A COGNITIVE HIERARCHY MODEL OF GAMES 1 (2008)
Colin F. Camerer, Teck-hua Ho, Juin-kuan Chong, Haitao Cui, Paul Glimcher, ...
Players in a game are “in equilibrium ” if they are rational, and accurately predict other players ’ strategies. In many experiments, however, players are not in equilibrium. An alternative is...
Familiarity-based Reinforcement and Response Sensitivity Summary (2007)
Teck-hua Ho, Juin-kuan Chong, Greg Allenby, David Bell, Eric Bradlow, ...
We develop a highly parsimonious model to describe and predict stock-keeping unit (SKU) choice in any frequently-bought consumer packaged good category. The model has 20 parameters for a category...
A Modeling Framework for Category Assortment Planning (2007)
Juin-kuan Chong, Teck-hua Ho, Christopher S. Tang
which have greatly improved the quality of this manuscript. Direct correspondence to any of the authors.
Sophisticated EWA Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games (2007)
Ì À Àó, Colin F. Camerer, Teck H. Ho, Juin-kuan Chong
Hong Kong UST. Sophisticated EWA Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games Most learning models assume players are adaptive (i.e., they respond only to their own previous experience and...
A Parsimonious Model of Stock-Keeping Unit Choice (2003)
Teck-hua Ho, Juin-kuan Chong, Teck H. Ho, Juin-kuan Chong
St. Louis, and Wharton for their helpful suggestions. The authors are especially grateful to John Lynch for his help in developing a behavioral underpinning for their model. David Bell, Pete Fader,...
Functional EWA: A One-parameter Theory of Learning in Games (2002)
Teck-Hua Ho, Colin F. Camerer, Juin-kuan Chong
A One-parameter Theory of Learning in Games Functional experience weighted attraction (fEWA) is a one-parameter theory of learning in games. It approximates the free parameters in an earlier model...
A cognitive hierarchy theory of one-shot games (2002)
Strategic thinking, best-response, and mutual consistency (equilibrium) are three key modeling principles in noncooperative game theory. This paper relaxes mutual consistency to predict how players...
Sophisticated EWA Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games (2000)
Colin F. Camerer, Teck H. Ho, J-K. Chong, Juin-kuan Chong
Most learning models assume players are adaptive (i.e., they respond only to their own previous experience and ignore others' payoff information) and that behavior is not sensitive to the way in...
Economic Value of EWA Lite: A Functional Theory of Learning in Games
Ho, Teck-Hua, Camerer, Colin F., Chong, Juin-Kuan
EWA Lite is a one-parameter theory of learning in normal-form games. It approximates the free parameters in an earlier model (EWA) with functions of experience. The theory is tested on seven...
Sophisticated EWA Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games.
Camerer, Colin F., Ho, Teck H., Chong, Juin-Kuan.
Most learning models assume players are adaptive (i.e., they respond only to their own previous experience and ignore others' payoff information) and that behavior is not sensitive to the way in...
A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
Colin F. Camerer, Teck-Hua Ho, Juin-Kuan Chong
Players in a game are "in equilibrium" if they are rational, and accurately predict other players' strategies. In many experiments, however, players are not in equilibrium. An alternative is...