A COGNITIVE HIERARCHY MODEL OF GAMES 1 (2008)
Colin F. Camerer, Teck-hua Ho, Juin-kuan Chong, Haitao Cui, Paul Glimcher, ...
Players in a game are “in equilibrium ” if they are rational, and accurately predict other players ’ strategies. In many experiments, however, players are not in equilibrium. An alternative is...
Familiarity-based Reinforcement and Response Sensitivity Summary (2007)
Teck-hua Ho, Juin-kuan Chong, Greg Allenby, David Bell, Eric Bradlow, ...
We develop a highly parsimonious model to describe and predict stock-keeping unit (SKU) choice in any frequently-bought consumer packaged good category. The model has 20 parameters for a category...
Abstract EWA LEARNING IN BILATERAL CALL MARKETS (2007)
Colin F. Camerer, David Hsia, Teck-hua Ho
This chapter extends the EWA learning model to bilateral call market games (also known as the "sealed-bid mechanism " in two-person bargaining). In these games, a buyer and seller...
A Modeling Framework for Category Assortment Planning (2007)
Juin-kuan Chong, Teck-hua Ho, Christopher S. Tang
which have greatly improved the quality of this manuscript. Direct correspondence to any of the authors.
TRUST BUILDING AMONG STRANGERS * (2007)
∗ We thank seminar participants at the ESA meeting and the University of Pennsylvania for helpful suggestions, Colin Camerer for his insightful comments on an earlier draft, and Christophe Van den...
Abstract EWA LEARNING IN BILATERAL CALL MARKETS (2007)
Colin F. Camerer, David Hsia, Teck-hua Ho
This chapter extends the EWA learning model to bilateral call market games (also known as the "sealed-bid mechanism " in two-person bargaining). In these games, a buyer and seller...
TRUST BUILDING AMONG STRANGERS (2004)
∗ We thank seminar participants at the ESA meeting and the University of Pennsylvania for helpful suggestions, Colin Camerer for his insightful comments on an earlier draft, and Christophe Van den...
A Parsimonious Model of Stock-Keeping Unit Choice (2003)
Teck-hua Ho, Juin-kuan Chong, Teck H. Ho, Juin-kuan Chong
St. Louis, and Wharton for their helpful suggestions. The authors are especially grateful to John Lynch for his help in developing a behavioral underpinning for their model. David Bell, Pete Fader,...
Functional EWA: A One-parameter Theory of Learning in Games (2002)
Teck-Hua Ho, Colin F. Camerer, Juin-kuan Chong
A One-parameter Theory of Learning in Games Functional experience weighted attraction (fEWA) is a one-parameter theory of learning in games. It approximates the free parameters in an earlier model...
A cognitive hierarchy theory of one-shot games (2002)
Strategic thinking, best-response, and mutual consistency (equilibrium) are three key modeling principles in noncooperative game theory. This paper relaxes mutual consistency to predict how players...
Creating Win-Win Trade Promotions: Theory and Empirical Analysis of Scan-back Trade Deals (2001)
Xavier Drèze, Xavier Drµeze, David R. Bell, Teck-hua Ho, Steve Hoch, Len Lodish, ...
By 1996, average manufacturer tr ade promotion spending had risen to around 13% of net sales (from 5% in 1978) and was second only to cost of goods sold as a profit and loss item. It has now become...
Managing Demand and Sales Dynamics in New Product Diffusion Under Supply Constraint (2001)
Teck-hua Ho, Sergei Savin, Christian Terwiesch
The Bass diffusion model is a well-known parametric approach to estimating new product demand trajectory over time. This paper generalizes the Bass model by allowing for a supply constraint. In the...
Experience-weighted attraction learning in normal form games (1999)
Colin Camerer, Colin Camerer, Colin Camerer, Teck-hua Ho, Teck-hua Ho, Teck-hua Ho
We describe a general model, `experience-weighted attraction ' (EWA) learning, which includes reinforcement learning and a class of weighted ctitious play belief models as special cases. In EWA,...
Iterated dominance and iterated best response in experimental "p-beauty contests" (1998)
Ho, Teck-Hua, Camerer, Colin F., Weigelt, Keith
Picture a thin country 1000 miles long, running north and south, like Chile. Several natural attractions are located at the northern tip of the country. Suppose each of n resort developers plans to...
Rational Shopping Behavior and the Option Value of Variable Pricing (1998)
Teck-hua Ho, Christopher Tang, David Bell
This paper addresses two related issues that deal with how consumer behavior is influenced by retail pricing format. First, we examine both analytically and HO, TANG, AND BELL
Does Format of Pricing Contract Matter?
The use of linear wholesale price contract has long been recognized as a threat to achieving channel effciency. Many formats of nonlinear pricing contract have been proposed to achieve vertical...
Violations of the Betweenness Axiom and Nonlinearity in Probability.
Camerer, Colin F, Ho, Teck-Hua
Betweenness is a weakened form of the independence axiom, stating that a probability mixture of two gambles should lie between them in preference. Betweenness is used in many generalizations of...
Economic Value of EWA Lite: A Functional Theory of Learning in Games
Ho, Teck-Hua, Camerer, Colin F., Chong, Juin-Kuan
EWA Lite is a one-parameter theory of learning in normal-form games. It approximates the free parameters in an earlier model (EWA) with functions of experience. The theory is tested on seven...
Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Games: A Unifying Approach
We describe a general model, 'experience-weighted attraction' (EWA) learning, which includes reinforcement learning and a class of weighted fictitious play belief models as special cases. In EWA,...
Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
In 'experience-weighted attraction' (EWA) learning, strategies have attractions which reflect initial predispositions, are updated based on payoff experience, and determine choice probabilities...
The trust building process is basic to social science. We investigate it in a laboratory setting using a novel multi-stage trust game where social gains are achieved if players trust each other in...
A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
Colin F. Camerer, Teck-Hua Ho, Juin-Kuan Chong
Players in a game are "in equilibrium" if they are rational, and accurately predict other players' strategies. In many experiments, however, players are not in equilibrium. An alternative is...
Experiments on strategic choices and markets
Wilfred Amaldoss, Teck-Hua Ho, Aradhna Krishna, Kay-Yut Chen, Preyas Desai, Ganesh Iyer, ...
Strategic choice, Market, Experiment,