Self Control, Risk Aversion, and the Allais Paradox (2006)
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Glenn Harrison, John Kagel, Drazen Prelec
We thank Daniel Benjamin and Jesse Shapiro for helpful comments and a very
Indicative Bidding: An Experimental Analysis (2004)
John Kagel, Svetlana Pevnitskaya, Lixin Ye
Indicative bidding is a practice commonly used in sales of complex and valuable assets and in some procurement auctions. Previous theoretical analysis shows that effcient en-try is not guaranteed...
Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms for Pure Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research (1999)
Yan Chen, Rachel Croson, John Kagel, John Ledyard, Bart Lipman, John Morgan, ...
This article surveys experimental research on these "new mechanisms", i.e., incentive-compatible mechanisms for pure public goods.
Alvin E. Roth, Ido Erev, Drew Fudenberg, John Kagel, Jack Emilie, Roth Xiaolin Xing
This paper considers the behavior observed in experiments with three different two-stage sequential games; a public goods provision game, a market game, and an "ultimatum" bargaining game,...
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Colin F. Camerer, Robin M. Hogarth, Reid Hastie, John Kagel, Daniel Kahneman
The effects of financial incentives in experiments: A review and capital-labor-production framework
Tests of Fairness Models Based on Equity Considerations in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game
Two recent models incorporating fairness considerations into the economics literature based on agents' concerns about the distribution of payoffs between themselves and others (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999,...
Lixin Ye, John Kagel, Svetlana Pevnitska
Ascending price clock auctions with drop-out information typically yield outcomes closer to equilibrium predictions than do comparable sealed-bid auctions. However clock auctions require congregating...
Do Asset Market Prices Reflect Traders' Judgment Biases?
Ananda Ganguly, John Kagel, Donald Moser
The existence of base rate fallacy (BRF) bias is explored employing: (i) a context treatment with a narrative story applied to asset markets and (ii) an isomorphic abstract setting using...
John Kagel, Svetlana Pevnitskaya, Lixin Ye
Survival auction, Vickrey auction, Ausubel auction, Multi-unit demand auction, D44, D78, C92,
Learning and transfer in signaling games
Learning, Learning transfer, Cross-game learning, Signaling games, Experiment, C72, C92, D82, L12,
Indicative bidding: An experimental analysis
Kagel, John, Pevnitskaya, Svetlana, Ye, Lixin
Indicative bidding is a practice commonly used in sales of complex and very expensive assets. Theoretical analysis shows that efficient entry is not guaranteed under indicative bidding, since there...
Behavioral finance, Experimental economics, Status quo bias, Self-signaling, Disposition effect, C91, D01, D53, D83,