Juan Dubra

A proper test of overconfidence (2008)

We conduct a proper test of the claim that people are overconfident, in the sense that they believe that they are better than others. The results of the experiment we present do not allow us to...

Anger and Regulation (2008)

In this paper we conduct two proper tests of overconfidence. We reject the hypothesis "the data cannot be generated by a rational model" in both experiments.

English auctions and the Stolper–Samuelson theorem (2008)

We propose a model where voters experience an emotional cost when they observe a firm that has displayed insufficient concern for other people's welfare (altruism) in the process of making high...

Dubra, Juan, Echenique, Federico, Manelli, Alejandro M.

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for...

Overconfidence? (2008)

Running Title: Finding All Equilibria. I am grateful to an associate editor and two referees for their comments. I thank Gerard (2008)

Many studies have shown that people display an apparent overconfidence. In particular, it is common for a majority of people to describe themselves as better than average. The literature takes for...

Federico Echenique, Eddie Dekel, Juan Dubra, Matt Jackson, Ivana Komunjer, Andy Mclennan, ...

suggestions. I also thank seminar audiences in a number of institutions for their comments. 1 2 F. ECHENIQUE Abstract. I present a simple and fast algorithm that finds all the purestrategy Nash...

Overconfidence? (2008)

WHY DO GOOD COPS DEFEND BAD COPS? ∗ (2007)

Many studies have shown that people display an apparent overconfidence. In particular, it is common for a majority of people to describe themselves as better than average. The literature takes for...

An Asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solution ∗ (2007)

Policemen are known to support colleagues who are the subject of criminal investigations. While we might expect guilty officers to defend each other, why do (otherwise) law-abiding policemen defend...

Volatility (2007)

Centro De, Investigacion Economica, Autnomo Mxico, Juan Dubra, Juan Dubra, ...

We analyze how the entry of less informed participants in a market for a risky asset affects the volatility of the price of the asset. In an endogenous participation model, we show that in...

Characterizatio o Finitely Generated Preferences Under Risk. (2007)

In 1972 Harsanyi and Selten characterized a one parameter asymmetric Nash solution. In this note I do the analog for the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution. Replacing Symmetry with a restricted version...

Juan Dubra Univ, Juan Dubra

this paper I char ater ize p r fe r nces over r isky alter natives that ar e finitely gener ated. Finitely gener pr efer ces have the followingstr ctur e. The decision maker has a basic, potentially...

English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (2007)

Dubra, Juan, Echenique, Federico, Manelli, Alejandro

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for...

Overconfidence? (2007)

Many studies have shown that people display an apparent overconfidence. In particular, it is common for a majority of people to describe themselves as better-than-average. The literature takes for...

Overconfidence? (2007)

Entrevista a Kenneth Arrow (2007)

Many studies have shown that people display an apparent overconfidence. In particular, it is common for a majority of people to describe themselves as better-than-average. The literature takes for...

A correction to uniqueness in "competitive biddingand propietary information" (2007)

Crime and Punishment in the “American Dream” (2007)

Rafael Di Tella, Juan Dubra, Federico Echenique, Peter Gourevitch, Mary Katzenstein, James Owen Mcleod, ...

A Theory of Time Preferences over Risky Outcomes (2007)

Asymmetric English Auctions Revisited (2006)

This paper provides two representation theorems for time preferences. They both cover as special cases a variety of time preference models considered in the experimental and theoretical literatures...

Crime and Punishment in the "American Dream" (2006)

I introduce a property of player's valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post efficient equilibrium in asymmetric English auctions. The use of this property has the advantage of yielding an...

The problem of prevention (2006)

We observe that countries where belief in the "American dream" (i.e., effort pays) prevails also set harsher punishment for criminals. We know from previous work that beliefs are also correlated with...

Entrevista a Kenneth Arrow (2006)

Many disasters are foreshadowed by insufficient preventative care. In this paper, we argue that there is a true problem of prevention, in that insufficient care is often the result of rational...

A correction to uniqueness in "competitive bidding and proprietary information" (2006)

Games and Economic Behavior 46(2) Feb. 2004 pp. 325-347 A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities ∗ (2006)

Federico Echenique, Bob Anderson, Juan Dubra, Paul Milgrom, Stephen Morris, ...

I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have...

Interview with Kenneth Arrow (2005)

Getting polluters to tell the truth (2005)

Arrow argues that the biggest failures of economic theory are: our failure to explain the business cycle; the missing explanations for the size of fluctuations of prices; our failure to explain the...

Caffera, Marcelo, Dubra, Juan

Getting Polluters to Tell the Truth ∗ (2005)

Marcelo Caffera, Juan Dubra

Characterization of Finitely Generated Preferences Under Risk. ∗ (2005)

Why do good cops defend bad cops? (2004)

In this paper I characterize preferences over risky alternatives that are finitely generated. Finitely

Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom (2003)

Dubra, Juan, Maccheroni, Fabio, Ok, Efe A.

Mathematical Social Sciences 47(2), March 2004, pp. 177-185. Information Is Not About Measurability ∗ (2003)

Juan Dubra, Federico Echenique, Jel Classification C, David Levine, Jim Pitman, Maxwell Stinchcombe, ...

We present a simple example where the use of σ-algebras as a model of information leads to a paradoxical conclusion: a decision maker prefers less information to more. We then explain that the...

Overconfidence in search (2002)

Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and The Correspondence Principle (2002)

Federico Echenique, Juan Dubra, Néstor G, López Córdova, Marcelo Moreira, ...

This paper formalizes the relation between comparative statics and the out-of-equilibrium explanation for how a system evolves after a change in parameters. The paper has two main results. First, an...

We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states...

We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states...

We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states...

Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and The Correspondence Principle (2000)

We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states...

Federico Echenique, Juan Dubra, Néstor G, López Córdova, Marcelo Moreira, ...

This paper formalizes the relation between comparative statics and the out-of-equilibrium explanation for how a system evolves after a change in parameters. The paper has two main results. First, an...

Measurability Is Not about Information

Monotone Preferences over Information

We comment on the relation between models of information based on signals/partitions, and those based on sigma-algebras. We show that more informative signals need not generate finer sigma-algebras,...

Juan Dubra, Echenique, Federico

We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states...

Market Participation, Information and Volatility

Juan Dubra, Helios Herrera

We analyze how the entry of less informed participants in a market for a risky asset affects the volatility of the price of the asset. In an endogenous participation model, we show that in...

Crime and Punishment in the "American Dream"

Rafael Di Tella, Juan Dubra

We observe that countries where belief in the "American dream" (i.e., effort pays) prevails also set harsher punishment for criminals. We know from previous work that beliefs are also correlated with...

Asymmetric English Auctions Revisited

Information revelation in auctions

I introduce a property of player's valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post efficient equilibrium in asymmetric English auctions. The use of this property has the advantage of yielding an...

Asymmetric English Auctions Revisited

The problem of prevention

I introduce a property of player's valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post efficient equilibrium in asymmetric English auctions. The use of this property has the advantage of yielding an...

Many disasters are foreshadowed by insufficient preventative care. In this paper, we argue that there is a true problem of prevention, in that insufficient care is often the result of rational...

A Model of Procedural Decision Making in the Presence of Risk

Many studies have shown that people display an apparent overconfidence. In particular, it is common for a majority of people to describe themselves as better-than-average. The literature takes for...

Juan Dubra, Efe A. Ok

We introduce a procedural model of risky choice in which an individual is endowed with a core preference relation that may be highly incomplete. She can, however, derive further rankings of...

Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom.

Juan Dubra, Fabio Maccheroni, Efe Oki

We study axiomatically the problem of obtaining an expected utility representation for a potentially incomplete preference relation over lotteries by means of a set of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility...

Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom

Dubra, Juan, Maccheroni, Fabio, Ok, Efe A.

Optimism and Overconfidence in Search

Expected Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom

In a standard search model I relax the assumption that agents know the distribution of offers and characterize the behavioral and welfare consequences of overconfidence. Optimistic individuals search...

Juan Dubra, Fabio Maacheroni, Efe A. Ok

We study axiomatically the problem of obtaining an expected utility representation for a potentially incomplete preference relation over lotteries by means of a set of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility...

Why do Good Cops Defend Bad Cops?

A correction to uniqueness in "Competitive Bidding and Proprietary Information"

TB

An asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

Information is not about measurability

WHY DO GOOD COPS DEFEND BAD COPS?

Jean-Pierre Benoit, Juan Dubra

Policemen are known to support colleagues who are the subject of criminal investigations. Although we might expect guilty officers to defend each other, why do (otherwise) law-abiding policemen...

A Correction to Uniqueness in 'Competitive Bidding and Proprietary Information'

Getting Polluters to Tell the Truth

In this note I show that there is a mistake in the proof of uniqueness in Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom and Weber’s seminal “Competitive Bidding and Proprietary Information” and provide a...

Marcelo Caffera, Juan Dubra

We study the problem of a regulator who must control the emissions of a given pollutant from a series of industries when the firms' abatement costs are unknown. We develop a mechanism in which the...

A Full Characterization of Representable Preferences

Monotone Preferences over Information

We fully characterize the preference relations that can be represented by a utility. Representation is equivalent to the condition that preferences do not have too many \jumps". A characterization of...

Expected Utility Without the Completeness Axiom

We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states...

Juan Dubra, Fabio Maccheroni, Efe A. Ok

We study axiomatically the problem of obtaining an expected utility representation for a potentially incomplete preference relation over lotteries by means of a set of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility...

Monotone Preferences Over Information

The Problem of Prevention

We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states...

Jean-Pierre Benoit, Juan Dubra

prevention ; accidents ; Volunteer's Dilemma; learning; career concerns

Overconfidence

Crime and punishment in the "American Dream"

Many studies have shown that people display an apparent overconfidence. In particular, it is common for a majority of people to describe themselves as better than average. The literature takes for...

We observe that countries where belief in the "American dream"(i.e., effort pays) prevails also set harsher punishment for criminals. We know that beliefs are also correlated with several features of...

Jean Pierre Benoit, Juan Dubra

Crime and Punishment in the "American Dream"

Interview with Kenneth Arrow

We observe that countries where belief in the "American dream" (i.e., effort pays) prevails also set harsher punishment for criminals. We know from previous work that beliefs are also correlated with...

Arrow argues that the biggest failures of economic theory are: our failure to explain the business cycle; the missing explanations for the size of fluctuations of prices; our failure to explain the...

Many studies have shown that people display an apparent overconfidence. In particular, it is common for a majority of people to describe themselves as better-than-average. The literature takes for...

English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem

Many studies have shown that people display an apparent overconfidence. In particular, it is common for a majority of people to describe themselves as better than average. The literature takes for...

Dubra, Juan, Echenique, Federico, Manelli, Alejandro

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for...

A proper test of overconfidence

A Resource Belief-Curse? Oil and Individualism

In this paper we conduct two proper tests of overconfidence. We reject the hypothesis "the data cannot be generated by a rational model" in both experiments.

Rafael Di Tella, Juan Dubra, Robert MacCulloch

We study the correlation between a belief concerning individualism and a measure of luck in the US during the period 1983-2004. The measure of beliefs is the answer to a question related to whether...

Does the Better-Than-Average Effect Show That People Are Overconfident?: An Experiment.

English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem

We conduct a proper test of the claim that people are overconfident, in the sense that they believe that they are better than others. The results of the experiment we present do not allow us to...

Dubra, Juan, Echenique, Federico, Manelli, Alejandro M.

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for...

Anger and Regulation