Using Neural Measures of Economic Value to Solve the Public Goods Free-Rider Problem (2009)
Krajbich, Ian, Camerer, Colin, Ledyard, John, Rangel, Antonio
Every social group needs to decide when to provide public goods and how to allocate the costs among its members. Ideally, this decision would maximize the group’s net benefits while also ensuring...
An experimental test of combinatorial information markets (2008)
John Ledyard, Robin Hanson, Takashi Ishikida
While a simple information market lets one trade on the probability of each value of a single variable, a full combinatorial information market lets one trade on any combination of values of a set of...
An experimental test of combinatorial information markets (2008)
John Ledyard, Robin Hanson, Takashi Ishikida
While a simple information market lets one trade on the probability of each value of a single variable, a combinatorial information market lets one trade on any combination of a set of variables,...
Computer Testbeds: The Dynamics of Groves-Ledyard Mechanisms (2007)
Jasmina Arifovic, John Ledyard
under grant #SES-0121478. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the the NSF. 1 We...
Information and Dynamics: Sequences of Call Markets (2007)
Jasmina Arifovic, John Ledyard
This paper is part of a wider research project with the objective of creating computational testbeds for designing and testing new mechanisms- new economic and political institutions. Here we...
John Ledyard, David Porter, Randii Wessen
This is an investigation into the design of a market-based process to replace NASA’s current committee process for allocating Shuttle secondary payload resources (lockers, Watts and crew). The...
Inducing Liquidity In Thin Financial Markets Through Combined-Value Trading Mechanisms (2007)
Hewlett Packard, Peter Bossaerts, Peter Bossaerts, Leslie Fine, Leslie Fine, John Ledyard, ...
Abstract: Previous experimental research has shown that thin financial markets fail to fully equilibrate, in contrast with thick markets. A specific type of market risk is conjectured to be the...
Shake It Up Baby: Scheduling with Package Auctions ∗ (2007)
Kan Takeuchi, John C. Lin, Yan Chen, Thomas A. Finholt, John Ledyard, ...
In many disciplines success depends on access to scarce resources, such as unique instruments. In large scale scientific collaborations, technologies have broadened access to scarce scientific and...
An Initial Implementation of the Turing Tournament to Learning in Repeated Two (2004)
Person Games, Jasmina Arifovic, Richard D. Mckelvey, Svetlana Pevnitskaya, Ido Erev, John Ledyard, ...
National Science Foundation (Grant #SES-0079301) for help in funding the experiments.
∗ The authors thank an anonymous referee, Sophie Bade, Ken Binmore, Steve Callander, (2004)
Marcus Berliant, Hideo Konishi, John Duggan, Matt Jackson, John Ledyard, Eric Rasmusen
Which issues are discussed by candidates in an election campaign? Why are some issues never discussed? Model tractability is lost quickly when dealing with these questions, partly because of the...
Computer Testbeds: The Dynamics of Groves-Ledyard Mechanisms (2002)
Jasmina Arifovic, John Ledyard
We develop a behavioral model as a a computer testbed we can use to study the probable performance of a wide range of mechanisms prior to testing them in a laboratory or using them in practice. In...
Jasmina Arifovic, John Ledyard, Stephanie Chow
We develop a model of individual learning that should allow us to study the probable performance of a wide range of mechanisms. Such a model could be a valuable design tool, allowing mechanism...
Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures (2000)
Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew O. Jackson, Michel Le Breton, Hulya Eraslan, Tim Feddersen, John Ledyard, ...
We study the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. We show that the outcomes of every non-dictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity will be...
Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms for Pure Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research (1999)
Yan Chen, Rachel Croson, John Kagel, John Ledyard, Bart Lipman, John Morgan, ...
This article surveys experimental research on these "new mechanisms", i.e., incentive-compatible mechanisms for pure public goods.
Anitesh Barua, Beomsoo Kim, Andrew B. Whinston, We Professors, Leo Hurwicz, John Ledyard
comments and suggestions.
Bayesian Implementable Efficient and Core Allocations," mimeo: Caltech (1998)
Anthony M. Kwasnica, Matt Jackson, John Ledyard, Richard Mckelvey
participants at Caltech and Minnesota are greatly appreciated. The financial support of the Haynes
An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects (1997)
Ronald Harstad, John Ledyard, Eric Maskin, Paul Milgrom, Vernon Smith, Lawrence M. Ausubel, ...
I am extraordinarily grateful to Kathleen Jacobson and Peter Cramton for numerous helpful discussions. I also
Computer Testbeds: The Dynamics of Groves-Ledyard Mechanisms
John Ledyard, Jasmina Arifovic
computer testbed, learning, experiments with human subjects, public goods
In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation,...
A Market-Based Mechanism for Allocating Space Shuttle Secondary Payload Priority
John Ledyard, David Porter, Randii Wessen
This is an investigation into the design of a market-based process to replace NASA's current committee process for allocating Shuttle secondary payload resources (lockers, Watts and crew). The...
Changes in the Environment and Individual Learning
John Ledyard, Jasmina Arifovic
The ability to adjust to changes in the environment (shifts in regime) has not been demonstrated in the models of individual behavior studied in the literature. This is an important issue that has...
Computer Testbeds and Mechanism Design
Jasmina Arifovic, John Ledyard
mechanism design, computer testbeds, evolutionary model of individual learning
Scaling Up Learning Models in Public Good Games
Jasmina Arifovic, John Ledyard
We study three learning rules (reinforcement learning (RL), experience weighted attraction learning (EWA), and individual evolutionary learning (IEL)) and how they perform in three different...
A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
Ledyard, John, Palfrey, Thomas
We consider the class of Bayesian environments with independent types, and utility functions which are both quasi-linear in a private good and linear in a one-dimensional private-value type...
Designing Organizations for Trading Pollution Rights
John Ledyard, Kristin Szakaly-Moore
Regulators and academicians have recently become interested in using a marketable permits program as a new way to control aggregate pollution emissions. Our research focuses on choosing a permit...
Contracting inside an organization: An experimental study
Paul Healy, John Ledyard, Charles Noussair, Harley Thronson, Peter Ulrich, Giulio Varsi
In this paper we propose and test a contracting mechanism, Multi-Contract Cost Sharing (MCCS), for use in the management of a sequence of projects. The mechanism is intended for situations where (1)...
Optimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxes with No Commitment
We wish to study optimal dynamic nonlinear income taxes. Do real world taxes share some of their features? What policy prescriptions can be made? We study a two period model, where the consumers and...
Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results (*)
Richard T. Boylan, Richard D. McKelvey, John Ledyard
We analyze the role of political competition on the type of economic policies that are selected in a one sector model of economic growth. We identify conditions under which neoclassical optimal...
The allocation of a shared resource within an organization
John Ledyard, Charles Noussair, David Porter
C92, Scheduling, Auctions, Mechanism design,
An experimental test of combinatorial information markets
Ledyard, John, Hanson, Robin, Ishikida, Takashi
While a simple information market lets one trade on the probability of each value of a single variable, a full combinatorial information market lets one trade on any combination of values of a set of...