An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects (1997)
Ronald Harstad, John Ledyard, Eric Maskin, Paul Milgrom, Vernon Smith, Lawrence M. Ausubel, ...
I am extraordinarily grateful to Kathleen Jacobson and Peter Cramton for numerous helpful discussions. I also
Dominant Strategy Adoption and Bidders' Experience with Pricing Rules
Truthful revelation is a dominant strategy in both English (oral ascending bid) and second-price sealed-bid private-values auctions. Controlled observations of English auctions are largely consistent...
Experimental Tests of Consciously Parallel Behaviour in Oligopoly
Ronald Harstad, Stephen Martin, Hans-Theo Normann
The purpose of this research is to examine, in experimental oligopoly markets, (a) whether parallel pricing patterns emerge when communication among players is limited to cheap talk announcements;...
Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly
Common-value auctions, Full surplus extraction, Ex-post individual rationality, Mechanism design, D44, D82, D61, C72,