Jean-robert Tyran

Does Money Illusion Matter? (2007)

Ernst Fehr, Ernst Fehr, Jean-robert Tyran, Jean-robert Tyran

Money illusion means that people behave differently when the same objective situation is represented in nominal terms rather than in real terms. This paper shows that seemingly innocuous differences...

Does Money Illusion Matter? An Experimental Approach (2007)

Ernst Fehr, Ernst Fehr, Jean-robert Tyran, Jean-robert Tyran, Jim Cox, Urs Fischbacher

Money illusion means that people behave differently when the same objective situation is represented in nominal or in real terms. To examine the behavioral impact of money illusion we studied the...

Cournot Competition and Hit-and-Run Entry and Exit in a Teaching Experiment (2006)

Simon Gaechter, Christian Thöni, Jean-Robert Tyran

We describe a computerized experiment which can be used to introduce students to imperfect competition in courses on introductory economics, industrial organization, game theory, and strategy &...

Limited Rationality and Strategic Interaction: The Impact of the Strategic . . . (2002)

Ernst Fehr, Ernst Fehr, Jean-Robert Tyran, Jean-robert Tyran, Jel C, Charles Goodhart, ...

The evidence from many experiments suggests that people are heterogeneous with regard to their abilities to make rational, forward looking, decisions. This raises the question when the rational types...

Happiness, economy and institutions (2000)

Bruno S. Frey, Bruno S. Frey, Alois Stutzer, Alois Stutzer, Andrew Oswald, Marcel Savioz, ...

Summary: A cross-regional econometric analysis suggests that institutional factors in the form of direct democracy (via initiatives and referenda) and of federal structure (local autonomy)...

Individual Irrationality and Aggregate Outcomes

Ernst Fehr, Jean-Robert Tyran

There is abundant evidence that many individuals violate the rationality assumptions routinely made in economics. However, powerful evidence also indicates that violations of individual rationality...

Limited Rationality and Strategic Interaction, The Impact of the Strategic Environment on Nominal Inertia

Ernst Fehr, Jean-Robert Tyran

The evidence from many experiments suggests that people are heterogeneous with regard to their abilities to make rational, forward looking, decisions. This raises the question when the rational types...

Micro Evidence on the Adjustment of Sticky-Price Goods: It's How Often, Not How Much

Götte, Lorenz, Minsch, Rudolf, Tyran, Jean-Robert

We use a unique panel data set to analyse price setting in restaurants in Switzerland 1977-93, for items known to have sticky prices. The macroeconomic environment during this time period allows us...

Micro Evidence on the Adjustment of Sticky-Price Goods: It's How Often, not How Much

Lorenz Goette, Rudolf Minsch, Jean-Robert Tyran

We use a unique panel data set to analyze price setting in restaurants in Switzerland 1977-93, for items known to have sticky prices. The macroeconomic environment during this time period allows us...

Money Illusion and Coordination Failure

Fehr, Ernst, Tyran, Jean-Robert

Economists long considered money illusion to be largely irrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion has powerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent payoffs in nominal terms,...

Learning Trust

Iris Bohnet, Heike Harmgart, Steffen Huck, Jean-Robert Tyran

We examine the effects of different forms of feedback information on the performance of markets that suffer from moral hazard problems due to sequential exchange. As orthodox theory would predict, we...

Staying on the Dole

Holger Strulik, Jean-Robert Tyran, Paolo Vanini

We develop a simple model of short- and long-term unemployment to study how labor market institutions interact with labor market conditions and personal characteristics of the unemployed. We analyze...

Pricing and Trust

Steffen Huck, Gabriele K. Ruchala, Jean-Robert Tyran

We experimentally examine the effects of flexible and fixed prices in markets for experience goods in which demand is driven by trust. With flexible prices, we observe low prices and high quality in...

Pricing and Trust

Huck, Steffen, Ruchala, Gabriele K., Tyran, Jean-Robert

We experimentally examine the effects of flexible and fixed prices in markets for experience goods in which demand is driven by trust. With flexible prices, we observe low prices and high quality in...

Consumer Networks and Firm Reputation: A First Experimental Investigation

Steffen Huck, Gabriele K. Lünser, Jean-Robert Tyran

Arguing that consumers are the carriers of firms’ reputations, we examine the role of consumer networks for trust in markets that suffer from moral hazard. When consumers are embedded in a network,...

Competition Fosters Trust

Huck, Steffen, Ruchala, Gabriele K., Tyran, Jean-Robert

We study the effects of reputation and competition in a stylized market for experience goods. If interaction is anonymous, such markets perform poorly: sellers are not trustworthy, and buyers do not...

Reciprocity, Social Ties, and Competition in Markets for Experience Goods

Steffen Huck, Jean-Robert Tyran

Reciprocal customers may disproportionately improve the performance of markets for experience goods. Reciprocal customers reward (punish) firms for providing good (bad) quality by upholding...

Testing the Mill hypothesis of fiscal illusion

Rupert Sausgruber, Jean-Robert Tyran

According to the “Mill hypothesis”, the tax burden from indirect taxation is underestimated because indirect taxes are less “visible” than direct taxes. We experimentally test the Mill...

Competition Fosters Trust

Steffen Huck, Gabriele K. Ruchala, Jean-Robert Tyran

We study the effects of reputation and competition in a stylized market for experience goods. If interaction is anonymous, such markets perform poorly: sellers are not trustworthy, and buyers do not...

Pure Redistribution and the Provision of Public Goods

Rupert Sausgruber, Jean-Robert Tyran

We study pure redistribution as a device to increase cooperation and efficiency in the provision of public goods. Experimental subjects play a two-stage game. The first stage is the standard linear...

Does Money Illusion Matter?

Ernst Fehr, Jean-Robert Tyran

This paper shows that a small amount of individual-level money illusion may cause considerable aggregate nominal inertia after a negative nominal shock. In addition, our results indicate that...

Individual Irrationality and Aggregate Outcomes

Ernst Fehr, Jean-Robert Tyran

In their personal lives, many economists recognize that they are surrounded by individuals who are less than fully rational. In their professional lives, however, economists often use models that...

Does Money Illusion Matter? An Experimental Approach

Fehr, Ernst, Tyran, Jean-Robert

Money illusion means that people behave differently when the same objective situation is represented in nominal terms rather than in real terms. This paper shows that seemingly innocuous differences...

Staying on the Dole

Strulik, Holger, Tyran, Jean-Robert, Vanini, Paolo

We develop a simple model of short- and long-term unemployment to study how labour market institutions interact with labour market conditions and personal characteristics of the unemployed. We...

Tax Liability Side Equivalence in Gift-Exchange Labor Markets

Arno Riedl, Jean-Robert Tyran

Tax Liability Side Equivalence (tax LSE) claims that the statutory incidence of a tax is irrelevant for its economic incidence. In gift-exchange labor markets, firms provide a gift to workers by...

Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent

Jean-Robert Tyran, Lars P. Feld

Law backed by non-deterrent sanctions (mild law) has been hypothesized to achieve compliance because of norm activation. We experimentally investigate the effects of mild law in the provision of...

To Buy or Not to Buy? An Experimental Study of Consumer Boycotts in Retail Markets

Jean-Robert Tyran, Dirk Engelmann

We investigate experimentally how firms and consumers react to a sudden cost increase in a competitive retail market. We compare two conditions that exclusively differ with respect to how difficult...

Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-deterrent

Jean-Robert Tyran, Lars P. Feld

Law backed by non-deterrent sanctions (mild law) has been hypothesized to achieve compliance because of norm activation. We experimentally investigate the effects of mild law in the provision of...

Staying on the Dole

Strulik, Holger, Tyran, Jean-Robert, Vanini, Paolo

We develop a simple model of labor market participation, human capital degradation, and re-training. We focus on how non-participation, as a distinct state from unemployment and employment, is...

LIMITED RATIONALITY AND STRATEGIC INTERACTION: THE IMPACT OF THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT ON NOMINAL INERTIA

Ernst Fehr, Jean-Robert Tyran

Much evidence suggests that people are heterogeneous with regard to their abilities to make rational, forward-looking decisions. This raises the question as to when the rational types are decisive...

Does Money Illusion Matter? An Experimental Approach

Ernst Fehr, Jean-Robert Tyran

Money illusion means that people behave differently when the same objective situation is represented in nominal or in real terms. To examine the behavioral impact of money illusion we studied the...

Why People Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence from the Provision of Public Goods

Lars Feld, Jean-Robert Tyran

According to economists, severe legal sanctions deter violations of the law. According to legal scholars, people may obey law backed by mild sanctions because of norm-activation. We experimentally...

Limited Rationality and Strategic Interaction: The Impact of the Strategic Environment on Nominal Inertia

Ernst Fehr, Jean-Robert Tyran

Much evidence suggests that people are heterogeneous with regard to their abilities to make rational, forward-looking decisions. This raises the question as to when the rational types are decisive...

Consumer Networks and Firm Reputation: A First Experimental Investigation

Huck, Steffen, Lünser, Gabriele, Tyran, Jean-Robert

Arguing that consumers are the carriers of firms’ reputations, we examine the role of consumer networks for trust in markets that suffer from moral hazard. When consumers are embedded in a network,...

Tax Evasion and Voting: An Experimental Analysis.

Feld, Lars P, Tyran, Jean-Robert

The puzzle of tax compliance is why people pay taxes instead of evading them: given the low expected fines, rational taxpayers should decide to underreport taxable income. However, most taxpayers...

Money Illusion and Coordination Failure

Fehr, Ernst, Tyran, Jean-Robert

Economists long considered money illusion to be largely irrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion has powerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent payoffs in nominal terms,...

Money illusion and coordination failure

Ernst Fehr, Jean-Robert Tyran

Economists long considered money illusion to be largely irrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion has powerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent payoffs in nominal terms,...

The Diffusion of Policy Innovations. An Experimental Investigation

Jean-Robert Tyran, Rupert Sausgruber

What causes a government to adopt a new program or policy? Despite a large number of empirical studies available to date, the relative importance of various determinants remains obscure because of...

Tax Liability Side Equivalence in Gift-Exchange Labor Markets

Jean-Robert Tyran, Arno Riedl

Tax Liability Side Equivalence (tax LSE) claims that the statutory incidence of a tax is irrelevant for its economic incidence. In gift-exchange labor markets, firms provide a gift to workers by...

Price Rigidity in Customer Markets

Jean-Robert Tyran, Elke Renner

Customer markets are characterized by long-term relations between buyers and sellers. Long-term relations evolve if buyers trust sellers to provide high quality and if sellers are trustworthy....

Voting when Money and Morals Conflict - An Experimental Test of Expressive Voting

Jean-Robert Tyran

Moral considerations may matter much in voting because the costs of expressing support for a morally worthy cause may be low in a referendum. These costs depend on whether a voter expects to affect...

To Buy or Not to Buy? An Experimental Study of Consumer Boycotts in Retail Markets

Jean-Robert Tyran, Dirk Engelmann

We experimentally investigate how firms and consumers react to a sudden cost increase in a competitive retail market. We compare two conditions which exclusively differ with respect to how difficult...

Do Institutions Promote Rationality? An Experimental Study of the Three-Door Anomaly

Tilman Slembeck, Jean-Robert Tyran

The three-door problem is an astounding example of a systematic violation of a key rationality postulate. In this seemingly simple individual decision task, most people initially fail to correctly...

Limited Rationality and Strategic Interaction - The Impact of the Strategic Environment on Nominal Inertia

Jean-Robert Tyran, Ernst Fehr

The evidence from many experiments suggests that people are heterogeneous with regard to their abilities to make rational, forward looking, decisions. This raises the question when the rational types...

A Little Fairness may Induce a Lot of Redistribution in Democracy

Jean-Robert Tyran, Rupert Sausgruber

We use a model of self-centered inequality aversion suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to study voting on redistribution. We theoretically identify two classes of conditions when an empirically...

Testing the Mill hypothesis of fiscal illusion

Rupert Sausgruber, Jean-Robert Tyran

According to the “Mill hypothesis”, the tax burden from indirect taxation is underestimated because indirect taxes are less “visible” than direct taxes. We experimentally test the Mill...

Does Money Illusion Matter? An Experimental Approach

Fehr, Ernst, Tyran, Jean-Robert

Money illusion means that people behave differently when the same objective situation is represented in nominal terms rather than in real terms. This paper shows that seemingly innocuous differences...

Money Illusion and Coordination Failure

Fehr, Ernst, Tyran, Jean-Robert

Economists long considered money illusion to be largely irrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion has powerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent pay-offs in nominal...

The diffusion of policy innovations -an experimental investigation

Jean-Robert Tyran, Rupert Sausgruber

What causes a government to adopt a new program or policy? Despite a large number of empirical studies available to date, the relative importance of various determinants remains obscure because of...

Does Money Illusion Matter?

Ernst Fehr, Jean-Robert Tyran

Money illusion means that people behave differently when the same objective situation is represented in nominal or in real terms. To examine the behavioral impact of money illusion we studied the...

Does Money Illusion Matter? REVISED VERSION

Ernst Fehr, Jean-Robert Tyran

Money illusion means that people behave differently when the same objective situation is represented in nominal terms rather than in real terms. This paper shows that seemingly innocuous differences...

Money Illusion and Coordination Failure

Ernst Fehr, Jean-Robert Tyran

Economists long considered money illusion to be largely irrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion has powerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent payoffs in nominal terms,...

Individual Irrationality and Aggregate Outcomes

Ernst Fehr, Jean-Robert Tyran

There is abundant evidence that many individuals violate the rationality assumptions routinely made in economics. However, powerful evidence also indicates that violations of individual rationality...

Tax Salience, Voting, and Deliberation

Rupert Sausgruber, Jean-Robert Tyran

Tax incentives can be more or less salient, i.e. noticeable or cognitively easy to process. Our hypothesis is that taxes on consumers are more salient to consumers than equivalent taxes on sellers...

Let the Experts Decide? Asymmetric Information, Abstention, and Coordination in Standing Committees

Rebecca Morton, Jean-Robert Tyran

We examine abstention when voters in standing committees are asymmetrically informed and there are multiple pure strategy equilibria-swing voter's curse (SVC) equilibria where voters with low quality...

Everyone Is A Winner: Promoting Cooperation Through Non-Rival Intergroup Competition

Ernesto Reuben, Jean-Robert Tyran

In this paper, we study the effectiveness of intergroup competition in promoting cooperative behavior. We focus on intergroup competition that is non-rival in the sense that everyone can be a winner....

Money Illusion and Nominal Inertia in Experimental Asset Markets

Charles N. Noussair, Gregers Richter, Jean-Robert Tyran

We test whether large but purely nominal shocks affect real asset market prices. We subject a laboratory asset market to an exogenous shock, which either inflates or deflates the nominal fundamental...

Cournot Competition and Hit-and-Run Entry and Exit in a Teaching Experiment

Simon Gächter, Christian Thöni, Jean-Robert Tyran

Instructors can use a computerized experiment to introduce students to imperfect competition in courses on introductory economics, industrial organization, game theory, and strategy and management....

Everyone is a Winner: Promoting Cooperation through All-Can-Win Intergroup Competition

Reuben, Ernesto, Tyran, Jean-Robert

We test if cooperation is promoted by rank-order competition between groups in which all groups can be ranked first, i.e. when everyone can be a winner. This type of rank-order competition has the...

Tax Salience, Voting, and Deliberation

Rupert Sausgruber, Jean-Robert Tyran

Tax incentives can be more or less salient, i.e. noticeable or cognitively easy to process. Our hypothesis is that taxes on consumers are more salient to consumers than equivalent taxes on sellers...

Microfoundations of Social Capital

Christian Thöni, Jean-Robert Tyran, Erik Wengström

We show that the standard trust question routinely used in social capital research is importantly related to cooperation behavior and we provide a microfoundation for this relation. We run a...

Tax Salience, Voting, and Deliberation

Rupert Sausgruber, Jean-Robert Tyran

Tax incentives can be more or less salient, i.e. noticeable or cognitively easy to process. Our hypothesis is that taxes on consumers are more salient to consumers than equivalent taxes on sellers...