The strategic motive to sell forward: experimental evidence (2009)
Ferreira, José Luis [jlferr], Kujal, Praveen [kujal], Rassenti, Stephen
We test the strategic motive to sell forward in experimental Cournot duopoly and quadropoly environments with either a finite (exogenous close) or an infinite (endogenous close) number of forward...
Jeffrey Banks, Mark Olson, David Porter, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon Smith, Dr. David Porter
The Federal Communications Commission uses an ascending bid auction called the Simultaneous Multi-round Auction (SMA) to assign spectrum for personal communication service licenses. Congress recently...
Mark Van Boening, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon Smith
We use numerical methods to compute Nash equilibrium (NE) bid functions for four agents bidding in a first-price auction. Each bidder i is randomly assigned: ri ɛ [0, rmax], where 1 − ri is...
An Experimental Examination of the Walrasian Tatonnement Mechanism
Bronfman, Corinne, McCabe, Kevin, Porter, David, Rassenti, Stephen, Smith, Vernon
Exclusionary Bundling and the Effects of a Competitive Fringe
Anil Caliskan, David Porter, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon L. Smith, Bart J. Wilson
The traditional analysis of exclusionary bundling examines the impact of a monopolist bundling product A with another product B, which is competitively provided. Using experimental posted-offer...
An Experimental Examination of the Walrasian Tatonnement Mechanism
Corinne Bronfman, Kevin McCabe, David Porter, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon Smith
This is a systematic experimental comparison of the efficiency and competitive properties of a computerized multiunit tatonnement with or without a dynamic improvement rule, with or without publicity...
MECHANISMS FOR ADDRESSING THIRD-PARTY IMPACTS RESULTING FROM VOLUNTARY WATER TRANSFERS
Murphy, James, Dinar, Ariel, Howitt, Richard, Mastrangelo, Erin, Rassenti, Stephen, Smith, Vernon
This research uses laboratory experiments to test alternative water market institutions designed to protect third-party interests. The institutions tested include taxing mechanisms that raise revenue...
Bronfman, Corinne, McCabe, Kevin, Porter, David, Rassenti, Stephen, Smith, Vernon, Charles R. Plott, ...
Electric Power Market Design Issues and Laboratory Experiments
Rassenti, Stephen, Smith, Vernon, Charles R. Plott, Vernon L. Smith
Transmission Constraints, Incentive Auction Rules and Trader Experience in an Electric Power Market
Backerman, Steven, Rassenti, Stephen, Smith, Vernon L., Charles R. Plott, Vernon L. Smith
The design, testing and implementation of Virginia's NOx allowance auction
Porter, David, Rassenti, Stephen, Shobe, William, Smith, Vernon, Winn, Abel
We report on the design and testing of three auction mechanisms to maximize revenue and efficiency in the sale of two vintages of nitrous oxide emission allowances by the Commonwealth of Virginia in...
The strategic motive to sell forward: experimental evidence
José Luis Ferreira, Praveen Kujal, Stephen Rassenti
We test the strategic motive to sell forward in experimental Cournot duopoly and quadropoly environments with either a finite (exogenous close) or an infinite (endogenous close) number of forward...