Statute law or case law? (2008)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Riboni, A.
We embed a simple contracting model with ex-ante investments in which there is scope for Court intervention in a full-blown open-ended dynamic setting. The underlying preferences of both Courts and...
Active courts and menu contracts (2006)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew
We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). An active court can improve...
Active courts and menu contracts (2006)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew
We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). An active court can improve...
Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? (2006)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew
We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title — courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual...
Active courts and menu contracts (2006)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew
We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). An active court can improve...
Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? (2006)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew
We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title — courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual...
Felli, Leonardo, Harris, Christopher J.
This Paper introduces two complementary models of firm-specific training: an informational model and a productivity-enhancement model. In both models, market provision of firm-specific training is...
Felli, Leonardo, Harris, Christopher J.
This Paper introduces two complementary models of firm-specific training: an informational model and a productivity-enhancement model. In both models, market provision of firm-specific training is...
Felli, Leonardo, Harris, Christopher
This paper introduces two complementary models of firm-specific training: an informational model and a productivity-enhancement model. In both models, market provision of firm-specific training is...
Felli, Leonardo, Harris, Christopher
This paper introduces two complementary models of firm-specific training: an informational model and a productivity-enhancement model. In both models, market provision of firm-specific training is...
Felli, Leonardo, Harris, Christopher
This paper introduces two complementary models of firm-specific training: an informational model and a productivity-enhancement model. In both models, market provision of firm-specific training is...
Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? (2004)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew
We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title ? courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyse a contractual...
Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? (2004)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew
We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title ? courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyse a contractual...
Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? (2003)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew
We find an economic rationale for the common-sense answer to the question in our title ¿ courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyse a contractual...
Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? (2003)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew
We find an economic rationale for the common-sense answer to the question in our title ¿ courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyse a contractual...
Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? (2003)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew
We find an economic rationale for the common-sense answer to the question in our title ¿ courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyse a contractual...
Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies (2003)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew
We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract...
Felli, Leonardo, Merlo, Antonio
In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy...
Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies (2003)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew
We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract...
Felli, Leonardo, Merlo, Antonio
In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy...
Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies (2003)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew
We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract...
Felli, Leonardo, Merlo, Antonio
In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy...
Does competition solve the hold-up problem? (2002)
Felli, Leonardo, Roberts, Kevin W. S.
In an environment in which both buyers and sellers can undertake match specific investments, the presence of market competition for matches may solve hold-up and coordination problems generated by...
Does competition solve the hold-up problem? (2002)
Felli, Leonardo, Roberts, Kevin W. S.
In an environment in which both buyers and sellers can undertake match specific investments, the presence of market competition for matches may solve hold-up and coordination problems generated by...
Unforeseen contingencies (2002)
Al-Najjar, Nabil, Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo
We develop a model of unforeseen contingencies. These are contingencies that are understood by economic agents — their consequences and probabilities are known — but are such that every...
Unforeseen contingencies (2002)
Al-Najjar, Nabil, Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo
We develop a model of unforeseen contingencies. These are contingencies that are understood by economic agents — their consequences and probabilities are known — but are such that every...
Unforeseen contingencies (2002)
Al-Najjar, Nabil J, Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo
We develop a model of unforeseen contingencies. These are contingencies that are understood by economic agents – their consequences and probabilities are known – but are such that every...
Unforeseen contingencies (2002)
Al-Najjar, Nabil, Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo
We develop a model of unforeseen contingencies. These are contingencies that are understood by economic agents – their consequences and probabilities are known – but are such that every...
Unforeseen contingencies (2002)
Al-Najjar, Nabil, Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo
We develop a model of unforeseen contingencies. These are contingencies that are understood by economic agents – their consequences and probabilities are known – but are such that every...
Felli, Leonardo, Merlo, Antonio
In this paper, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy...
Felli, Leonardo, Merlo, Antonio
In this paper, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy...
How to sell a (bankrupt) company? (2001)
Cornelli, Francesca, Felli, Leonardo
The restructuring of a bankrupt company often entails the sale of such company. This paper suggests a way to sell the company that maximizes the creditors’ proceeds. The key to this proposal is the...
How to sell a (bankrupt) company? (2001)
Cornelli, Francesca, Felli, Leonardo
The restructuring of a bankrupt company often entails the sale of such company. This paper suggests a way to sell the company that maximizes the creditors’ proceeds. The key to this proposal is the...
Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies (2001)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew
We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract...
Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies (2001)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew
We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract...
Does competition solve the hold-up problem? (2001)
Felli, Leonardo, Roberts, Kevin
In an environment in which both buyers and sellers can undertake match specific investments, the presence of market competition for matches may solve hold-up and coordination problems generated by...
Does competition solve the hold-up problem? (2001)
Felli, Leonardo, Roberts, Kevin
In an environment in which both buyers and sellers can undertake match specific investments, the presence of market competition for matches may solve hold-up and coordination problems generated by...
Does competition solve the hold-up problem? (2001)
Felli, Leonardo, Roberts, Kevin
In an environment in which both buyers and sellers can undertake match specific investments, the presence of market competition for matches may solve hold-up and coordination problems generated by...
Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts (2000)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo
This paper explores the link between boundedly rational behaviour and incomplete contracts. The bounded rationality of the agents in our world is embodied in a constraint that the contracts they...
Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts (2000)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo
This paper explores the link between boundedly rational behaviour and incomplete contracts. The bounded rationality of the agents in our world is embodied in a constraint that the contracts they...
Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts (2000)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo
This paper explores the link between boundedly rational behaviour and incomplete contracts. The bounded rationality of the agents in our world is embodied in a constraint that the contracts they...
How to sell a (bankrupt) company? (2000)
Cornelli, Francesca, Felli, Leonardo
The restructuring of a bankrupt company often entails the sale of such company. This paper suggests a way to sell the company that maximizes the creditors‘ proceeds. The key to this proposal is the...
How to sell a (bankrupt) company? (2000)
Cornelli, Francesca, Felli, Leonardo
The restructuring of a bankrupt company often entails the sale of such company. This paper suggests a way to sell the company that maximizes the creditors‘ proceeds. The key to this proposal is the...
Fixed-term Contracts and an Efficiency Wage Unemployment: Analysis (2000)
Maia Giiell, This Project Also, Charlie Bean, Samuel Bentolila, Alberto Bennardo, Antonio Cabrales, ...
During the 1980s, many European countries introduced fixed-term contracts to fight high and persistent levels of unemployment. Although these contracts have been widely used, unemployment remains...
Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem (2000)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo
This paper explores the extent to which the presence of ex-ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’...
Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem (2000)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo
This paper explores the extent to which the presence of ex-ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’...
Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem (2000)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo
This paper explores the extent to which the presence of ex-ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’...
Competition and Hold-ups (1999)
. In an environment in which both workers and firms undertake match specific investments, the presence of market competition for matches may solve the hold-up problems generated by the absence of...
Revenue efficiency and change of control: the case of bankruptcy (1998)
Cornelli, Francesca, Felli, Leonardo
The restructuring of a bankrupt company often entails a change of control. By efficiency of a bankruptcy procedure it is usually meant that the control is allocated into the hands of those who can...
Revenue efficiency and change of control: the case of bankruptcy (1998)
Cornelli, Francesca, Felli, Leonardo
The restructuring of a bankrupt company often entails a change of control. By efficiency of a bankruptcy procedure it is usually meant that the control is allocated into the hands of those who can...
Costly coasian contracts (1998)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo
We identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show...
Costly bargaining and renegotiation (1998)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo
We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an...
Costly coasian contracts (1998)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo
We identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show...
Costly bargaining and renegotiation (1998)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo
We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an...
Costly coasian contracts (1998)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo
We identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show...
Costly bargaining and renegotiation (1998)
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo
We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an...
Technological innovations slumps and booms (1998)
Felli, Leonardo, Ortalo-Magne, F
This paper documents the delayed adoption of a major technological innovation: the adoption of the diesel locomotive in the US railway industry. Contrary to other instances of major technological...
Technological innovations slumps and booms (1998)
Felli, Leonardo, Ortalo-Magne, F
This paper documents the delayed adoption of a major technological innovation: the adoption of the diesel locomotive in the US railway industry. Contrary to other instances of major technological...
Technological innovations slumps and booms (1998)
Felli, Leonardo, Ortalo-Magne, F
This paper documents the delayed adoption of a major technological innovation: the adoption of the diesel locomotive in the US railway industry. Contrary to other instances of major technological...
Technological innovations: slumps and booms (1997)
Felli, Leonardo, Ortalo-Magne, Francois
This paper documents the delayed adoption of a major technological innovation: the adoption of the diesel locomotive in the US railway industry. Contrary to other instances of major technological...
Technological innovations: slumps and booms (1997)
Felli, Leonardo, Ortalo-Magne, Francois
This paper documents the delayed adoption of a major technological innovation: the adoption of the diesel locomotive in the US railway industry. Contrary to other instances of major technological...