An experimental test of combinatorial information markets (2009)
Ledyard, John O., Hanson, Robin, Ishikida, Takahi
While a simple information market lets one trade on the probability of each value of a single variable, a full combinatorial information market lets one trade on any combination of values of a set of...
Economics - The promise of prediction markets (2008)
Arrow, Kenneth J., Forsythe, Robert, Gorham, Michael, Hahn, Robert, Hanson, Robin, Ledyard, John O., ...
The ability of groups of people to make predictions is a potent research tool that should be freed of unnecessary government restrictions.
Intelligence (AAAI-00), 2000. (2008)
As Martin Andersson, Tuomas W S, Aty Arne Andersson, Mattias Tenhunen, John O Ledyard, ...
tracts with myopic and strategic agents. In Proc. 15th National Conference
Concurrent Trading in Two Experimental Markets with Demand Interdependence (2007)
Arlington W. Williams, Vernon L. Smith, John O. Ledyard
Summary. We report results from fteen computerized double auctions with concurrent trading of two commodities. In contrast to prior experimental markets, buyers ' demands are induced via CES...
D7- Analysis of Collective Decision Making (2007)
Ehud Kalai, John O. Ledyard, Tim Feddersen, Alvaro S
by
John O. Ledyard, John O. Ledyard, John O. Ledyard, Thomas R. Palfrey, Thomas R. Palfrey, Thomas R. Palfrey
We consider a Bayesian public goods environment with independent private valua-tions. We fully characterize interim e cient allocation rules and prove that they cor-respond to decision rules based on...
1 The First Use of a Combined Value Auction for Transportation Services (2007)
Ú� È Ìóöñ, John O. Ledyard, Joseph A. Swanson, David P. Torma, Jos Swanson
Sears, Roebuck and Co. is one of the largest procurers of trucking services in the world through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Sears Logistics Services (SLS). SLS controls supply chain elements that...
D7- Analysis of Collective Decision Making (2007)
Ehud Kalai, John O. Ledyard, Tim Feddersen, Alvaro S
by
Concurrent Trading in Two Experimental Markets with Demand Interdependence (2007)
Arlington W. Williams, Vernon L. Smith, John O. Ledyard
Summary. We report results from fteen computerized double auctions with concurrent trading of two commodities. In contrast to prior experimental markets, buyers ' demands are induced via CES...
Journal of Economic Theory 83, 308317 (1998) (2007)
Notes Comments And, Ehud Kalai, John O. Ledyard
This paper provides a strong implementation folk theorem:" for patient implementors, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable
Information Aggregation Mechanisms and Environmental Complexity (2007)
Paul J. Healy, John O. Ledyard, Sera Linardi, J. Richard Lowery
We experimentally test four different information aggregation mechanisms. Each mechanism is tested in a simple ‘two-state’ environment and a complex ‘eight-state’ environment where the number...
The Ex-post Inefficiency of Optimal Combinatoric Auctions with Single-Minded Bidders (2006)
The combinatoric auction problem is to allocate M heterogeneous objects from one seller to N buyers. The goal is to do this in a way that is optimal and, because the seller does not know the...
A simple mechanism for the efficient provision of public goods: experimental evidence (2000)
Josef Falkinger, Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter, Rudolf Winter-ebmer, John O. Ledyard
Free-riding incentives are a pervasive phenomenon of social life. In case of private provisions of public goods, free-riding leads to inefficient underprovision. Economic theory explains this by...
A new and improved design for multi-object iterative auctions (1998)
Anthony M. Kwasnica, John O. Ledyard, Dave Porter, Christine Demartini
In this paper we present a new improved design for multi-object auctions and report on the results of experimental tests of that design. We merge the better features of two extant but very different...
A new and improved design for multi-object iterative auctions (1998)
Christine Demartini, Anthony M. Kwasnica, John O. Ledyard, David Porter, Paul Milgrom
In this paper we present a new improved design for multi-object auctions and report on the results of tests of that design. We merge the better features of two extant but very di erent auction...
Repeated implementation (1998)
In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation,...
A new and improved design for multi-object iterative auctions (1998)
Anthony M. Kwasnica, John O. Ledyard, David Porter, Christine Demartini, Christine Demartini
In this paper we present a new improved design for multi-object auctions and report on the results of tests of that design. We merge the better features of two extant but very different auction...
Mutually destructive bidding: The FCC auction design problem (1995)
Mark M. Bykowsky, Mark M. Bykowsky, Robert J. Cull, Robert J. Cull, John O. Ledyard, John O. Ledyard
Dissatisfaction with previous assignment mechanisms and the desire to raise revenue induced Congress to grant the FCC authority to auction radio licenses. The debate over an appropriate auction...
A New and Improved Design For Multi-Object Iterative Auctions
DeMartini, Christine, Kwasnica, Anthony M., Ledyard, John O., Porter, David
In this paper we present a new improved design for multi-object auctions and report on the results of tests of that design. We merge the better features of two extant but very different auction...
In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation,...
Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem.
Bykowsky, Mark M, Cull, Robert J, Ledyard, John O
In general, synergies across license valuations complicate the auction design process. Theory suggests that a "simple" (i.e., non-combinatorial) auction will have difficulty in assigning licenses...
"Inducing Liquidity In Thin Financial Markets Through Combined-Value Trading Mechanisms."
Ledyard, John O., Bossaerts, Peter, Fine, Leslie.
Previous experimental research has shown that thin financial markets fail to fully equilibrate, in contrast with thick markets. A specific type of market risk is conjectured to be the reason, namely,...
"The First Use of a Combined Value Auction for Transportation Services."
Ledyard, John O., Olson, Mark, Porter, David, Swanson, Joseph A., Torma, David P.
"The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes."
Ledyard, John O., Palfrey, Thomas R.
public goods, interim efficiency, voting, simple mechanism.
Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms
John O. Ledyard, David Porter, Antonio Rangel
This paper reports the results of over 130 auctions conducted under controlled conditions to examine the robustness of several auction mechanisms to allocate multiple objects. The simultaneous...
The Design of Multi-Object Multi-Round Auction
Kwasnica, Anthony M., Ledyard, John O., Porter, David, Scott, Julie
Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms.
Ledyard, John O, Palfrey, Thomas R
This paper characterizes interim efficient mechanisms for public good production and cost allocation in a two-type environment with risk-neutral, quasi-linear preferences and fixed-size projects,...
Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms
John O. Ledyard, Thomas R. Palfrey
This paper characterizes interim efficient mechanisms for public good production and cost allocation in a two-type environment with risk neutral, quasi-linear preferences and fixed size projects,...
Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
Environments with public goods are a wonderful playground for those interested in delicate experimental problems, serious theoretical challenges, and difficult mechanism design issues. A review is...
Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach
Jeffrey S. Banks, John O. Ledyard, David P. Porter
We identify an important class of economic problems that arise naturally in several applications: the allocation of multiple resources when there are uncertainties in demand or supply, unresponsive...
symposium articles : Concurrent trading in two experimental markets with demand interdependence
Arlington W. Williams, John O. Ledyard, Steven Gjerstad, Vernon L. Smith
We report results from fifteen computerized double auctions with concurrent trading of two commodities. In contrast to prior experimental markets, buyers' demands are induced via CES earnings...