Srihari Govindan

MESSAGE SPACES FOR PERFECT CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA (2007)

of the equilibrium set has an associated index, defined as the local degree of the map. This note shows that for a two-player game, every map with the same roots induces the same index. Moreover,...

Autnomo Mxico, Shurojit Chatterji, Shurojit Chatterji, Srihari Govindan, Srihari Govindan

Abstract. We show that a perfect correlated equilibrium distribution of an N-person game, as defined by Dhillon and Mertens (1996) can be achieved using a finite number of copies of the strategy...

Paying politicians* (2007)

Matthias Messher, Mattias K. Polborn, Western Ontario, Jim Davies, Srihari Govindan, Ig Horstmann, ...

Consider a situation where a society has to elect an official who provides a public service for the citizens. Candidates differ in their competence and every potential candidate has private...

and (2007)

Srihari Govindan, Andrew Mclennan

* We would like to acknowledge stimulating conversations with Larry Blume, Andreu Mas-Colell, and

RESEARCH PAPER NO. 1955 ON FORWARD INDUCTION (2007)

Srihari Govindan, Robert Wilson, Srihari Govindan, Robert Wilson

We examine Hillas and Kohlberg’s conjecture that invariance to the addition of payoff-redundant strategies implies that a backward induction outcome survives deletion of strategies that are...

Sufficient conditions for stable equilibria (2006)

Srihari Govindan; University Of Iowa, Robert B. Wilson; Stanford University

[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] A refinement of the set of Nash equilibria that satisfies two assumptions is shown to select a subset that is...

Symmetry and p-stability (2004)

Govindan, Srihari, Von Schemde, Arndt, Von Stengel, Bernhard

Computing Nash equilibria by iterated polymatrix approximation (2004)

DOI 10.1007/s001820400167 Symmetry and p-Stability (2002)

Abstract. This article develops a new algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium of an N-person game. The algorithm approximates the game by a sequence of polymatrix games. We provide su±cient...

Srihari Govindan, Arndt Von Schemde, Bernhard Von Stengel

Abstract A symmetry of a game is a permutation of the player set and their strategy sets that leaves the payoff functions invariant. In this paper we introduce and discuss two relatively mild...

A sufficient condition for invariance of essential components (1995)

Stable equilibria : two backwards induction properties and an application / (1993)

Govindan, Srihari.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1993.

Sufficient Conditions for Stable Equilibria

Metastable Equilibria

Message spaces for perfect correlated equilibria

Shurojit Chatterji, Srihari Govindan

We show that a perfect correlated equilibrium distribution of an N-person game, as defined by Dhillon and Mertens (1996) can be achieved using a finite number of copies of the strategy space as the...

Structure theorems for game trees

Kohlberg and Mertens [Kohlberg, E. & Mertens, J. (1986) Econometrica 54, 1003–1039] proved that the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence is homeomorphic to its domain when the domain is the...

Essential equilibria

Sufficient conditions for stable equilibria

The connected uniformly hyperstable sets of a finite game are shown to be precisely the essential components of Nash equilibria.

Wilson, Robert B., Govindan, Srihari

A refinement of the set of Nash equilibria that satisfies two assumptions is shown to select a subset that is stable in the sense defined by Kohlberg and Mertens. One assumption requires that a...

Message Spaces for Perfect Correlated Equilibria

Shurojit Chatterji, Srihari Govindan

We show that a perfect correlated equilibrium distribution of an N-person game, as defined by Dhillon and Mertens (1996) can be achieved using a finite number of copies of the strategy space as the...

Structure theorems for game trees

Kohlberg and Mertens [Kohlberg, E. & Mertens, J. (1986) Econometrica 54, 1003–1039] proved that the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence is homeomorphic to its domain when the domain is the...

Essential equilibria

The connected uniformly hyperstable sets of a finite game are shown to be precisely the essential components of Nash equilibria.

'On Forward Induction

A global Newton method to compute Nash equilibria

Forward Induction, Public Randomization, and Admissibility,

Govindan, Srihari, Robson, Arthur J.

A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem

Govindan, Srihari, Reny, Philip J., Robson, Arthur J.

Computing Nash equilibria by iterated polymatrix approximation

Direct Proofs of Generic Finiteness of Nash Equilibrium Outcomes.

On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms.

Govindan, Srihari, McLennan, Andrew

Consider nonempty finite pure strategy sets S[subscript 1], . . . , S[subscript n], let S = S[subscript 1] times . . . times S[subscript n], let Omega be a finite space of "outcomes," let...

Every Stable Set Contains a Fully Stable Set.

Govindan, Srihari

Robust nonexistence of equilibrium with incomplete markets

Busch, Lutz-Alexander, Govindan, Srihari

Uniqueness of the index for Nash equilibria of two-player games

Robert Wilson, Srihari Govindan

Given a map whose roots are the Nash equilibria of a game, each component of the equilibrium set has an associated index, defined as the local degree of the map. This note shows that for a two-player...

Justification of Stable Equilibria

Refinements of Nash Equilibrium

Two assumptions are used to justify selection of equilibria in stable sets. One assumption requires that a selected set is invariant to addition of redundant strategies. The other is a strong version...

Stable Outcomes of Generic Games in Extensive Form

This paper describes ways that the definition of an equilibrium among players’ strategies in a game can be sharpened by invoking additional criteria derived from decision theory. Refinements of...

We apply Mertens' dedinition of stability for a game in strategic form to a game in extensive form with perfect recall. We prove that if payoffs are generic then the outcomes of stable sets of...

Metastable Equilibria

We define a refinement of Nash equilibria called metastability. This refinement supposes that the given game might be embedded within any global game that leaves its local bestreply correspondence...

Wilson, Robert B., Govindan, Srihari

We examine Hillas and Kohlberg's conjecture that invariance to the addition of payoff-redundant strategies implies that a backward induction outcome survives deletion of strategies that are inferior...

A Decomposition Algorithm for N-Player Games

Global Newton Method for Stochastic Games

An N-player game can be approximated by adding a coordinator who interacts bilaterally with each player. The coordinator proposes strategies to the players, and his payoff is maximized when each...

Decision-Theoretic Forward Induction

The Global Newton Method for games in normal form and in extensive form is shown to have a natural extension to computing Markov-perfect equilibria of stochastic games.

An equivalent definition of stable Equilibria

A player's pure strategy is called relevant for an outcome of a game in extensive form with perfect recall if there exists a weakly sequential equilibrium with that outcome for which the strategy is...

Srihari Govindan, Jean-François Mertens

Characterisations of stable equilibria in terms of the best reply correspondence are given. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Symmetry and p-Stability

Srihari Govindan, Arndt Von Schemde, Bernhard Von Stengel

Nash equilibrium, Stability, Symmetry,

Maximal stable sets of two-player games

Perfect equilibrium and lexicographic beliefs

If a connected component of perfect equilibria of a two-player game contains a stable set as defined by Mertens, then the component is itself stable. Thus the stable sets maximal under inclusion are...

Srihari Govindan, Tilman Klumpp

We extend the results of Blume, Brandenberger, and Dekel (1991b) to obtain a finite characterization of perfect equilibria in terms of lexicographic probability systems (LPSs). The LPSs we consider...

Axiomatic Justification of Stable Equilibria

Essential Equilibria

Global Newton Method for stochastic games

A player's pure strategy is called relevant for an outcome of a game in extensive form with perfect recall if there exists a weakly sequential equilibrium with that outcome for which the strategy is...

Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games with Generic Payoffs

The Global Newton Method for games in normal form and in extensive form is shown to have a natural extension to computing Markov-perfect equilibria of stochastic games.

Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Two Players, Perfect Information, and Generic Payoffs

Three axioms from decision theory select sets of Nash equilibria of signaling games in extensive form with generic payoffs. The axioms require undominated strategies (admissibility), inclusion of a...

Stability and the chain store paradox

GOVINDAN, Srihari

Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic two-player games

A decomposition algorithm for N-player games