The Evolution of Security Designs (2008)
Thomas H. Noe, Michael J. Rebello, Jun Wang
ments. Rebello would like to thank the Robinson College of Business for research support. We also extend special thanks to Rob Stambaugh (the editor) and two anonymous reviewers for very insightful...
Board Structures Around the World: an Experimental Investigation (2008)
Gillette, Ann B., Noe, Thomas H., Rebello, Michael J.
We model and experimentally examine the board structure–performance relationship. We examine single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards, and outsider-controlled boards. We...
Structuring International Cooperative Ventures (2002)
Noe, Thomas H., Rebello, Michael J., Shrikhande, Milind M.
We examine the effect of bargaining power and informational asymmetry on the design of international cooperative ventures in the presence of restrictions on equity participation and investment. When...
Market Coditions and Venture Capitalist Experience in Start-Up Financing
Koskinen, Yrjo, Rebello, Michael J., Wang, Jun
We examine how the relative bargaining power of privately informed venture capitalists and entrepreneurs - determined either by market conditions or by prior experience - affects both the willingness...
Board structures around the world: An experimental investigation
Ann B. Gillette, Thomas H. Noe, Michael J. Rebello
We model and experimentally examine the board structure-performance relationship. We examine single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards, and outsider-controlled boards. We...
Corporate Board Composition, Protocols, and Voting Behavior: Experimental Evidence
Ann B. Gillette, Thomas H. Noe, Michael J. Rebello
We examine voting by a board designed to mitigate conflicts of interest between privately informed insiders and owners. Our model demonstrates that, as argued by researchers and the business press,...
Managerial rents and optimal regulatory intervention in troubled banks
Thomas H. Noe, Michael J. Rebello, Larry D. Wall
Bank management ; Bank supervision
Emerging debt and equity markets: an exploratory investigation of integration using daily data
Mandeep S. Chahal, Michael J. Rebello, Stephen D. Smith
In this paper we examine integration between emerging and U.S. debt and equity markets. We first investigate price changes around significant "events," in this case changes in short-term U.S....
Price reactions to public announcements
B. Sailesh Ramamurtie, Michael J. Rebello
We employ a parametric rational expectations equilibrium model to study the impact of public information releases on private information acquisition and asset prices in a large economy. We...
Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: experimental evidence
Ann B. Gillette, Thomas H. Noe, Michael J. Rebello
We model experimentally the governance of an institution. The optimal management of this institution depends on the information possessed by insiders. However, insiders, whose interests are not...
Rent Division, Restructuring, and Managerial Risk Taking: A Strategic Bargaining Model.
Noe, Thomas H, Rebello, Michael J
This paper demonstrates that, when the manager of a poorly performing firm generates firm-specific rents, strategic considerations associated with anticipated future restructuring may lead to the...
The Role of Debt Purchases in Takeovers: A Tale of Two Retailers
Thomas H. Noe, Michael J. Rebello
"In this paper, we examine acquisitions of two financially distressed retailers-Federated's takeover of Macy's, and Zell Chilmark's takeover of Carter Hawley Hale. In both cases the raider purchased...
Corporate Financing: An Artificial Agent-based Analysis
Thomas H. Noe, Michael J. Rebello, Jun Wang
We examine corporate security choice by simulating an economy populated by adaptive agents who learn about the structure of security returns and prices through experience. Through a process of...
The Evolution of Security Designs
THOMAS H. NOE, MICHAEL J. REBELLO, JUN WANG
We consider a competitive and perfect financial market in which agents have heterogeneous cash flow valuations. Instead of assuming that agents are endowed with rational expectations, we model their...
Debt Financing under Asymmetric Information.
Goswami, Gautam, Noe, Thomas H, Rebello, Michael J
The authors analyze the optimal design of debt maturity, coupon payments, and dividend payout restrictions under asymmetric information. They show that, if the asymmetry of information is...
Asymmetric Information, Managerial Opportunism, Financing, and Payout Policies.
Noe, Thomas H, Rebello, Michael J
The authors examine corporate issuance and payout policies in the presence of both adverse selection (in capital markets) and managerial opportunism. Their results establish the importance of the...
Activists, raiders, and directors: Opportunism and the balance of corporate power
Thomas H. Noe, Michael J. Rebello, Ramana Sonti
We model corporate governance in a world with competitive securities markets as well as markets for corporate assets. We show that varying the liquidity and opacity of corporate assets, the vitality...
Product market efficiency: The bright side of myopic, uninformed, and passive external finance
Thomas H. Noe, Michael J. Rebello, Thomas A. Rietz
We show that introducing an external capital market with information asymmetry into a product market model reduces opportunistic substitution of sub-standard goods and encourages producers to...
Board structures around the world: An experimental investigation
Ann B. Gillette, Thomas H. Noe, Michael J. Rebello
We model and experimentally examine the board structure-performance relationship. We examine single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards, and outsider-controlled boards. We...
Activists, raiders, and directors: Opportunism and the balance of corporate power
Thomas H. Noe, Michael J. Rebello, Ramana Sonti
We model corporate governance in a world with competitive securities markets as well as markets for corporate assets. We show that varying the liquidity and opacity of corporate assets, the vitality...
Thomas H. Noe, Michael J. Rebello
We model long-run firm performance, management compensation, and corporate governance in a dynamic, nonstationary world. We show that managerial compensation and governance policies, which, in a...
The Dynamics of Business Ethics and Economic Activity.
Noe, Thomas H, Rebello, Michael J
The authors model the agency relationship between managers and investors. Through socialization, ethical managers develop internalized norms that prevent them from acting opportunistically. Unethical...
Rents, regulation and risk-taking in the banking industry
Thomas H. Noe, Michael J. Rebello, Larry D. Wall
Risk ; Bank supervision
The Evolution of Security Designs
Noe, Thomas H., Rebello, Michael J., Wang, Jun
This paper embeds security design in a model of evolutionary learning. We consider a competitive and perfect financial market where agents, as in Allen and Gale (1988), have heterogeneous valuations...
Structuring International Cooperative Ventures
Thomas H. Noe, Michael J. Rebello, Milind M. Shrikhande
We examine the effect of bargaining power and informational asymmetry on the design of international cooperative ventures in the presence of restrictions on equity participation and investment. When...
Collusion in Uniform-Price Auctions: Experimental Evidence and Implications for Treasury Auctions.
Goswami, Gautam, Noe, Thomas H, Rebello, Michael J
We provide experimental evidence that nonbinding preplay communication between bidders in auctions of shares facilitates the adoption of equilibrium strategies: cohesive strategies in uniform-price...
Financing and the Demand for Corporate Insurance
Martin F. Grace, Michael J. Rebello
In this paper we examine the insurance decision of a firm with private information regarding its cash flows and insurable losses. We show that, even in the absence of bankruptcy costs and information...
Renegotiation, Investment Horizons, and Managerial Discretion.
Noe, Thomas H, Rebello, Michael J
In this article, the authors show that the evolution of managerial entrenchment can distort investment horizons. Both myopic and hypermetropic distortions can arise. The direction of these...
Board Structures Around the World: an Experimental Investigation
Ann B. Gillette, Thomas H. Noe, Michael J. Rebello
We model and experimentally examine the board structure-performance relationship. We examine single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards, and outsider-controlled boards. We...
Reputation and the Market for Distressed Firm Debt
Noe, Thomas H., Rebello, Michael J.
Our analysis explains how vulture investors (vultures) can maintain and exploit their reputations for toughness. Vultures leverage their reputations to extract concessions from stockholders in debt...
Board Structures Around the World: an Experimental Investigation
Ann B. Gillette, Thomas H. Noe, Michael J. Rebello
We model and experimentally examine the board structure-performance relationship. We examine single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards, and outsider-controlled boards. We...