Goods Experiment with Heterogeneity and Incomplete Information (2009)
M. Vittoria Levati, Matthias Sutter, M. Vittoria Levati, Matthias Sutter
On behalf of:
Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria, Ploner, Matteo
On a heterogeneous experimental oligopoly market, sellers choose a price, specify a set-valued prior-free conjecture about the others' behavior, and form their own profit-aspiration for each element...
Satisficing in strategic environments : a theoretical approach and experimental evidence (2008)
Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria, Ploner, Matteo
The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. Based on direct elicitation of aspirations, we formally define the concept of satisficing, which does not exclude...
Attitudes toward private and collective risk in individual and strategic choice situations (2008)
Brennan, Geoffrey, González, Luis, Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria
Tax Morale and (De-)Centralization- An Experimental Study- (2007)
Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati, Rupert Sausgruber
We consider a society composed of two regions. Each of them provides a public good whose benefits reach beyond local boundaries. In case of decentralization, taxes collected by members of a region...
- An Experimental Study- (2007)
Ultimatum Games, Susanne Büchner, Luis González, Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati, Jel-classification C
Whether incentive contracts perform better than trust in terms of productive efficiency is usually explored by principal-agent experiments (most involving only one agent). We investigate this issue...
Luis G. González, Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati, Jel Classification C
A robust finding of repeated public goods experiments is that high initial contribution rates sharply decline towards the end. This paper reports on an exploratory experiment designed to discover...
Cheap Talk and Secret Intentions in a Public Goods Experiments (2007)
Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria, Weiland, Torsten
In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen...
Scenario-Based Satisficing in Saving : A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis (2007)
Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria, Ploner, Matteo
Contrary to the models of deterministic life cycle saving, we take it for granted that uncertainty of one’s future is the essential problem of saving decisions. However, unlike the stochastic life...
Are cooperators efficiency- or fair-minded? : Evidence from a public goods experiment (2007)
Levati, M. Vittoria, Ploner, Matteo, Traub, Stefan
We use a two-person public goods experiment to distinguish between efficiency and fairness as possible motivations for cooperative behavior. Asymmetric marginal per capita returns allow only the...
Listen: I am angry! : An experiment comparing ways of revealing emotions (2007)
Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria
We report on an experiment designed to explore whether allowing individuals to voice their anger prevents costly punishment. For this sake, we use an ultimatum minigame and distinguish two...
Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments (2007)
Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria, Sutter, Matthias, Van Der Heijden, Eline
Buying a pig in a poke : An experimental study of unconditional veto power (2007)
Gehrig, Thomas, Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria, Levinsky, René, Ockenfels, Axel, Uske, Tobias, ...
Leading by Example in a Public Goods Experiment with Heterogeneity and Incomplete Information (2007)
Levati, M. Vittoria, Sutter, Matthias, Van Der Heijden, Eline
Games that Doctors Play : Two-layered agency problems in a medical system (2006)
Behrens, Johann, Güth, Werner, Kliemt, Hartmut, Levati, M. Vittoria
Medical doctors act as agents of their patients by either treating them directly or referring them to other more or differently specialized doctors, who thereby become "agents of agents". The main...
Güth, Werner, Kliemt, Hartmut, Levati, M. Vittoria, Von Wangenheim, Georg
Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almost exclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by material incentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthy...
Does anticipated aid create the need it wants to avoid? : An experimental investigation (2006)
Buitrago, Gelkha, Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria
A novel two-person "charity game" is used to experimentally investigate whether anticipation of help crowds out incentives to work, and therefore impulses to help. We distinguish two treatments...
Voluntary contributions with imperfect information : An experimental study (2006)
Fiore, Annamaria, Levati, M. Vittoria, Morone, Andrea
We use a two-person linear voluntary contribution mechanism with stochastic marginal benefits from the public good to examine the effect of imperfect information on contributions levels. To assess...
Satisficing in sales competition : experimental evidence (2006)
Berninghaus, Siegfried, Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria, Qiu, Jianying
In a stochastic duopoly market, sellers must form state-specific aspirations expressing how much they want to earn given their expectations about the other's behavior. We define individually and...
Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments (2006)
Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria, Sutter, Matthias, Van Der Heijden, Eline
The study investigates protective responses in low probability and high loss risk situations. Particularly, it (1) detects individual protection valuations to variations in probability versus to...
Logit estimation of conditional cooperation in a repeated public goods experiment (2005)
González, Luis G., González-Farias, Graciela, Levati, M. Vittoria
A conditional cooperator in a public goods game wants to match his partners' expected contribution. We investigate theoretically and empirically, whether (and to what extent) conditional cooperation...
The Effect of Group Identity in an Investment Game (2005)
Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria, Ploner, Matteo
The present research experimentally examines the influence of group identity on trust behavior in an investment game. In one treatment, group identity is manipulated only through the creation of...
Leading by example in a public goods experiment with heterogeneity and incomplete information (2005)
Levati, M. Vittoria, Sutter, Matthias, Van Der Heijden, Eline
We study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are heterogeneously endowed. Leadership is implemented as a sequential public goods game where one...
The impact of payoff interdependence on trust and trustworthiness (2005)
Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria, Ploner, Matteo
In one-shot investment game experiments where each player's payoff is a convex combination of own and other's profit, trust remains unaffected by the extent of interdependence whereas trustworthiness...
Attitudes toward Private and Collective Risks in Individual and Strategic Choice Situations (2005)
Brennan, Geoffrey, González, Luis G., Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria
Idiosyncratic risk attitudes are usually assumed to be commonly known and restricted to own payoffs. However, the alternatives faced by a decision maker often involve risks for others' payoffs as...
On the social dimension of time and risk preferences : An experimental study (2005)
Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria, Ploner, Matteo
We report on an experiment designed to explore the interrelation of other-regarding concerns with attitudes towards risk and delay when the latter have a social dimension, i.e., pertain to one's own...
Güth, Werner, Koschmieder, Kurt-Dieter, Levati, M. Vittoria, Martin, Ev
Direct transfers allow heirs to freely use what has been passed on to them. Bequeathers who do not trust their descendants to make proper use of the fortune may prefer investing it in a safe...
"Buying a pig in a poke" : An experimental study of unconditional veto power (2005)
Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria, Ockenfels, Axel, Weiland, Torsten
We study an ultimatum experiment in which the responder does not know the offer when accepting or rejecting. Unconditional veto power leads to acceptances, although proposers are significantly...
Relatives Versus Neighbors : An Experiment Studying Spontaneous Social Exchange (2004)
Güth,Werner, Levati,M. Vittoria, Von Wangenheim,Georg
Social institutions regulating group conduct have been regarded as necessary for human cooperation to transcend family bonds. However, many studies in economics and biology indicate that reciprocity...
Leadership and cooperation in public goods experiments (2004)
Güth,Werner, Levati,M. Vittoria, Sutter,Matthias, Van Der Heijden,Eline
Leadership is important for the well-functioning of organizations. We examine the effects of leadership on contributions in public goods experiments. Leadership by example is implemented by letting...
Incentive contracts versus trust in three-person ultimatum games : an experimental study (2004)
Büchner,Susanne, González,Luis G., Güth,Werner, Levati,M. Vittoria
González,Luis G., Güth,Werner, Levati,M. Vittoria
A robust finding of repeated public goods experiments is that high initial contribution rates sharply decline towards the end. This paper reports on an exploratory experiment designed to discover...
Incentive contracts versus trust in three-person ultimatum games : an experimental study (2004)
Büchner, Susanne, González, Luis G., Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria
González, Luis G., Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria
A robust finding of repeated public goods experiments is that high initial contribution rates sharply decline towards the end. This paper reports on an exploratory experiment designed to discover...
Leadership and cooperation in public goods experiments (2004)
Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria, Sutter, Matthias, Van Der Heijden, Eline
Leadership is important for the well-functioning of organizations. We examine the effects of leadership on contributions in public goods experiments. Leadership by example is implemented by letting...
Relatives Versus Neighbors : An Experiment Studying Spontaneous Social Exchange (2004)
Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria, Von Wangenheim, Georg
Social institutions regulating group conduct have been regarded as necessary for human cooperation to transcend family bonds. However, many studies in economics and biology indicate that reciprocity...
Leading by example in a public goods experiment with heterogeneity and incomplete information
M. Vittoria Levati, Matthias Sutter
We study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are heterogeneously endowed. Leadership is implemented as a sequential public goods game where one...
Werner Güth, Kurt-Dieter Koschmieder, M. Vittoria Levati, Ev Martin
Direct transfers allow heirs to freely use what has been passed on to them. Bequeathers who do not trust their descendants to make proper use of the fortune may prefer investing it in a safe...
"Buying a pig in a poke": An experimental study of unconditional veto power
Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati, Axel Ockenfels, Torsten Weiland
We study an ultimatum experiment in which the responder does not know the offer when accepting or rejecting. Unconditional veto power leads to acceptances, although proposers are significantly...
On the social dimension of time and risk preferences: An experimental study
M. Vittoria Levati, Werner Güth, Matteo Ploner
We report on an experiment designed to explore the interrelation of other-regarding concerns with attitudes towards risk and delay when the latter have a social dimension, i.e., pertain to one's own...
Attitudes toward Private and Collective Risks in Individual and Strategic Choice Situations
Geoffrey Brennan, Werner Güth, Luis G. Gonzalez, M. Vittoria Levati
Idiosyncratic risk attitudes are usually assumed to be commonly known and restricted to own payoffs. However, the alternatives faced by a decision maker often involve risks for others' payoffs as...
Luis G. Gonzalez, Werner Gueth, M. Vittoria Levati
A robust finding of repeated public goods experiments is that high initial contribution rates sharply decline towards the end. This paper reports on an exploratory experiment designed to discover...
Stefan Traub, Christian Seidl, Ulrich Schmidt, M. Vittoria Levati
This paper investigates distributive justice using a fourfold experimental design: The ignorance and the risk scenarios are combined with the self-concern and the umpire modes. We study behavioral...
Games that Doctors Play Two-layered agency problems in a medical system
Johann Behrens, Hartmut Kliemt, M. Vittoria Levati, Werner Güth
Medical doctors act as agents of their patients by either treating them directly or referring them to other more or differently specialized doctors, who thereby become "agents of agents". The main...
Does anticipated aid create the need it wants to avoid? An experimental investigation
Gelkha Buitrago, Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati
A novel two-person "charity game" is used to experimentally investigate whether anticipation of help crowds out incentives to work, and therefore impulses to help. We distinguish two treatments...
Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt, M. Vittoria Levati, Geog Von Wangenheim
Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almost exclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by material incentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthy...
Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments
Guth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria, Sutter, Matthias, Van Der Heijden, Eline
Let Me See You! A Video Experiment on the Social Dimension of Risk Preferences
Werner Gueth, M. Vittoria Levati, Matteo Ploner
Previous studies have shown that decision makers are less other-regarding when their own payoff is risky than when it is sure. Empirical observations also indicate that people care more about...
An Application of the English Clock Market Mechanism to Public Goods Games
M. Vittoria Levati, Tibor Neugebauer
This paper reports an experimental study of the public goods game in which contributions are not submitted all at once but incrementally as coordinated in real time by a clock. Individuals press a...
Scenario-Based Satisficing in Saving: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
Werner Gueth, M. Vittoria Levati, Matteo Ploner
Contrary to the models of deterministic life cycle saving, we take it for granted that uncertainty of one's future is the essential problem of saving decisions. However, unlike the stochastic life...
Incentive contracts versus trust in three-person ultimatum games: an experimental study
Buchner, Susanne, Gonzalez, Luis G., Guth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria
We adopt an indirect evolutionary approach to investigate whether and when conditional cooperation can explain the voluntary contribution phenomenon often observed in public goods experiments and in...
ON THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF TIME AND RISK PREFERENCES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
WERNER GÜTH, M. VITTORIA LEVATI, MATTEO PLONER
"When explaining risk taking, intertemporal allocation, and distributing behavior, economists rely on risk, time, and other-regarding preferences but offer no guidance on how these three crucial...
Planning ahead: eliciting intentions and beliefs in a public goods game
Luis G. Gonzalez, M. Vittoria Levati
In a two-person ï¬nitely repeated public goods experiment, we use intentions data to interpret individual behavior. Based on a random-utility model speciï¬cation, we develop a relationship...
Cheap Talk and Secret Intentions in a Public Goods Experiments
Werner G�th, M. Vittoria Levati, Torsten Weiland
In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen...
Are cooperators effciency- or fair-minded? Evidence from a public goods experiment
M. Vittoria Levati, Matteo Ploner, Stefan Traub
We use a two-person public goods experiment to distinguish between efficiency and fairness as possible motivations for cooperative behavior. Asymmetric marginal per capita returns allow only the...
Listen: I am angry! An experiment comparing ways of revealing emotions
Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati
We report on an experiment designed to explore whether allowing individuals to voice their anger prevents costly punishment. For this sake, we use an ultimatum minigame and distinguish two...
The Impact of Payoff Interdependence on Trust and Trustworthiness
Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati, Matteo Ploner
In one-shot investment games where each player's payoff is a convex combination of own and other's profit, we measure trust by the amount given to the trustee and trustworthiness by the amount...
Social identity and trust - An experimental investigation
Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati, Matteo Ploner
We experimentally examine how group identity affects trust behavior in an investment game. In one treatment, group identity is induced purely by minimal groups. In other treatments, group members are...
Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt, M. Vittoria Levati, Georg Von Wangenheim
Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almost exclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by material incentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthily...
Incentive Contracts versus Trust in Three-Person Ultimatum Games - An Experimental Study
Susanne Büchner, Luis Gonzalez, Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati
Whether incentive contracts perform better than trust in terms of productive efficiency is usually explored by principal-agent experiments (most involving only one agent). We investigate this issue...
Reasoning and Institutions: Do Markets Facilitate Logical Reasoning in the Wason Selection Task?
Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati, Rupert Sausgruber
We consider a society composed of two regions. Each of them provides a public good whose benefits reach beyond local boundaries. In case of decentralization, taxes collected by members of a region...
Leadership and cooperation in public goods experiments
Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati, Matthias Sutter
Leadership is important for the well-functioning of organizations. We examine the effects of leadership on contributions in public goods experiments. Leadership by example is implemented by letting...
The impact of payoff interdependence on trust and trustworthiness
M. Vittoria Levati, Matteo Ploner, Werner Güth
In one-shot investment game experiments where each player's payoff is a convex combination of own and other's profit, trust remains unaffected by the extent of interdependence whereas trustworthiness...
Is Satisficing Absorbable? - An Experimental Study
Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati, Matteo Ploner
We experimentally investigate whether the satisficing approach is absorbable, i.e., whether it still applies after participants become aware of it. In a setting where an investor decides between a...
Voluntary contributions with imperfect information: An experimental study
Annamaria Fiore, M. Vittoria Levati, Andrea Morone
We use a two-person linear voluntary contribution mechanism with stochastic marginal benefits from the public good to examine the effect of imperfect information on contributions levels. To assess...
Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence
Siegfried Berninghaus, Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati, Jianying Qiu
In a stochastic duopoly market, sellers must form state-specific aspirations expressing how much they want to earn given their expectations about the other's behavior. We define individually and...
Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments
Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati, Matthias Sutter
We examine the effects of leading by example in voluntary contribution experiments. Leadership is implemented by letting one group member contribute to the public good before followers do. Such...
DEADLINE EFFECTS IN SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING â AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
WERNER GÃTH, M. VITTORIA LEVATI, BORIS MACIEJOVSKY
This paper reports on an experiment designed to explore the robustness of the deadline effect in multi period bargaining games using constant and decreasing pies, different time horizons, and...
Attitudes toward private and collective risk in individual and strategic choice situations
Brennan, Geoffrey, González, Luis G., Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria
Idiosyncratic risk attitudes are usually assumed to be commonly known and related to own payoffs only. However, the alternatives faced by a decision maker often involve risk about others' payoffs as...
Social identity and trust--An experimental investigation
Güth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria, Ploner, Matteo
We experimentally examine how group identity affects trust behavior in an investment game. In one treatment, group identity is induced purely by minimal groups. In other treatments, group members are...
Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence
Berninghaus, Siegfried K., Gueth, Werner, Levati, M. Vittoria, Qiu, Jianying
In a duopoly market, aspirations express how much sellers want to earn given their expectations about the other's behavior. We define individually and mutually satisficing sales behavior for given...
Satisficing in strategic environments: a theoretical approach and experimental evidence
Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati, Matteo Ploner
The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. Based on direct elicitation of aspirations, we formally define the concept of satisficing, which does not exclude...
Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
M. Vittoria Levati, Ro'i Zultan
This paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a real-time version of the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. Our approach avoids most drawbacks of the traditional...
Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence
Siegfried Berninghaus, Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati, Jianying Qiu
In a duopoly market, aspiration levels express how much sellers want to earn given their expectations about the other’s behavior. We augment the sellers’ decision task by eliciting their profit...
Cycles of conditional cooperation in a real-time voluntary contribution mechanism
M. Vittoria Levati, Ro'i Zultan
This paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a real-time version of the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. Our approach avoids most drawbacks of the traditional...
M. Vittoria Levati, Andrea Morone
Previous research indicates that risky and uncertain marginal returns from the public good significantly lower contributions. This paper presents experimental results illustrating that the effects of...
Making the World a better Place: Experimental evidence from the generosity Game
Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati, Matteo Ploner
We study ultimatum and dictator experiments where the first mover chooses the amount of money to be distributed between the players within a given interval, knowing that her own share is ?xed. Thus,...