Causal Reasoning through Intervention Observation vs. Intervention 1 (2008)
York Hagmayer, Steven A. Sloman, David A. Lagnado, Michael R. Waldmann
Causal knowledge enables us to predict future events, to choose the right actions to achieve our goals, and to envision what would have happened if things had been different. Thus, it allows us to...
Causal Models Frame Causal Models Frame Interpretation of Mathematical Equations (2008)
Daniel Mochon, Steven A. Sloman, Steven Sloman
Causal Models Frame We offer evidence that people construe mathematical relations as causal. The studies show that people can select the causal versions of equations, and that their selections...
Steven Sloman, Avenue Robert Schuman, Steven A. Sloman, David A. Lagnado
Running head: Undoing effect in causal reasoning Undoing effect in causal reasoning 1 Undoing effect in causal reasoning 4 A normative framework for modeling causal and counterfactual reasoning has...
The Empirical Case for Two Systems ofReasoning (2008)
Distinctions have been proposed between systems of reasoning for centuries. This article distills JAN ~ properties shared by many of these distinctions and characterizes the resulting systems in...
Opinion TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.10 No.9 The causal psycho-logic of choice (2008)
Steven A. Sloman, York Hagmayer
Choices do not merely identify one option among a set of possibilities; choosing is an intervention, an action that changes the world. As a result, good decision making generally requires a model...
Assessing the Causal Structure of Function (2008)
Sergio E. Chaigneau, Steven A. Sloman, Lawrence W. Barsalou
Theories typically emphasize affordances or intentions as the primary determinant of an object’s perceived function. The HIPE theory assumes that people integrate both into causal models that...
Barbara C. Malt, Steven A. Sloman
Languages vary idiosyncratically in the sets of referents to which common nouns are applied. To use nouns as a native speaker would, second language learners must acquire language-specific naming...
ARTICLE NO. CG970672 Categorical Inference Is Not a Tree: The Myth of Inheritance Hierarchies (2007)
inherit the properties of their superordinates. In five experiments, I show that people do not consistently apply this principle when evaluating categorical arguments involving natural categories and...
Medin for suggesting use of the Cultural Consensus (2007)
Barbara C. Malt, Steven A. Sloman, Silvia Gennari, Meiyi Shi, Yuan Wang, Barbara Malt, ...
We argue that it is important to distinguish between categorization as object recognition and as naming because the relation between the two may not be as straightforward as has often been assumed....
Steven Sloman, Steven A. Sloman, Barbara C. Malt
Essentialism and artifact kinds 2 We evaluate three theories of categorization in the domain of artifacts. Two theories are versions of psychological essentialism; they posit that artifact...
Please address correspondence to: (2007)
Barbara C. Malt, Steven A. Sloman, Silvia P. Gennari
We thank Dedre Gentner and Susan Goldin-Meadow for helpful comments on a previous draft of the chapter. 2 A strong version of the Whorfian hypothesis is that the influence of language on thought is...
Is Deontic Reasoning Special? Address Correspondence to: (2007)
Steven Sloman, Amit Almor, Steven A. Sloman
Oaksford and Chater (1994), like several theorists before them, attribute cases in which selections in the Wason 4-card task match the prescriptions of formal logic to a special kind of deontic...
Correspondence should be sent to the current address of the first author: (2007)
Er Staller, Steven A. Sloman, Talia Ben-zeev, Alexander Staller, Alexander Staller, Perspective Effects
Perspective effects in the Wason four-card selection task occur when people choose mutually exclusive sets of cards depending on the perspective they adopt when making their choice. Previous...
A Non-Deontic Perspective on Perspective Effects (2007)
Hedco Neuroscience Building, Amit Almor, Amit Almor, Steven A. Sloman
We argue that perspective effects in the Wason 4-card selection task are a product of the linguistic interpretation of the rule in the context of the problem text and not of the reasoning process...
Submitted for publication. (2007)
Steven A. Sloman, Steven Sloman
2 A connectionist model of argument strength is proposed that applies to categorical arguments involving natural categories and predicates about which subjects have few prior beliefs. An example is...
Barbara C. Malt, Steven A. Sloman
Rather than having universal linguistic categories for sets of common objects, languages develop their own, idiosyncratic naming patterns for them. Accounting for these patterns requires reference...
Beyond covariation: Cues to causal structure (2006)
Michael R. Waldmann, York Hagmayer, Steven A. Sloman, David A. Lagnado, David A. Lagnado
computation. In preparation. Address for correspondence:
Universality and language specificity in object naming (2003)
Memorial Dr. East, Barbara C. Malt, Steven A. Sloman, Silvia P. Gennari
Object Naming Rather than having universal linguistic categories for some sets of common objects, languages develop their own, idiosyncratic naming patterns for them. Accounting for these patterns...
Artifacts are not ascribed essences, nor are they treated as belonging to kinds (2003)
Steven A. Sloman, Barbara C. Malt
We evaluate three theories of categorisation in the domain of artifacts. Two theories are versions of psychological essentialism; they posit that artifact categorisation is a matter of judging...
Perspective Effects in Non-Deontic Versions of the Wason Selection Task (2000)
Er Staller, Steven A. Sloman, Talia Ben-zeev, Alexander Staller, Alexander Staller, Perspective Effects
Perspective effects in the Wason four-card selection task occur when people choose mutually exclusive sets of cards depending on the perspective they adopt when making their choice. Previous...
Feature centrality: naming versus imagining (1999)
Being white is central to whether we call an animal a "polar bear, " but it is fairly peripheral to our concept of what a polar bear is. We propose that a feature is central to...
Feature centrality and conceptual coherence (1998)
Steven A. Sloman, Bradley C. Love
Conceptual features differ in how mentally tranformable they are. A robin that does nt eat Is harder to imagine than a robin that does not chirp. Ife argue that features are Immutable to the extent...
Feature Centrality and Conceptual Coherence (1997)
Sloman, Steven A., Love, Bradley C., Woo-kyoung, Ahn
Conceptual features differ in how mentally tranformable they are. A robin that does not eat is harder to imagine than a robin that does not chirp. We argue that features are immutable to the extent...
Feature Centrality and Conceptual Coherence (1997)
Sloman, Steven A., Love, Bradley C., Woo-kyoung, Ahn
Conceptual features differ in how mentally tranformable they are. A robin that does not eat is harder to imagine than a robin that does not chirp. We argue that features are immutable to the extent...
Feature Centrality and Conceptual Coherence (1997)
Sloman, Steven A., Love, Bradley C., Woo-kyoung, Ahn
Conceptual features differ in how mentally tranformable they are. A robin that does not eat is harder to imagine than a robin that does not chirp. We argue that features are immutable to the extent...
The empirical case for two systems of reasoning (1996)
Distinctions have been proposed between systems of reasoning for centuries. This article distills properties shared by many of these distinctions and characterizes the resulting systems in light of...
The empirical case for two systems of reasoning (1996)
Distinctions have been proposed between systems of reasoning for centuries. This article distills properties shared by many of these distinctions and characterizes the resulting systems in light of...
Persistence in memory and judgment [microform] : part-set inhibition and primacy. (1991)
University Microfilms order no. 9108904.
Persistence in memory and judgment : part-set inhibition and primacy / (1990)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Stanford University, 1990.