Luca Anderlini

Agency problems (2008)

Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies (2007)

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew

Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies (2007)

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew

Costly contingent contracts: a failure of the Coase theorem (2007)

Costly contingent contracts: a failure of the Coase theorem (2007)

Undescribable events (2006)

Felli, Leonardo, Anderlini, Luca, Al-Najjar, Nabil

Active courts and menu contracts (2006)

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew

We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). An active court can improve...

Undescribable events (2006)

Felli, Leonardo, Anderlini, Luca, Al-Najjar, Nabil

Active courts and menu contracts (2006)

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew

We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). An active court can improve...

Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? (2006)

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew

We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title — courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual...

Undescribable events (2006)

Felli, Leonardo, Anderlini, Luca, Al-Najjar, Nabil

Active courts and menu contracts (2006)

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew

We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). An active court can improve...

Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? (2006)

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew

We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title — courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual...

Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem (2006)

Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem (2006)

Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem (2006)

Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts (2004)

Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts (2004)

Economics and language. Five essays by Ariel Rubinstein, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000 [book review] (2004)

Economics and language. Five essays by Ariel Rubinstein, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000 [book review] (2004)

Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? (2004)

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew

We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title ? courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyse a contractual...

Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? (2004)

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew

We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title ? courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyse a contractual...

Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? (2003)

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew

We find an economic rationale for the common-sense answer to the question in our title ¿ courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyse a contractual...

Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? (2003)

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew

We find an economic rationale for the common-sense answer to the question in our title ¿ courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyse a contractual...

Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? (2003)

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew

We find an economic rationale for the common-sense answer to the question in our title ¿ courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyse a contractual...

Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies (2003)

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew

We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract...

Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies (2003)

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew

We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract...

Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies (2003)

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew

We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract...

We develop a model of unforeseen contingencies. These are contingencies that are understood by economic agents — their consequences and probabilities are known — but are such that every...

We develop a model of unforeseen contingencies. These are contingencies that are understood by economic agents — their consequences and probabilities are known — but are such that every...

Al-Najjar, Nabil J, Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo

We develop a model of unforeseen contingencies. These are contingencies that are understood by economic agents – their consequences and probabilities are known – but are such that every...

We develop a model of unforeseen contingencies. These are contingencies that are understood by economic agents – their consequences and probabilities are known – but are such that every...

Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies (2001)

We develop a model of unforeseen contingencies. These are contingencies that are understood by economic agents – their consequences and probabilities are known – but are such that every...

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew

We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract...

Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies (2001)

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew

We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract...

Costly bargaining and renegotiation (2001)

Costly bargaining and renegotiation (2001)

Costly bargaining and renegotiation (2001)

Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts (2000)

Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts (2000)

This paper explores the link between boundedly rational behaviour and incomplete contracts. The bounded rationality of the agents in our world is embodied in a constraint that the contracts they...

Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts (2000)

This paper explores the link between boundedly rational behaviour and incomplete contracts. The bounded rationality of the agents in our world is embodied in a constraint that the contracts they...

Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem (2000)

This paper explores the link between boundedly rational behaviour and incomplete contracts. The bounded rationality of the agents in our world is embodied in a constraint that the contracts they...

Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem (2000)

This paper explores the extent to which the presence of ex-ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’...

Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem (2000)

This paper explores the extent to which the presence of ex-ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’...

Structural stability and robustness to bounded rationality (2000)

This paper explores the extent to which the presence of ex-ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’...

Anderlini, Luca, Canning, David

The introduction of a small amount of bounded rationality into a model sometimes has little effect, and sometimes has a dramatic impact on predicted behavior. We call a model robust to bounded...

Incomplete contracts and complexity costs (1999)

Incomplete contracts and complexity costs (1999)

Costly coasian contracts (1998)

Costly bargaining and renegotiation (1998)

We identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show...

Costly coasian contracts (1998)

We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an...

Costly bargaining and renegotiation (1998)

We identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show...

Costly coasian contracts (1998)

We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an...

Costly bargaining and renegotiation (1998)

We identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show...

Describability and agency problems (1998)

We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an...

Describability and agency problems (1998)

Learning on a Torus (1997)

Anderlini, Luca, Ianni, Antonella

Costly contingent contracts (1996)

Costly contingent contracts (1996)

We identify and investigate the basic ?hold-up? problem which arises whenever each party to a contingent contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to...

Costly contingent contracts (1996)

We identify and investigate the basic ?hold-up? problem which arises whenever each party to a contingent contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to...

The Evolution of Algorithmic Learning Rules: A Global Stability Result (1996)

We identify and investigate the basic ?hold-up? problem which arises whenever each party to a contingent contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to...

ANDERLINI, Luca, SABOURIAN, Hamid

The Evolution of Algorithmic Learning Rules: A Global Stability Result (1996)

ANDERLINI, Luca, SABOURIAN, Hamid

The Evolution of Algorithmic Learning Rules: A Global Stability Result (1996)

ANDERLINI, Luca, SABOURIAN, Hamid

Incomplete written contracts: undescribable states of nature (1994)

Incomplete written contracts: undescribable states of nature (1994)

Incomplete written contracts: endogenous agency problems (1993)

Incomplete written contracts: undescribable states of nature (1993)

This paper suggests a reason, other than asymmetric formation, why agency contracts are not explicitly contingent on the contracting parties' performances or actions. This reason is the formal nature...

Incomplete written contracts: endogenous agency problems (1993)

This paper extends the classic two-armed bandit problem to a many-agent setting in which N players each face the same experimentation problem. The difference with the single-agent problem is that...

Incomplete written contracts: undescribable states of nature (1993)

This paper suggests a reason, other than asymmetric formation, why agency contracts are not explicitly contingent on the contracting parties' performances or actions. This reason is the formal nature...

Incomplete written contracts: endogenous agency problems (1993)

This paper extends the classic two-armed bandit problem to a many-agent setting in which N players each face the same experimentation problem. The difference with the single-agent problem is that...

Incomplete written contracts: undescribable states of nature (1993)

This paper suggests a reason, other than asymmetric formation, why agency contracts are not explicitly contingent on the contracting parties' performances or actions. This reason is the formal nature...

The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games

This paper extends the classic two-armed bandit problem to a many-agent setting in which N players each face the same experimentation problem. The difference with the single-agent problem is that...

Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies

A canonical interpretation of an infinitely repeated game is that of a "dynastic" repeated game: a stage game repeatedly played by successive generations of finitely-lived players with dynastic...

We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract...

Undescribable Events

Active Courts and Menu Contracts

We develop a model of undescribable events. Examples of events that are well understood by economic agents but are prohibitively difficult to describe in advance abound in real-life. This notion has...

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?

We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). An active court can improve...

Social Memory and Evidence from the Past

We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title — courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual...

A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games

Examples of repeated destructive behavior abound throughout the history of human societies. This paper examines the role of social memory -- a society's vicarious beliefs about the past -- in...

Undescribable Contingencies

Nabil Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli

Active Courts and Menu Contracts*

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?

We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court.The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). Anactive court can improve on...

Active Courts and Menu Contracts

We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title — courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual...

Social Memory and Evidence from the Past

We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). An active court can improve...

Active Courts and Menu Contracts

Examples of repeated destructive behavior abound throughout the history of human societies. This paper examines the role of social memory --- a society's vicarious beliefs about the past --- in...

Should Courts always Enforce what Contracting Parties Write?

We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). An active court can improve...

Incomplete Written Contracts: Endogenous Agency Problems (Revised version, Describability and Agency Problems, published in European Economic Review, vol.42 (1998), pp.35-59.)

We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title — courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual...

Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature (Now published in Quarterly Journal of Economics (1994), vol.109, pp.1085-1124.)

This paper suggests a reason, other than asymmetric formation, why agency contracts are not explicitly contingent on the contracting parties' performances or actions. This reason is the formal nature...

Costly Contingent Contracts

This paper extends the classic two-armed bandit problem to a many-agent setting in which N players each face the same experimentation problem. The difference with the single-agent problem is that...

We identify and investigate the basic ?hold-up? problem which arises whenever each party to a contingent contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to...

Costly Coasian Contracts

Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation - (Now published in Econometrica, 69(4) (March 2001), pp. 377-411.)

We identify and investigate the basic 'hold-up problem' which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show that,...

Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts

We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an...

Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem

This paper explores the link between boundedly rational behaviour and incomplete contracts. The bounded rationality of the agents in our world is embodied in a constraint that the contracts they...