Community tax evasion models: A stochastic dominance test
In a multi community environment local authorities compete for tax base. When monitoring is imperfect, agents may decide not to pay in their community (evasion), and save the tax difference. The...
Tax Competition and Tax Harmonization With Evasion
Néstor Gandelman, Rubén Hernández-Murillo
We examine a two-jurisdiction tax competition environment where local governments can only imperfectly monitor where agents pay taxes and risk-averse individuals may choose to cross borders to pay...
Zuleika Ferre, Néstor Gandelman, Giorgina Piani, Sven Schaffrath
This paper presents descriptive data about Uruguayan’s quality of life and spare time. The data is divided depending on sex, education, age and living place of the target people of this study. Four...