nature,...

Informal Risk Sharing in an Infinite-horizon Experiment

Gary Charness, Garance Genicot

This paper presents the first laboratory study of risk-sharing without commitment. Our experiment captures the main features of a simple model of voluntary insurance between two agents. In the model,...

Cooperation and Competition in Intergenerational Experiments in

Gary Charness, MARIE-CLAIRE VILLEVAL

There is economic pressure towards the postponement of the retirement age, but employers are still reluctant to employ older workers. We investigate the comparative behavior of juniors and seniors in...

Incentives to Exercise

An investment game with third-party intervention

Can incentives be effective when trying to encourage the development of good habits? We investigate the effect of paying people a non-trivial amount of money to attend an exercise facility a number...

This paper explores the effect of the possibility of third-party intervention on behavior in a variant of the Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) "Investment Game". A third party's material payoff is...

Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation

Gary Charness, Matthew Jackson

We study games played between groups of players, where a given group decides which strategy it will play through a vote by its members. When groups consist of two voting players, our games can also...

Bargaining and Network Structure: An Experiment

Gary Charness, Margarida Corominas-Bosch, GUILLAUME FRECHETTE

We consider bargaining in a bipartite network of buyers and sellers, who can only trade with the limited number of people with whom they are connected. Such networks could arise due to proximity...

Incentives to Exercise

Cooperation and Competition in Intergenerational Experiments in the Field and in the Laboratory

Can incentives be effective in encouraging the development of good habits? We investigate the post-intervention effects of paying people to attend a gym a number of times during one month. In two...

Cooperation and Competition in Intergenerational Experiments in the Field and the Laboratory

There is economic pressure towards the postponement of the retirement age, but employers are still reluctant to employ older workers. We investigate the comparative behavior of juniors and seniors in...