Competing for Recognition through Public Good Provision (2008)
We consider a setting in which several groups of individuals with common interests (``clubs") compete with each other for recognition by other individuals. Depending on the context, recognition may...
Competing for Recognition through Public Good Provision (2008)
We consider a setting in which several groups of individuals with common interests (``clubs") compete with each other for recognition by other individuals. Depending on the context, recognition may...
Competing for Recognition through Public Good Provision (2008)
We consider a setting in which several groups of individuals with common interests (``clubs") compete with each other for recognition by other individuals. Depending on the context, recognition may...
Competing for Recognition through Public Good Provision (2008)
We consider a setting in which several groups of individuals with common interests (``clubs") compete with each other for recognition by other individuals. Depending on the context, recognition may...
Matthias Messner, Mattias K. Polborn
This paper builds on Cremer’s [3] seminal analysis which shows that (almost) complete cooperation can be achieved as an equilibrium in a game played by overlapping generations of players if the...
Robust Political Equilibria under Plurality and Runoff Rule ∗ (2007)
Matthias Messner, Mattias K. Polborn
A central problem for the game theoretic analysis of voting is that voting games have very many Nash equilibria. In this paper, we consider a new refinement concept for voting games that combines two...
Voting on Majority Rules ∗ (2007)
Matthias Messner, Mattias K. Polborn
We analyze an overlapping generations model of voting on “reform projects”. These resemble investments in that they first require some investment expenditure and later pay off. Since the time...
Calibrating the world and the world of calibration ∗ (2007)
We develop and calibrate a comprehensive model of the world and the calibrators calibrating it. The model is general in the sense that it takes into account not only the relevant, but also the...
Matthias Messher, Mattias K. Polborn, Western Ontario, Jim Davies, Srihari Govindan, Ig Horstmann, ...
Consider a situation where a society has to elect an official who provides a public service for the citizens. Candidates differ in their competence and every potential candidate has private...
Primaries and the New Hampshire Effect ∗ (2007)
Candidates for U.S. presidential elections are determined through sequential elec-tions in single states, the primaries. We develop a model in which candidates can influence their winning probability...
Constitutional Conservatism and Resistance to Reform (2007)
Matthias Messner, Mattias K. Polborn, Alfonso Rosolia
We analyze an overlapping generations model of voting over \reform projects". These resemble investments in that they rst require some investment expenditure and later bring a payo;...
Endogenous Majority Rules with Changing Preferences (2007)
Mattias K. Polborn, Paul Klein
This paper provides a new explanation why several US states have implemented supermajority requirements for tax increases.We model a dynamic and stochastic OLG economy where individual preferences...
Information and Dynamic Adjustment in Life Insurance Markets (2007)
Mattias K. Polborn, Mike Hoy, Asha Sadanand
Genetic tests can be expected to produce a large amount of economically important information in the future. What are the eects on a life insurance market if more information becomes available over...
A New Test of Price Dispersion
Ekkehard Kessner, Mattias K. Polborn
Economists have been concerned with price dispersion for apparently homogeneous goods for a long time. Many models have been developed which explain price dispersion by imperfect consumer information...
Information and Dynamic Adjustment in Life Insurance Markets
Mattias K. Polborn, Mike Hoy, Asha Sadanand
Genetic tests can be expected to produce a large amount of economically important information in the future. What are the effects on a life insurance market if more information becomes available over...
Information and Dynamic Adjustment in Life Insurance Markets
Matthias Messner, Mattias K. Polborn
We analyze an overlapping generations model of voting over ``reform projects''. These resemble investments in that they first require some investment expenditure and later bring a payoff;...
The Option to Wait in Collective Decisions
Matthias Messner, Mattias K. Polborn
We consider a model in which voters over time receive more information about their preferences concerning an irreversible social decision. Voters can either implement the project in the first period,...
Matthias Messner, Mattias K. Polborn
We analyse an overlapping generations model of voting on "reform projects". These resemble investments in that they first require some investment expenditure and later payoff. Since the time during...
Advantageous Effects of Regulatory Adverse Selection in the Life Insurance Market
Mattias K. Polborn, Michael Hoy, Asha Sadanand
We analyse the effects of regulations prohibiting the use of information to risk-rate premiums in a life insurance market. New information derived from genetic tests is likely to become increasingly...
A Model of an Oligopoly in an Insurance Market
This article analyzes the behavior of an oligopoly of risk-averse insurers that insure many consumers facing identical independent risks; however, the probability of a loss is ex ante not known with...
Endogenous Categorization in Insurance
This paper analyzes the welfare properties of equilibrium when insurers use observable actions to classify consumers into different risk categories, and consumers' choice is influenced by the...
Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
Krasa, Stefan, Polborn, Mattias K.
We investigate the welfare effects of policies that increase voter turnout in costly voting models. In a generalized costly voting model, we show that if the electorate is sufficiently large, then...