Risk Aversion, Beliefs, and (2005)
Prediction Market Equilibrium, Steven Gjerstad
Manski [2004] analyzes the relationship between the distribution of traders' beliefs and the equilibrium price in a prediction market with risk neutral traders. He finds that there can be a...
The General Equilibrium Structure of Bargaining Models and Market Experiments (2000)
Steven Gjerstad, Jason Shachat
We map induced supply and demand environments to equivalent general equilibrium economies. This general equilibrium structure facilitates reinterpretation of bargaining models and market experiments,...
Price formation in double auctions (1998)
Steven Gjerstad, John Dickhaut
Abstract. We develop a model of information processing and strategy choice for participants in a double auction. Sellers in this model form beliefs that an offer will be accepted by some buyer....
Price formation in double auctions (1998)
Steven Gjerstad, John Dickhaut
Abstract. We develop a model of information processing and strategy choice for participants in a double auction. Sellers in this model form beliefs that an o er will be accepted by some buyer....
PRICE FORMATION IN DOUBLE AUCTIONS 2 (1998)
Steven Gjerstad, John Dickhaut, Steven Gjerstad
We also would like to thank two referees for several useful suggestions. We especially thank Jim Jordan for his help with the formulation of this model as an informationally decentralized decision...
A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness
James C. Cox, Daniel Friedman, Steven Gjerstad
We introduce a parametric model of other-regarding preferences in which my emotional state determines the marginal rate of substitution between my own and others' payoffs, and thus my subsequent...
A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness
James Cox, Daniel Friedman, Steven Gjerstad
We introduce a parametric model of other-regarding preferences. The income distribution and the kindness or unkindness of others' choices ('intentions') systematically affect a person's emotional...
The Strategic Impact of Pace in Double Auction Bargaining
This paper evaluates performance of human subjects and instances of a bidding model that interact in continuous-time double auction experiments. Asks submitted by instances of the seller model...
Price Formation in Double Auctions
Steven Gjerstad, John Dickhaut
We develop a model of information processing and strategy choice for participants in a double auction. Sellers in this model form beliefs that an offer will be accepted by some buyer. Similarly,...
The Strategic Impact of Pace in Double Auction Bargaining
This paper evaluates performance of human subjects and instances of a bidding model that interact in continuous time double auction experiments. Asks submitted by instances of the seller model...
The Edgeworth exchange formulation of bargaining models and market experiments
Steven Gjerstad, Jason Shachat
We construct Edgeworth exchange economies equivalent to demand and supply environments typically used in bargaining models and market experiments. This formulation clearly delineates environment,...
Market Dynamics in Edgeworth Exchange
Edgeworth exchange is the fundamental general equilibrium model, yet equilibrium predications and theories of price adjustment for this model remain untested. This paper reports an experimental test...
Risk Aversion, Beliefs, and Prediction Market Equilibrium
Manski [2004] analyzes the relationship between the distribution of traders’ beliefs and the equilibrium price in a prediction market with risk neutral traders. He finds that there can be a...
A General Equilibrium Structure for Induced Supply and Demand
Steven Gjerstad, Jason Shachat
We construct a mapping between induced supply and demand environments, often used in laboratory market experiments, and general equilibrium production economies. This general equilibrium structure,...
symposium articles : Concurrent trading in two experimental markets with demand interdependence
Arlington W. Williams, John O. Ledyard, Steven Gjerstad, Vernon L. Smith
We report results from fifteen computerized double auctions with concurrent trading of two commodities. In contrast to prior experimental markets, buyers' demands are induced via CES earnings...
The Rate of Convergence of Continuous Fictitious Play.
The rate of convergence to Nash equilibrium of continuous fictitious play is determined for a generic set of utilities and initial beliefs in 2 x 2 games. In addition, an example is provided...
The rate of convergence of continuous fictitious play
The rate of convergence to Nash equilibrium of continuous fictitious play is determined for a generic set of utilities and initial beliefs in 2 þ 2 games. In addition, an example is provided...
Individual Rationality and Market Efficiency
Steven Gjerstad, Jason M. Shachat
The demonstration by Smith [1962] that prices and allocations quickly converge to the competitive equilibrium in the continuous double auction (CDA) was one of the first – and remains one of the...
Price Dynamics in an Exchange Economy
The pure exchange model is the foundation of the neoclassical theory of value, yet equilibrium predictions and models of price adjustment for this model remained untested prior to the experiment...