Making Sense of the Aggregator Bank (2009)
Ausubel, Lawrence M, Cramton, Peter
On Tuesday, 10 February 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner proposed the aggregator bank ("public-private investment fund") as a key instrument to resolve the financial crisis. He left out many...
Making Sense of the Aggregator Bank (2009)
Ausubel, Lawrence M, Cramton, Peter
On Tuesday, 10 February 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner proposed the aggregator bank ("public-private investment fund") as a key instrument to resolve the financial crisis. He left out many...
Making Sense of the Aggregator Bank (2009)
Ausubel, Lawrence M, Cramton, Peter
On Tuesday, 10 February 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner proposed the aggregator bank ("public-private investment fund") as a key instrument to resolve the financial crisis. He left out many...
Making Sense of the Aggregator Bank (2009)
Ausubel, Lawrence M, Cramton, Peter
On Tuesday, 10 February 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner proposed the aggregator bank ("public-private investment fund") as a key instrument to resolve the financial crisis. He left out many...
No Substitute for the "P" Word in Financial Rescue (2009)
Ausubel, Lawrence M, Cramton, Peter
Fears of pricing troubled assets have needlessly stalled the rescue effort, according to Lawrence Ausubel and Peter Cramton, two market-design economists whose work on TARP has received the attention...
No Substitute for the "P" Word in Financial Rescue (2009)
Ausubel, Lawrence M, Cramton, Peter
Fears of pricing troubled assets have needlessly stalled the rescue effort, according to Lawrence Ausubel and Peter Cramton, two market-design economists whose work on TARP has received the attention...
No Substitute for the "P" Word in Financial Rescue (2009)
Ausubel, Lawrence M, Cramton, Peter
Fears of pricing troubled assets have needlessly stalled the rescue effort, according to Lawrence Ausubel and Peter Cramton, two market-design economists whose work on TARP has received the attention...
No Substitute for the "P" Word in Financial Rescue (2009)
Ausubel, Lawrence M, Cramton, Peter
Fears of pricing troubled assets have needlessly stalled the rescue effort, according to Lawrence Ausubel and Peter Cramton, two market-design economists whose work on TARP has received the attention...
Implications of Auction Theory for New Issues Markets (2008)
Imagine attempting to explain to a visitor, from another era or another planet, the economic rationale behind various institutions in the American economy at the start of the twenty-first century....
“Auctions: Theory” For the New Palgrave, 2nd Edition (2008)
Auctions occupy a deservedly prominent place within microeconomics and game theory, for at least three reasons: • The auction is, in its own right, an important device for trade. Auctions have long...
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Paul R. Milgrom
Copyright c○2002 by the authors. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic,...
Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan (2008)
Ausubel, Lawrence M, Cramton, Peter
The details of the auction design could make or break the Treasury's plan to invest $700 billion in mortgage-related securities to resolve the financial crisis, using market mechanisms such as...
Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan (2008)
Ausubel, Lawrence M, Cramton, Peter
The details of the auction design could make or break the Treasury's plan to invest $700 billion in mortgage-related securities to resolve the financial crisis, using market mechanisms such as...
Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan (2008)
Ausubel, Lawrence M, Cramton, Peter
The details of the auction design could make or break the Treasury's plan to invest $700 billion in mortgage-related securities to resolve the financial crisis, using market mechanisms such as...
Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan (2008)
Ausubel, Lawrence M, Cramton, Peter
The details of the auction design could make or break the Treasury's plan to invest $700 billion in mortgage-related securities to resolve the financial crisis, using market mechanisms such as...
Market-Based Alternatives for Managing Congestion at New York’s LaGuardia Airport (2007)
Ball, Michael O., Ausubel, Lawrence M., Berardino, Frank, Cramton, Peter, Donohue, George, Hansen, Mark, ...
In the paper, we summarize the results of a project that was motivated by the expiration of the “High Density Rule,” which defined the slot controls employed at New York’s LaGuardia Airport for...
Market-Based Alternatives for Managing Congestion at New York’s LaGuardia Airport (2007)
Ball, Michael O., Ausubel, Lawrence M., Berardino, Frank, Cramton, Peter, Donohue, George, Hansen, Mark, ...
In the paper, we summarize the results of a project that was motivated by the expiration of the “High Density Rule,” which defined the slot controls employed at New York’s LaGuardia Airport for...
The lovely but lonely vickrey auction (2006)
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Paul Milgrom
William Vickrey’s (1961) inquiry into auctions and “counterspeculation ” marked the first serious attempt by an economist to analyze the details of market rules and to design new rules to...
Dynamic Auctions in Procurement (2006)
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton
We study the theory and practical implementation of dynamic procurement auctions. We consider the procurement of many related items. With many related items, price discovery is important not only to...
The clock-proxy auction: A practical combinatorial auction design (2006)
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Paul Milgrom
We propose the clock-proxy auction as a practical means for auctioning many related items. A clock auction phase is followed by a last-and-final proxy round. The approach combines the simple and...
Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing (2004)
Ausubel, Lawrence M., Cramton, Peter
We generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multi-unit auction with interdependent values. In the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing, the seller determines the quantity to...
Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing (2004)
Ausubel, Lawrence M., Cramton, Peter
We generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multi-unit auction with interdependent values. In the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing, the seller determines the quantity to...
Auctioning Many Divisible Goods (2004)
Ausubel, Lawrence M., Cramton, Peter
We study the theory and practical implementation of auctioning many divisible goods. With multiple related goods, price discovery is important not only to reduce the winner’s curse, but more...
Auctioning Many Divisible Goods (2004)
Ausubel, Lawrence M., Cramton, Peter
We study the theory and practical implementation of auctioning many divisible goods. With multiple related goods, price discovery is important not only to reduce the winner’s curse, but more...
Auctioning Many Divisible Goods (2004)
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton
We study the theory and practical implementation of auctioning many divisible goods. With multiple related goods, price discovery is important not only to reduce the winner’s curse, but more...
Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (2002)
Ausubel, Lawrence M, Milgrom, Paul R
A family of ascending package auction models is introduced in which bidders may determine their own packages on which to bid. In the proxy auction (revelation game) versions, the outcome is a point...
Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (2002)
Ausubel, Lawrence M, Milgrom, Paul R
A family of ascending package auction models is introduced in which bidders may determine their own packages on which to bid. In the proxy auction (revelation game) versions, the outcome is a point...
Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (2002)
Ausubel, Lawrence M, Milgrom, Paul R
A family of ascending package auction models is introduced in which bidders may determine their own packages on which to bid. In the proxy auction (revelation game) versions, the outcome is a point...
Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (2002)
Ausubel, Lawrence M, Milgrom, Paul R
A family of ascending package auction models is introduced in which bidders may determine their own packages on which to bid. In the proxy auction (revelation game) versions, the outcome is a point...
Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions (2002)
Ausubel, Lawrence M., Cramton, Peter
Auctions typically involve the sale of many related goods. Treasury, spectrum and electricity auctions are examples. In auctions where bidders pay the market-clearing price for items won, large...
Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions (2002)
Ausubel, Lawrence M., Cramton, Peter
Auctions typically involve the sale of many related goods. Treasury, spectrum and electricity auctions are examples. In auctions where bidders pay the market-clearing price for items won, large...
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Professors Lawrence, M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton
Auctions typically involve the sale of many related goods. Treasury, spectrum and electricity auctions are examples. In auctions where bidders pay the market-clearing price for items won, large...
The Optimality of Being Efficient (2001)
Ausubel, Lawrence M., Cramton, Peter
In an optimal auction, a revenue-optimizing seller often awards goods inefficiently, either by placing them in the wrong hands or by withholding goods from the market. This conclusion rests on two...
The Optimality of Being Efficient (2001)
Ausubel, Lawrence M., Cramton, Peter
In an optimal auction, a revenue-optimizing seller often awards goods inefficiently, either by placing them in the wrong hands or by withholding goods from the market. This conclusion rests on two...
An efficient dynamic auction for heterogeneous commodities (2000)
Professor Lawrence, M. Ausubel, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Lawrence M. Ausubel
This paper proposes a new dynamic design for auctioning multiple heterogeneous commodities, generalizing earlier work that treated identical objects. An auctioneer wishes to allocate one or more...
An efficient dynamic auction for heterogeneous commodities (2000)
Professor Lawrence, M. Ausubel, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Lawrence M. Ausubel
This paper proposes a new dynamic design for auctioning multiple heterogeneous commodities, generalizing earlier work that treated identical objects. An auctioneer wishes to allocate one or more...
The Ascending Auction Paradox (1999)
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Jesse A. Schwartz, Jesse A. Schwartz, Jesse A. Schwartz
We examine uniform-price, multiple-unit auctions that are dynamic rather than sealedbid, auctions where the price ascends, giving bidders the chance to observe and respond to the bidding. In this...
The Optimality of Being Efficient (1999)
Professors Lawrence, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton, ...
In an optimal auction, a revenue-optimizing seller often awards goods inefficiently, either by placing them in the wrong hands or by withholding goods from the market. This conclusion rests on two...
Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing (1999)
Professors Lawrence, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton, ...
We generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multiple item auction with interdependent values. By withholding quantity in some circumstances, the seller can improve revenues or...
Ausubel, Lawrence M., Cramton, Peter
Treasury debt and other divisible securities are traditionally sold in either a pay-your-bid(discriminatory) auction or a uniform-price auction. We compare these auction formats with a Vickrey...
Ausubel, Lawrence M., Cramton, Peter
Treasury debt and other divisible securities are traditionally sold in either a pay-your-bid(discriminatory) auction or a uniform-price auction. We compare these auction formats with a Vickrey...
Professors Lawrence, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton, ...
Treasury debt and other divisible securities are traditionally sold in either a pay-your-bid (discriminatory) auction or a uniform-price auction. We compare these auction formats with a Vickrey...
Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions (1997)
Ausubel, Lawrence M., Cramton, Peter, McAfee, R. Preston, McMillan, John
We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for evidence of value synergies. First, we estimate a benchmark regression for the determinants of final auction prices. Then,...
Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions (1997)
Ausubel, Lawrence M., Cramton, Peter, McAfee, R. Preston, McMillan, John
We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for evidence of value synergies. First, we estimate a benchmark regression for the determinants of final auction prices. Then,...
An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects (1997)
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Professor Lawrence, M. Ausubel
In multiple-object environments where individual bidders may demand more than one object, standard methods of auction generally result in allocative inefficiency. This paper proposes a new...
An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects (1997)
Ronald Harstad, John Ledyard, Eric Maskin, Paul Milgrom, Vernon Smith, Lawrence M. Ausubel, ...
I am extraordinarily grateful to Kathleen Jacobson and Peter Cramton for numerous helpful discussions. I also
Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions (1997)
Peter Cramton, R. Preston Mcafee, John Mcmillan, Prof Lawrence, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Prof Peter Cramton, ...
We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for evidence of value synergies. First, we estimate a benchmark regression for the determinants of final auction prices. Then,...
Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions (1996)
Professors Lawrence, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton, ...
Auctions typically involve the sale of many related goods. The FCC spectrum auctions and the Treasury debt auctions are examples. With conventional auction designs, large bidders have an incentive to...
An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects
When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills...
Auctioning Many Divisible Goods
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton
We study the theory and practical implementation of auctioning many divisible goods. With multiple related goods, price discovery is important not only to reduce the winner's curse, but more...
An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous
This article proposes a new dynamic design for auctioning multiple heterogeneous commodities. An auctioneer wishes to allocate K types of commodities among n bidders. The auctioneer announces a...
A Generalized Theorem of the Maximum
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Raymond J. Deneckere
This paper generalizes the Theorem of the Maximum (Berge, 1963) to allow for discontinuous changes in the domain and the objective function. It also provides a geometrical version of the...
Durable Goods Monopoly with Incomplete Information.
Ausubel, Lawrence M, Deneckere, Raymond J
This article reconsiders the durable goods monopoly problem when the monopolist's marginal cost is private information. The authors show that the Coase conjecture implies the no trade theorem: in any...
Consumer Time Inconsistency: Evidence from a market experiment in the credit card market
Haiyan Shui, Lawrence M. Ausubel
This paper analyzes a unique dataset, which contains results of a large-scale experiment in the credit card market. Two strange phenomena that suggest time inconsistency in consumer behavior are...
Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan
We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for evidence of value synergies. First, we estimate a benchmark regression for the determinants of final auction prices. Then,...
Efficient Sequential Bargaining.
Ausubel, Lawrence M, Deneckere, Raymond J
Suppose that a seller and a buyer have private valuations for a good and that their respective utilities from a trading mechanism are given by u(subscript 's') and u(subscript 'b'). Consider the...
Bargaining and the Right to Remain Silent.
Ausubel, Lawrence M, Deneckere, Raymond J
This paper analyzes a class of alternating-offer bargaining games with one-sided incomplete information for the case of "no gap." If sequential equilibria are required to satisfy the additional...
Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly.
Ausubel, Lawrence M, Deneckere, Raymond J
This paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite-horizon, discrete-time game. The authors prove that, as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero, all seller payoffs...
The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market.
The bank credit card market, containing 4,000 firms and lacking regulatory barriers, casually appears to be a hospitable environment for the model of perfect competition. Nevertheless, this article...
Insider Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy.
It is often argued that efficiency considerations require society to freely permit insider trading. In this article, an opposing efficiency argument is formalized. The model incorporates an...
The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Paul Milgrom
We propose the clock-proxy auction as a practical means for auctioning many related items. A clock auction phase is followed by a last-and-final proxy round. The approach combines the simple and...
Auctioning Many Divisible Goods
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton
We study the theory and practical implementation of auctioning many divisible goods. With multiple related goods, price discovery is important not only to reduce the winner’s curse, but more...
Bargaining with Incomplete Information
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Raymond J. Deneckere
A central question in economics is understanding the difficulties that parties have in reaching mutually beneficial agreements. Informational differences provide an appealing explanation for...
Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton
We generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multiple item auction with interdependent values. By withholding quantity in some circumstances, the seller can improve revenues or...
The Optimality of Being Efficient
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton
In an optimal auction, a revenue-optimizing seller often awards goods inefficiently, either by placing them in the wrong hands or by withholding goods from the market. This conclusion rests on two...
Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton
Auctions typically involve the sale of many related goods. The FCC spectrum auctions and the Treasury debt auctions are examples. With conventional auction designs, large bidders have an incentive to...
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton
Treasury debt and other divisible securities are traditionally sold in either a pay-your-bid (discriminatory) auction or a uniform-price auction. We compare these auction formats with a Vickrey...
Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan
We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for evidence of value synergies. First, we estimate a benchmark regression for the determinants of final auction prices. Then,...
One is Almost Enough for Monopoly
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Raymond J. Deneckere
It has been argued that two factors -- product durability and (potential) entry -- may force a monopolist to price at marginal cost. This article shows that when these two forces coexist, the...
Bargaining with incomplete information
Ausubel, Lawrence M., Cramton, Peter, Deneckere, Raymond J., R.J. Aumann, S. Hart
A central question in economics is understanding the difficulties that parties have in reaching mutually beneficial agreements. Informational differences provide an appealing explanation for...
A Generalized Theorem of the Maximum.
Ausubel, Lawrence M, Deneckere, Raymond J
This paper generalizes the Theorem of the Maximum (Berge (1963)) to allow for discontinuous changes in the domain and the objective function. It also provides a geometrical version of the...
Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Paul Milgrom
March 2002 A family of ascending package auction models is introduced in which bidders may determine their own packages on which to bid. In the proxy auction (revelation game) versions, the outcome...
Implications of Auction Theory for New Issues Markets
Imagine attempting to explain to a visitor, from another era or another planet, the economic rationale behind various institutions in the American economy at the start of the 21st century. Few...
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Nathaniel Higgins, Erkut Ozbay, Andrew Stocking
We experimentally test alternative auction designs suitable for pricing and removing troubled assets from banks’ balance sheets as part of the financial rescue. Many individual securities or pools...
No Substitute for the 'P'-Word in Financial Rescue
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton
Three months and three-hundred billion dollars of bank rescue efforts have gotten bogged down in a widespread and irrational fear among policymakers: the fear of trying to put a price on banks’...
Making Sense of the Aggregator Bank
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton
On Tuesday, 10 February 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner proposed the aggregator bank (“public-private investment fund”) as a key instrument to resolve the financial crisis...
A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton
The US Treasury has proposed purchasing $700 billion of troubled assets to restore liquidity and solve the current financial crisis, using market mechanisms such as reverse auctions where...
Auctions for Injecting Bank Capital
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton
Public discussion has turned, in the past few days, toward using some of the $700 billion in rescue funds for the injection of government money into banks in return for ownership stakes. The purpose...
Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton
The Treasury proposes to invest $700 billion in mortgage-related securities to resolve the financial crisis, using market mechanisms such as reverse auctions to determine prices. A well-designed...
A Two-Sided Auction for Legacy Loans
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton
On Monday, 23 March 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner presented the Public-Private Investment Program as a key instrument to resolve the financial crisis (www.financialstability.gov). The...
Market-Based Alternatives for Managing Congestion at New York’s LaGuardia Airport
Michael O. Ball, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Frank Berardino, Peter Cramton, George Donohue, Mark Hansen, ...
We summarize the results of a project that was motivated by the expiration of the “High Density Rule,” which defined the slot controls employed at New York’s LaGuardia Airport for more than 30...
Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton
The details of the auction design could make or break the Treasury's plan to invest $700 billion in mortgage-related securities to resolve the financial crisis, using market mechanisms such as...
No Substitute for the "P" Word in Financial Rescue
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton
Fears of pricing troubled assets have needlessly stalled the rescue effort, according to Lawrence Ausubel and Peter Cramton, two market-design economists whose work on TARP has received the attention...
Making Sense of the Aggregator Bank
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton
On Tuesday, 10 February 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner proposed the aggregator bank ("public-private investment fund") as a key instrument to resolve the financial crisis. He left out many...