Non-existence of competitive equilibria with dynamically inconsistent preferences (2009)
Gabrieli, Tommaso, Ghosal, Sayantan
This paper shows the robust non existence of competitive equilibria even in a simple three period representative agent economy with dynamically inconsistent preferences. We distinguish between a...
Does strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) help? (2009)
Ghosal, Sayantan, Thampanishvong, Kannika
In a model with both issues of sovereign debtor moral hazard and creditor coordination under incomplete information, we show that the resulting conflict between ex ante and interim efficiency limits...
Technology, Unilateral Commitments and Cumulative Emissions Reduction (2009)
Chatterji, Shurojit, Ghosal, Sayantan
In this article, we argue that weak property rights over transnational pollution and the limited threat of retaliatory punishments blunts the effectiveness of a broad-based multilateral agreement to...
Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders (2008)
Busetto, Francesca, Codognato, Giulio, Ghosal, Sayantan
In this paper, we study three prototypical models of noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders : the model of Cournot-Walras equilibrium of Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991), the...
Broadberry, S. N., Ghosal, Sayantan, Proto, Eugenio
We provide a model of the links between commercialisation and technological progress, which is consistent with the historical evidence and places market relations at the heart of the industrial...
Democracy, collective action and intra-elite conflict (2008)
Ghosal, Sayantan, Proto, Eugenio
This paper studies the conditions under which intra-elite conflict leads to a democracy. There are two risk averse elites competing for the appropriation of a unit of social surplus, with an ex-ante...
Moral hazard, bank runs and contagion (2008)
Chatterji, Shurojit, Ghosal, Sayantan
We study banking with ex ante moral hazard. Resolving the misalignment of the incentives between banks and depositors requires early liquidation with positive probability : efficient risk-sharing...
Behavioural decisions and welfare (2008)
Dalton, Patricio Santiago, Ghosal, Sayantan
We study decision problems where (a) preference parameters are de.ned to include psychological/moral considerations and (b) there is a feedback effect from chosen actions to preference parameters. In...
Cournot-Walras equilibrium as a subgame perfect equilibrium (2008)
Busetto, Francesca, Codognato, Giulio, Ghosal, Sayantan
In this paper, we investigate the problem of the strategic foundation of the Cournot-Walras equilibrium approach. To this end, we respecify à la Cournot-Walras the mixed version of a model of...
The transition to democracy: collective action and intra-elite confict (2007)
Ghosal, Sayantan, Proto, Eugenio
This paper studies how intra-elite confict results in transition to democracy, characterized as both franchise extension to, and lowering the individual cost of collective political action for, an...
Enfranchisement, intra-elite conflict and bargaining (2006)
Ghosal, Sayantan, Proto, Eugenio
Does power sharing between competing elites result in franchise extension to non-elites? In this paper, we argue that competing, risk-averse elites will enfranchise non-elites as insurance against...
Bargaining and sustainability: the Argentine debt swap of 2005 (2006)
Dhillon, Amrita, García Fronti, Javier I., Ghosal, Sayantan
When Argentine sovereign default in December 2001 led to a collapse of the peso, the burden of dollar debt became demonstrably unsustainable. But it was not clear what restructuring was feasible, nor...
Bargaining and sustainability: the Argentine debt swap of 2005 (2005)
Dhillon, Amrita, García Fronti, Javier I., Ghosal, Sayantan
When Argentine sovereign default in December 2001 led to a collapse of the peso, the burden of dollar debt became demonstrably unsustainable. But it was not clear what restructuring was feasible, nor...
Sovereign debt crisis: coordination, bargaining and moral hazard (2005)
Ghosal, Sayantan, Thampanishvong, Kannika
We study the interaction between (a) inefficiencies in the post-default debtor-creditor bargaining game and (b) ex ante debtor moral hazard and excessive lending in sovereign debt markets....
Broadberry, Stephen, Ghosal, Sayantan
This paper documents the comparative productivity performance of the United States and Britain since 1870, showing the importance of developments in services. We identify the transition in market...
Co-ordination failure, moral hazard and sovereign bankruptcy procedures (2003)
We study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor co-ordination and debtor moral hazard. Solving the sovereign debtor’s incentives leads to excessive ‘rollover...
Coordination failure, moral hazard and sovereign bankruptcy procedures (2003)
We study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor co-ordination and debtor moral hazard. Solving the sovereign debtor’s incentives leads to excessive ‘rollover...
Information aggregation, costly voting and common values (2003)
Ghosal, Sayantan, Lockwood, Ben
In a model of majority voting with common values and costly but voluntary participation, we show that in the vicinity of equilibrium, it is always Pareto-improving for more agents, on the average, to...
Farsighted Network Formation (2003)
Bhaskar Dutta, Sayantan Ghosal, Debraj Ray
This paper studies a model of dynamic network formation when individuals are farsighted: players evaluate the desirability of a “current " move in terms of its consequences on the entire...
Bank runs and noisy signals (2001)
Boonprakaikawe, Juntip, Ghosal, Sayantan
We show that even with noisy signals on the quality of a bank's assets multiple equilibria exist in models of banking. We argue that the conditions under which this happens arise naturally in models...
Bargaining and Sustainability: The Argentine Debt Swap of 2005
Dhillon, Amrita, García-Fronti, Javier, Ghosal, Sayantan, Miller, Marcus
When Argentine sovereign default in December 2001 led to a collapse of the peso, the burden of dollar debt became demonstrably unsustainable. But it was not clear what restructuring was feasible, nor...
INFORMATION AGGREGATION, COSTLY VOTING AND COMMON VALUES
Ghosal, Sayantan, Lockwood, Ben
In a model of majority voting with common values and costly but voluntary participation, we show that in the vicinity of equilibrium, it is always Pareto-improving for more agents, on the average, to...
Optimal Sovereign Debt Write-downs
Sayantan Ghosal, Kannika Thampanishvong
At present, the enhanced HIPC initiative and the Gleneagles Proposal for debt write-downs by the G8 are the main mechanisms used to reduce indebtedness of low-income countries. In these countries...
Does Strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) Help?
Sayantan Ghosal, Kannika Thampanishvong
We study the effect of strengthening CACs in a debt rollover model of a sovereign debt crisis. Conditional on default, there are multiple equilibria: the impact of strengthening CACs depends...
The Millenium Development Goals and Sovereign Debt Write-downs
Sayantan Ghosal, Kannika Thampanishvong
Can sovereign debt write-downs be used to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)? This paper shows that transparency of domestic governance determines how a sovereign debt write-down is...
Sayantan Ghosal, Massimo Morelli
When agents are not price takers, they typically cannot obtain an efficient reallocation of resources in one round of trade. This paper presents a noncooperative model of imperfect competition where...
Co-ordination Failure, Moral Hazard and Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures
Sayantan Ghosal, Marcus Miller
We study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor co-ordination and debtor moral hazard. In the face of sovereign default, the need to give appropriate incentives to the...
Broadberry, Stephen, Sayantan Ghosal
We document comparative productivity performance since 1870, showing the importance of services for US overtaking of Britain. The transition in market services from customised, low-volume,...
Broadberry, Stephen, Ghosal, Sayantan
The United States overtook Britain in comparative aggregate productivity levels primarily as a result of trends in services rather than trends in industry. This occurred during the transition from...
Why did (not) the East Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Intra-Elite Conflict and Risk Sharing
Sayantan Ghosal, Eugenio Proto
The process of enfranchisement is studied in a model of intra-elite conflict over the sharing of social surplus. The relative bargaining power of each elite, function of the surplus each elite is...
Debt Restructuring and Economic Recovery: Analysing the Argentine Swap
Amrita Dhillon, Javier García-Fronti, Sayantan Ghosal, Marcus Miller
When Argentine sovereign default in December 2001 led to a collapse of the peso, the burden of dollar debt became demonstrably unsustainable. But it was not clear what restructuring was feasible, nor...
Broadberry, Stephen N, Ghosal, Sayantan
This Paper first documents the comparative productivity performance of the United States and Britain since 1870, showing the importance of developments in services. We identify the transition in...
Bhaskar Dutta, Sayantan Ghosal, Debraj Ray
This paper studies a model of dynamic network formation when individuals are farsighted : players evaluate the desirability of a “current” move in terms of its consequences on the entire...
Coordination Failure, Moral Hazard and Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures
Ghosal, Sayantan, Miller, Marcus
We study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor co-ordination and debtor moral hazard. Solving the sovereign debtor’s incentives leads to excessive ‘rollover...
original papers : Buyers' and sellers' cartels on markets with indivisible goods
Francis Bloch, Sayantan Ghosal
This paper analyzes the formation of cartels of buyers and sellers in a simple model of trade inspired by Rubinstein and Wolinsky's (1990) bargaining model. When cartels are formed only on one side...
Enfranchisement, Intra-Elite Conflict and Bargaining
Ghosal, Sayantan, Proto, Eugenio
Does power sharing between competing elites result in franchise extension to non-elites? In this paper, we argue that competing, risk-averse elites will enfranchise non-elites as in-surance against...
The Transition to Democracy : Collective Action and Intra-elite Confict
Ghosal, Sayantan, Proto, Eugenio
This paper studies how intra-elite confict results in transition to democracy, characterized as both franchise extension to, and lowering the individual cost of collective political action for, an...
Behavioural Decisions and Welfare
Dalton, Patricio, Ghosal, Sayantan
We study decision problems where (a) preference parameters are defined to include psychological/moral considerations and (b) there is a feedback effect from chosen actions to preference parameters....
Moral hazard, bank runs and contagion
Ghosal, Sayantan, Chatterji, Shurojit
We study banking with ex ante moral hazard. Resolving the misalignment of the incentives between banks and depositors requires early liquidation with positive probability : efficient risk-sharing...
Cournot-Walras Equilibrium as a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Busetto, Francesca, Codognato, Giulio, Ghosal, Sayantan
In this paper, we investigate the problem of the strategic foundation of the Cournot-Walras equilibrium approach. To this end, we respecify a'la Cournot-Walras the mixed version of a model of...
Democracy, Collective Action and Intra-elite Conflict
Ghosal, Sayantan, Proto, Eugenio
This paper studies the conditions under which intra-elite conflict leads to a democracy. There are two risk averse elites competing for the appropriation of a unit of social surplus, with an ex-ante...
Broadberry, Stephen, Ghosal, Sayantan, Proto, Eugenio
We provide a model of the links between commercialisation and technological progress, which is consistent with the historical evidence and places market relations at the heart of the industrial...
Noncooperative Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
Busetto, Francesca, Codognato, Giulio, Ghosal, Sayantan
In this paper, we study three prototypical models of noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders : the model of Cournot-Walras equilibrium of Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991), the...
Democracy, Collective Action and Intra-Elite Conflict
Sayantan Ghosal, Eugenio Proto
This paper studies the conditions under which intra-elite conflict leads to a democ- racy. There are two risk averse elites competing for the appropriation of a unit of so- cial surplus, with an...
Broadberry, Stephen, Ghosal, Sayantan
The United States overtook Britain in comparative aggregate productivity levels primarily as a result of trends in services rather than trends in industry. This occurred during the transition from...
Does strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) help?
Ghosal, Sayantan, Thampanishvong, Kannika
In a model with both issues of sovereign debtor moral hazard and creditor coordination under incomplete information, we show that the resulting conflict between ex ante and interim efficiency limits...
Non-Existence of Competitive Equilibria with Dynamically Inconsistent Preferences
Gabrieli, Tommaso, Ghosal, Sayantan
This paper shows the robust non existence of competitive equilibria even in a simple three period representative agent economy with dynamically inconsistent preferences. We distinguish between a...
Technology, Unilateral Commitments and Cumulative Emissions Reduction
Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal
In this article, we argue that weak property rights over transnational pollution and the limited threat of retaliatory punishments blunts the effectiveness of a broad-based multilateral agreement to...
Democracy, collective action and intra-elite conflict
Ghosal, Sayantan, Proto, Eugenio
We analyze a model where there is uncertainty about the future power of two ex-ante symmetric elites to appropriate surplus, and ex-ante surplus sharing agreements are not binding. We show that in an...
Unilateral measures and global emissions mitigation
Chatterji, Shurojit, Ghosal, Sayantan, Walsh, Sean, Whalley, John
In this paper we discuss global climate change mitigation that builds on existing unilateral actions to deliver ever deepening emission cuts over time. A wide array of unilateral environmental...
Unilateral Measures and Emissions Mitigation
Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal, Sean Walsh, John Whalley
We discuss global climate mitigation that builds on existing unilateral measures to cut emissions. We document and discuss the rationale for such unilateral measures argue that such measures have the...