Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky, Michael Schwarz, Thank Drew Fudenberg, Louis Kaplow, Robin Lee, ...
We investigate the “generalized second-price ” (GSP) auction, a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising. Although GSP looks similar to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)...
Auctions, Matching and the Law of Aggregate Demand (2008)
John William Hatfield, Paul Milgrom
Abstract. We develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates, as special cases, the college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model, and ascending package...
Economics - The promise of prediction markets (2008)
Arrow, Kenneth J., Forsythe, Robert, Gorham, Michael, Hahn, Robert, Hanson, Robin, Ledyard, John O., ...
The ability of groups of people to make predictions is a potent research tool that should be freed of unnecessary government restrictions.
Auctions, Matching and the Law of Aggregate Demand (2008)
John William Hatfield, Paul Milgrom
Abstract. We develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates, as special cases, the college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model, and ascending package...
Assignment Messages and the Assignment Exchange (2008)
Abstract. We introduce a new message space – the “assignment messages ” – that parameterize substitutable preferences and use them to build assignment exchanges – auction and exchange...
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness ∗ (2007)
Ernst Fehr A, Alexander Klein B, Dan Friedman, Paul Milgrom, Jean Tirole
Abstract: We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only...
Presentation and Structure of Substitutes Valuations (2007)
Meir Bing, Daniel Lehmann, Paul Milgrom
We propose two dierent methods for presenting (gross-) substitutes valuations. Each provides short descriptions for a family of substitutes valuations. We also show that any substitutes valuation...
Lecture at the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (2007)
theoretical ideas to advise a government about its economic policy, hoping to make life better for large numbers of people. I took the chance to approach him and introduce myself. Soon, we were...
Robert Day, Paul Milgrom, R. Day, P. Milgrom (b, R. Day, P. Milgrom
Abstract Auctions that select core allocations with respect to reported values generate competitive levels of sales revenues at equilibrium and limit bidder incentives to use shills. Among...
The lovely but lonely vickrey auction (2006)
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Paul Milgrom
William Vickrey’s (1961) inquiry into auctions and “counterspeculation ” marked the first serious attempt by an economist to analyze the details of market rules and to design new rules to...
Concepts and Properties of Substitute Goods ∗ (2006)
Paul Milgrom, Bruno Strulovici
We distinguish two notions of substitutes for discrete inputs of a firm. Class substitutes are defined assuming that units of a given input have the same price while unitary substitutes treat each...
Federico Echenique, Bob Anderson, Juan Dubra, Paul Milgrom, Stephen Morris, ...
I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have...
The clock-proxy auction: A practical combinatorial auction design (2006)
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Paul Milgrom
We propose the clock-proxy auction as a practical means for auctioning many related items. A clock auction phase is followed by a last-and-final proxy round. The approach combines the simple and...
Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky, Michael Schwarz, Thank Drew Fudenberg, Louis Kaplow, Robin Lee, ...
We investigate the “generalized second-price ” (GSP) auction, a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising. Although GSP looks similar to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)...
Michael Ostrovsky, John Asker, Jerry Green, Kate Ho, Paul Milgrom, Markus Mobius, ...
This paper presents a theory of matching in vertical networks, generalizing the theory of matching in two-sided markets introduced by Gale and Shapley. Under natural restrictions, stable networks are...
The Communication Requirements of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets (2004)
Ilya Segal, Jonathan Levin, Eric Maskin, Paul Milgrom, Andy Postlewaite
The paper examines the communication requirements of social choice rules when the (sincere) agents privately know their preferences. It shows that for a large class of choice rules, any communication...
The Communication Requirements of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets (2003)
Ilya Segal, Jonathan Levin, Eric Maskin, Paul Milgrom, Andy Postlewaite
The paper examines the communication requirements of social choice rules when the (sincere) agents privately know their preferences. It shows that for a large class of choice rules, any communication...
Rational Cooperation in the Finitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. (2002)
Kreps,David M., Milgrom,Paul, Roberts,John, Wilson,Robert
The purpose of this note is to demonstrate how reputation effects due to informational asymmetries can generate cooperative behavior in finitely-repeated versions of the classic prisoners' dilemma....
Efficient design with interdependent valuations (2001)
Benny Moldovanu, Eric Maskin, Paul Milgrom, Tim Van Z
We study efficient, Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms in a social choice setting that allows for informational and allocative externalities. We show that such mechanisms exist only if a...
Martin F. Hellwig, Klaus M. Schmidt, Bengt Holmström, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Paul Milgrom, John Moore, ...
This paper studies the relation between discrete-time and continuoustime principal-agent models. We derive the continuous-time model as a limit of discretetime models with ever shorter periods and...
Abstract. Ascending auctions with package bidding and their economic uses are explained and the main results of recent FCC-sponsored experiments with such auctions are summarized. A benchmark model...
Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence. (1998)
Economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational, since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly. Our game-theoretic, equilibrium analysis suggests that...
A new and improved design for multi-object iterative auctions (1998)
Christine Demartini, Anthony M. Kwasnica, John O. Ledyard, David Porter, Paul Milgrom
In this paper we present a new improved design for multi-object auctions and report on the results of tests of that design. We merge the better features of two extant but very di erent auction...
Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction (1998)
We review the uses of economic theory in the initial design and later improvement of the “simultaneous ascending auction, ” which was developed initially for the sale of radio spectrum licenses...
Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction (1998)
We review the uses of economic theory in the initial design and later improvement of the “simultaneous ascending auction, ” which was developed initially for the sale of radio spectrum licenses...
How Homogeneous Should a Team Be? (1998)
Andrea Prat, Joshua Gans, Thomas Hellmann, Marcos Lisboa, Paul Milgrom, Dolf Talman, ...
Should an organization hire people with similar backgrounds or with different backgrounds? We formulate this question within the framework of team theory. The team manager must fill n jobs and can...
Econometric Models of Ascending Auctions (1997)
Han Hong, Matthew Shum, George Mailath, Paul Milgrom, Peter Reiss, Jacques Robert, ...
We develop general econometric models of ascending (English) auctions which allow for both bidder asymmetries as well as common and/or private value components in bidders ' underlying...
An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects (1997)
Ronald Harstad, John Ledyard, Eric Maskin, Paul Milgrom, Vernon Smith, Lawrence M. Ausubel, ...
I am extraordinarily grateful to Kathleen Jacobson and Peter Cramton for numerous helpful discussions. I also
Economía, organización y gestión de la empresa (1993)
Traducción de: Economics, organization and management
Traducción de: Economics, organization and management
Economics, organization and management (1992)
Obra en que se conjugan los puntos de vista económico y administrativo para explicar los procesos directivos de las empresas. Este tratamiento unificado permite reconocer y analizar la complejidad...
Economics, organization and management / P. Milgrom, J. Roberts. (1992)
Obra en que se conjugan los puntos de vista económico y administrativo para explicar los procesos directivos de las empresas. Este tratamiento unificado permite reconocer y analizar la complejidad...
Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships.
Abreu, Dilip, Milgrom, Paul, Pearce, David
In a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring, the authors distinguish among the effects of (1) reducing the interest rate, (2) shortening the period over which actions are held fixed, and...
The authors develop an ordinal approach to comparing the equilibria of economic models. Its main advantages over the traditional approach based on signing derivatives are that it utilizes only a...
The Firm as an Incentive System.
Holmstrom, Bengt, Milgrom, Paul
The authors explore the twin hypotheses (1) that high-performance incentives, worker ownership of assets, and worker freedom from direct controls are complementary instruments for motivating workers,...
The LeChatelier principle, in the form introduced into economics by Paul A. Samuelson, asserts that, at a point of long-run equilibrium, the derivative of long-run compensated demand with respect to...
Comparing Optima: Do Simplifying Assumptions Affect Conclusions?
Consider a family of maximization models in which the optimum trades off beneficial and costly effects. Then comparative statics derived under many kinds of simplifying assumptions about the benefits...
Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild.
Greif, Avner, Milgrom, Paul, Weingast, Barry R
The authors interpret historical evidence in light of a repeated-game model to conclude that merchant guilds emerged during the late medieval period to allow rulers of trade centers to commit to the...
Putting auction theory to work : the simultaneous ascending auction
The"simultaneous ascending auction"was first introduced in 1994 to sell licenses to use bands of radio spectrum in the United States. Much of the attention devoted to the auction came from its role...
Substitute Valuations, Auctions, and Equilibrium with Discrete Goods
For economies in which goods are available in several (discrete) units, this paper identifies two notions of substitutes. The weaker notion guarantees monotonicity of tatonnement processses and...
Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes.
Meyer, Margaret, Milgrom, Paul, Roberts, John
We augment efficiency-based theories of ownership by including influence costs. Our principal conclusion is that the prospect of organizational decline and layoffs creates additional influence costs...
The authors derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the solution set of an optimization problem to be monotonic in the parameters of the problem. In addition, they develop practical methods...
The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization.
Manufacturing is undergoing a revolution. The mass production model is being replaced by a vision of a flexible multiproduct firm that emphasizes quality and speedy response to market conditions...
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, David M., Milgrom, Paul, Roberts, John, Wilson, Robert
Communication and Inventory as Substitutes in Organizing Production.
A major organizational design decision for manufacturing firms is t he extent to which production should be to stock versus to order: inventories and communication with customers are substitutes. The...
Package Auctions and Exchanges
We report recent advances concerning the package allocation problem, in which traders seek to buy or sell combinations of goods. The problems are most difficult when some goods are not substitutes....
Economic Theories of the Firm: Past, Present, and Future.
The authors explore the current state of the theory of the firm, with attention to its historical origins. Answers to the crucial theoretical question of why an organization c ontrolled by a central...
Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
The standard envelope theorems apply to choice sets with convex and topological structure, providing sufficient conditions for the value function to be differentiable in a parameter and...
Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities.
The authors study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition, macroeconomic coordination failures, arms races, bank runs, technology adoption and diffusion,...
Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives.
Holmstrom, Bengt, Milgrom, Paul
The authors develop two themes in the theory of incentive schemes. First, one need not always use all of the information available in an optimal incentive contract. Accounting information, which...
The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Paul Milgrom
We propose the clock-proxy auction as a practical means for auctioning many related items. A clock auction phase is followed by a last-and-final proxy round. The approach combines the simple and...
Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions
Peter Cramton, John McMillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, ...
We evaluate a number of possible enhancements to the FCC auctions. We consider only changes to the current auction rules that stay within the basic format of the simultaneous multiple round auction...
Package Bidding for Spectrum Licenses
Peter Cramton, John McMillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, ...
The FCC was an innovator in adopting the rules of the simultaneous ascending-price auction for its sales of spectrum licenses. While these rules have performed well in the auctions conducted so far...
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
Peter Cramton, John McMillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, ...
An effective package bidding mechanism addresses three problems: the exposure problem (the risks a bidder faces in trying to construct an efficiently large combination of licenses), the free-rider...
Concepts and Properties of Substitute Goods
Paul Milgrom, Bruno Strulovici
We distinguish two notions of substitutes for discrete inputs of a firm. Class substitutes are defined assuming that units of a given input have the same price while unitary substitutes treat each...
Relying on the Information of Interested Parties
We investigate the conventional wisdom that competition among interested parties attempting to influence a decisionmaker by providing verifiable information elicits all relevant information. We find...
Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes
Meyer, Margaret A, Milgrom, Paul, Roberts, Donald John
We augment efficiency-based theories of ownership by including influence costs. Our principal conclusion is that the prospect of organizational decline and layoffs creates additional influence costs...
Complementarities and systems: Understanding japanese economic organization
The performance of the Japanese economy in the last forty five years, during which it has gone from post war destitution and near collapse to one of the richest and most productive in the world is...
Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
Lawrence Ausubel, Paul Milgrom
A family of ascending package auction models is introduced in which bidders may determine their own packages on which to bid. In the proxy auction (revelation game) versions, the outcome is a point...
Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
Lawrence Ausubel, Paul Milgrom
A family of ascending package auction models is introduced in which bidders may determine their own packages on which to bid. In the proxy auction (revelation game) versions, the outcome is a point...
What the Seller Won’t Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets
Imagine that you are considering an investment in a new public offering of a firm's shares. The firm's officers make a presentation that includes an audited financial statement, an earnings forecast...
Core-selecting package auctions
Core, Stable matching, Marriage problem, Auctions, Core-selecting auctions, Menu auctions, Proxy auctions, Package bidding, Combinatorial bidding, Incentives, Truncation strategies, D44, C78,
Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Paul Milgrom
March 2002 A family of ascending package auction models is introduced in which bidders may determine their own packages on which to bid. In the proxy auction (revelation game) versions, the outcome...
March 2003 We introduce a two-sided matching model with contracts that subsumes and extends the Gale-Shapley matching model, the Kelso-Crawford labor market model and the Ausubel-Milgrom package...
Strongly Coalition-Proof Equilibria in Games with Strategic Complementarities
We identify two sufficient conditions for games with strategic complementarities to have a unique equilibrium that is "strongly coalition-proof," that is, immune to incentive-compatible deviations by...
Forthcoming in the American Economic Review The LeChatelier principle, in the form introduced into economics by Samuelson, asserts that at a point of long-run equilibrium, the derivative of long-run...
Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction
December 8, 1997 (Revised April 21, 1999) We review the uses of economic theory in the initial design and later improvement of the "simultaneous ascending auction," which was developed initially for...
December 19, 1999 (Revised) At least three different "envelope theorems" have proved useful for economic analysis. One applies to unconstrained optimization problems with parameterized objectives...
Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium
Milgrom, Paul, Strulovici, Bruno
This paper identifies two notions of substitutes for auction and equilibrium analysis. Weak substitutes, the usual price-theory notion, guarantees monotonicity of Tatonnement processes and...
Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions
Jeremy Bulow, Jonathan Levin, Paul Milgrom
We describe factors that make bidding in large spectrum auctions complex -- including exposure and budget problems, the role of timing within an ascending auction, and the possibilities for price...
Assignment Messages and Exchanges
"Assignment messages" are maximally general messages to describe substitutable preferences by means of a linear program. With "integer assignment messages," there exist integer-valued Walrasian...