Nearly all observational learning models assume that individuals can observe all the decisions that have previously been made. In reality, such perfect information is rarely available. To explore the...
Syngjoo Choi, Raymond Fisman, Douglas M. Gale, Shachar Kariv
Because uncertainty is endemic in a wide variety of economic circumstances, models of decision making under uncertainty play a key role in every field of economics. The standard model of decisions...
Social learning describes any situation in which economic agents learn by observing the behavior of others. Social learning in networks applies this idea to situations in which agents observe the...
Consistency and Heterogeneity of Individual Behavior under Uncertainty ∗ (2007)
Syngjoo Choi, Raymond Fisman, Shachar Kariv, Jim Andreoni, Dan Ariely, Liran Einav, ...
NYU ∗ Some of the results reported here were previously distributed in a paper titled “Substantive
Beliefs and Social Preferences (2007)
Zachary Grossman, Shachar Kariv, Ulrike Malmendier, Criticism Participants
Why do people sacrifice to help others in some situations, but not in others? Besides a direct taste for helping others, I study three additional psychological motivations that involve beliefs:...
Syngjoo Choi, Raymond Fisman, Shachar Kariv, Douglas Gale
We report a laboratory experiment that enables us to study systematically the substantive and procedural rationality of decision making under uncertainty. By using novel graphical representations of...
Distinguishing Social Preferences from Preferences for Altruism (2005)
Fisman, Raymond, Kariv, Shachar, Markovitz, Daniel
We report a laboratory experiment that enables us to distinguish preferences for altruism (concerning trade-offs between own payoffs and the payoffs of others) from social preferences (concerning...
Individual Preferences for Giving (2005)
Fisman, Raymond J, Kariv, Shachar, Markovits, Daniel
This paper reports an experimental test of individual preferences for giving. We use graphical representations of modified Dictator Games that vary the price of giving. This generates a very rich...
Syngjoo Choi, Raymond Fisman, Shachar Kariv, Douglas Gale
We report a laboratory experiment that enables us to study systematically the substantive and procedural rationality of decision making under uncertainty. By using novel graphical representations of...
2005a), “Behavioral Aspects of Learning in Social Networks: An Experimental Study (2005)
Syngjoo Choi, Douglas Gale, Shachar Kariv
Networks are natural tools for understanding social and economic phenomena. For example, all markets are characterized by agents connected by complex, multilateral information networks, and the...
A Theory and Experiments of Learning in Social Networks (2004)
Individuals living in society are bound together by a social network, the complex of relationships that brings them into contact with other agents. In many social and economic situations, individuals...
We extend the standard model of social learning in two ways. First, we introduce a social network and assume that agents can only observe the actions of agents to whom they are connected by this...
Douglas Gale (corresponding, Shachar Kariv
We extend the standard model of social learning in two ways. First, we introduce a social network and assume that agents can only observe the actions of agents to whom they are connected by this...
Distinguishing Informational Cascades from Herd Behavior in the Laboratory
This paper reports an experimental test of how individuals learn from the behavior of others. By using techniques only available in the laboratory, we elicit subjects' beliefs. This allows us to...
Distinguishing Social Preferences from Preferences for Altruism
Raymond Fisman, Shachar Kariv, Daniel Markovits
We report a laboratory experiment that enables us to distinguish preferences for altruism (concerning tradeoffs between own payoffs and the payoffs of others) from social preferences (concerning...
Consistency, Heterogeneity, and Granularity of Individual Behavior under Uncertainty
Syngjoo Choi, Raymond Fisman, Douglas Gale, Shachar Kariv
By using graphical representations of budget sets over bundles of state-contingent commodities, we generate a very rich data set well-suited to studying behavior under uncertainty at the level of the...
Individual Preferences for Giving
Raymond Fisman, Shachar Kariv, Daniel Markovits
We utilize graphical representations of Dictator Games which generate rich individual- level data. Our baseline experiment employs budget sets over feasible payoff- pairs. We test these data for...
Consistency and Heterogeneity of Individual Behavior under Uncertainty
Syngjoo Choi, Raymond Fisman, Douglas Gale, Shachar Kariv
By using graphical representations of simple portfolio choice problems, we generate a very rich dataset to study behavior under uncertainty at the level of the individual subject. We test the data...
An Experimental Test of Advice and Social Functioning
Bogachan Celen, Shachar Kariv, Andrew Schotter
Social learning is the process of individuals learning by observing the actions of others. In the real world, however, although people learn by observing the actions of others, they also learn from...
Revealing Preferences Graphically: An Old Method Gets a New Tool Kit
Syngjoo Choi, Raymond Fisman, Douglas M. Gale, Shachar Kariv
Individual Preferences for Giving
Raymond Fisman, Shachar Kariv, Daniel Markovits
This paper reports an experimental test of individual preferences for giving. We use graphical representations of modified Dictator Games that vary the price of giving. This generates a very rich...
An experimental test of observational learning under imperfect information
Nearly all observational learning models assume that individuals can observe all the decisions that have previously been made. In reality, such perfect information is rarely available. To explore the...
Network architecture, salience and coordination
Choi, Syngjoo, Gale, Douglas, Kariv, Shachar, Palfrey, Thomas
Sequential equilibrium in monotone games: A theory-based analysis of experimental data
Choi, Syngjoo, Gale, Douglas, Kariv, Shachar
A monotone game is an extensive-form game with complete information, simultaneous moves and an irreversibility structure on strategies. It captures a variety of situations in which players make...
Trading in Networks: A Normal Form Game Experiment
Douglas M. Gale, Shachar Kariv
This paper reports an experimental study of trading networks. Networks are incomplete in the sense that each trader can only exchange assets with a limited number of other traders. The greater the...