Raising Revenues for Charity: Auctions versus Lotteries
Douglas D. Davis, Laura Razzolini, Robert Reilly, Bart J. Wilson
We report an experiment conducted to gain insight into factors that may affect revenues in English auctions and lotteries, two commonly used charity fund-raising formats. In particular, we examine...
Laboratory methods are used to evaluate the effects of institutional arrangements and rent-defending activity on rent-seeking auction outcomes. In part, Nash equilibrium predictions are a useful...
Re-matching, Information and Sequencing Effects in Posted Offer Markets
Douglas D. Davis, Korenok Oleg, Robert Reilly
This paper evaluates the effects of some standard procedural variations on outcomes in posted offer oligopoly experiments. Variations studied include the presence or absence of market information,...
Cooperation without Coordination: Signaling, Types and Tacit Collusion in Laboratory Oligopolies
Douglas D. Davis, Korenok Oleg, Robert Reilly
This paper studies the effects of price signaling and underlying propensities to cooperate on tacit collusion in laboratory posted offer markets. The experiment consists of two stages. The first...
Cost Structures and Nash Play in Repeated Cournot Games
Douglas Davis, Robert Reilly, Bart Wilson
This paper reports an experiment designed to assess the effects of a rotation in the marginal cost curve on convergence in a repeated Cournot triopoly. Increasing the cost curve's slope both reduces...
Subsidy Schemes and Charitable Contributions: A Closer Look
Douglas Davis, Edward Millner, Robert Reilly
This article replicates and “stress tests†a recent finding by Eckel and Grossman (2003) that matching subsidies generate substantially higher Charity Receipts than theoretically comparable...
Re-matching, information and sequencing effects in posted offer markets
Douglas Davis, Oleg Korenok, Robert Reilly
Market experiments, Oligopoly, Re-matching, Information, Market concentration, C9, D4, L4,