The Involvement of the Orbitofrontal Cortex in the Experience of Regret (2009)
Nathalie Camille, Giorgio Coricelli, Jerome Sallet, Pascale Pradat-diehl, Jean-rené Duhamel, Angela Sirigu
Facing the consequence of a decision we made can trigger emotions like satisfaction, relief, or regret, which reflect our assessment of what was gained as compared to what would have been gained by...
The investment game with asymmetric information ∗ (2007)
Giorgio Coricelli, Luis González Morales, Amelie Mahlstedt
We analyze the effects of introducing asymmetric information and expectations in the investment game (Berg et al., 1995). In our ex-periment, only the trustee knows the size of the surplus....
STRATEGIC INTERACTION IN ITERATED ZERO-SUM GAMES (2007)
The aim of this research is to carry out an experimental study that analyzes strategic dependency in two-person iterated zero-sum games, and also explain the evidence for large variance in players...
Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally? (2007)
Coricelli, Giorgio, Joffily, Mateus, Montmarquette, Claude, Villeval, Marie-Claire
Les modèles économiques d'évasion fiscale prédisent que les individus devraient frauder dès que le bénéfice attendu de l'évasion dépasse son coût espéré. Sous cette condition, le fort...
Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally? (2007)
Coricelli, Giorgio, Joffily, Mateus, Montmarquette, Claude, Villeval, Marie-Claire
Les modèles économiques d'évasion fiscale prédisent que les individus devraient frauder dès que le bénéfice attendu de l'évasion dépasse son coût espéré. Sous cette condition, le fort...
Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally? (2007)
Coricelli, Giorgio, Joffily, Matteus, Montmarquette, Claude, Villeval, Marie-Claire
The economic models of tax compliance predict that individuals should evade taxes when the expected benefit of cheating is greater than its expected cost. When this condition is fulfilled, the high...
Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally? (2007)
Coricelli, Giorgio, Joffily, Matteus, Montmarquette, Claude, Villeval, Marie-Claire
The economic models of tax compliance predict that individuals should evade taxes when the expected benefit of cheating is greater than its expected cost. When this condition is fulfilled, the high...
Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally? (2007)
Coricelli, Giorgio, Joffily, Mateus, Montmarquette, Claude, Villeval, Marie-Claire
The economic models of tax compliance predict that individuals should evade taxes when the expected benefit of cheating is greater than its expected cost. When this condition is fulfilled, the high...
The investment game with asymmetric information (2006)
Coricelli, Giorgio, González Morales, Luis, Mahlstedt, Amelie
New Experimental Results on the Solidarity Game (2003)
Büchner,Susanne, Coricelli,Giorgio, Greiner,Ben
This paper revisits and extends the experiment on the solidarity game by Selten and Ockenfels (1998). We replicate the basic design of the solidarity game and extend it in order to t test the...
Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments (2003)
Coricelli,Giorgio, Fehr,Dietmar, Fellner,Gerlinde
This paper studies the e_ect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good. Subjects participate in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good...
The investment game with asymmetric information (2003)
Coricelli,Giorgio, González Morales,Luis, Mahlstedt,Amelie
We analyze the effects of introducing asymmetric information and expectations in the investment game (Berg et al., 1995). In our experiment, only the trustee knows the size of the surplus. Subjects'...
Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments (2003)
Coricelli, Giorgio, Fehr, Dietmar, Fellner, Gerlinde
This paper studies the e_ect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good. Subjects participate in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good...
The investment game with asymmetric information (2003)
Coricelli, Giorgio, González Morales, Luis, Mahlstedt, Amelie
We analyze the effects of introducing asymmetric information and expectations in the investment game (Berg et al., 1995). In our experiment, only the trustee knows the size of the surplus. Subjects'...
New Experimental Results on the Solidarity Game (2003)
Büchner, Susanne, Coricelli, Giorgio, Greiner, Ben
This paper revisits and extends the experiment on the solidarity game by Selten and Ockenfels (1998). We replicate the basic design of the solidarity game and extend it in order to t test the...
New Experimental Results on the Solidarity Game (2003)
Susanne Büchner, Giorgio Coricelli, Ben Greiner
This paper revisits and extends the experiment on the solidarity game by Selten and Ockenfels (1998). We replicate the basic design of the solidarity game and extend it in order to test the...
Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments (2003)
Giorgio Coricelli, Dietmar Fehr, Gerlinde Fellner, Werner Güth, Anna Gunnthorsdottir, Georg Kirchsteiger, ...
This paper studies the e#ect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good. Subjects participate in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good...
Double moral hazard: an experiment on warranties (1999)
Coricelli, Giorgio, Luni, Luigi
The paper designs a two-stage experiment to analyze a market for durable goods with warranties. In such a market double moral hazard may arise as the seller can reduce (increase) the initial quality...
Partner selection in public goods experiments
Giorgio Coricelli, Dietmar Fehr, Gerlinde Fellner
This paper studies the e_ect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good. Subjects participate in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good...
How the Brain Predicts and Evaluates Monetary Rewards
We study the relations between decision-making and emotions in normal subjects and in patients with brain damage. The experimental task is based on a simple gambling situation. This task allows to...
THE INVESTMENT GAME WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
Giorgio Coricelli, Luis González Morales, Amelie Mahlstedt
We analyze the effects of introducing asymmetric information and expectations in the investment game ( Berg et al., Games and Economic Behavior, 1995 , 10, 122-42). In our experiment, only the...
Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally?
Claude Montmarquette, Giorgio Coricelli, Mateus Joffily, Marie-Claire Villeval
The economic models of tax compliance predict that individuals should evade taxes when the expected benefit of cheating is greater than its expected cost. When this condition is fulfilled, the high...
Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally?
Giorgio Coricelli, Mateus Joffily, Claude Montmarquette, Marie-Claire Villeval
The economic models of tax compliance predict that individuals should evade taxes when the expected benefit of cheating is greater than its expected cost. When this condition is fulfilled, the high...
Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments
Coricelli, Giorgio, Fehr, Dietmar, Fellner, Gerlinde
This paper studies the effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good. Subjects participate in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good...
New Experimental Results on the Solidarity Game
Susanne Büchner, Giorgio Coricelli, Ben Greiner
This paper revisits and extends the experiment on the solidarity game by Selten and Ockenfels (1998). We replicate the basic design of the solidarity game and extend it in order to t test the...
Self Centered and Other Regarding Fairness in the Solidarity Game
Susanne Büchner, Giorgio Coricelli, Ben Greiner
This paper revisits and extends the experiment on the solidarity game by Selten and Ockenfels (1998). We replicate the basic design of the solidarity game and extend it in order to test the...
This paper presents an experimental analysis of people’s behavior in situations involving both positive and negative reciprocity. The experiment implements sequences of two types of extensive form...
Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally?
Giorgio Coricelli, Matteus Joffily, Claude Montmarquette, Marie-Claire Villeval
The economic models of tax compliance predict that individuals should evade taxes when the expected benefit of cheating is greater than its expected cost. When this condition is fulfilled, the high...
The Physionomics of Tax Evasion
Giorgio Coricelli, Matteus Joffily, Claude Montmarquette, Marie-Claire Villeval
tax evasion
The Physionomics of Tax Evasion
Giorgio Coricelli, Matteus Joffily, Claude Montmarquette, Marie-Claire Villeval
tax evasion
The Physionomics of Tax Evasion
Giorgio Coricelli, Matteus Joffily, Claude Montmarquette, Marie-Claire Villeval
tax evasion
Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally?
Giorgio Coricelli, Matteus Joffily, Claude Montmarquette, Marie-Claire Villeval
The economic models of tax compliance predict that individuals should evade taxes when the expected benefit of cheating is greater than its expected cost. When this condition is fulfilled, the high...
Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally?
Giorgio Coricelli, Mateus Joffily, Claude Montmarquette, Marie-Claire Villeval
The economic models of tax compliance predict that individuals should evade taxes when the expected benefit of cheating is greater than its expected cost. When this condition is fulfilled, the high...
Interdependent Utilities: How Social Ranking Affects Choice Behavior
Bault, Nadège, Coricelli, Giorgio, Rustichini, Aldo
Organization in hierarchical dominance structures is prevalent in animal societies, so a strong preference for higher positions in social ranking is likely to be an important motivation of human...
Neural correlates of depth of strategic reasoning in medial prefrontal cortex
Coricelli, Giorgio, Nagel, Rosemarie
We used functional MRI (fMRI) to investigate human mental processes in a competitive interactive setting—the “beauty contest” game. This game is well-suited for investigating whether and how a...