Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies (2009)
Rogers, Brian W., Palfrey, Thomas R., Camerer, Colin F.
We explore an equilibrium model of games where behavior is given by logit response functions, but payoff responsiveness and beliefs about others' responsiveness are heterogeneous. We study two...
Equilibrium models of multiple-object auctions (2008)
This dissertation uses two different game-theoretic models to explore properties of equilibria in multiple-object auctions and presents the results of an empirical test of one of them. The first...
Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees (2008)
Ali, S. Nageeb, Goeree, Jacob K., Kartik, Navin, Palfrey, Thomas R.
Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections (2008)
Battaglini, Marco, Morton, Rebecca, Palfrey, Thomas R.
[No abstract]
Voluntary Implementation (2007)
Matthew O. Jackson, Thomas R. Palfrey
We examine Nash implementation when individuals cannot be forced to accept the outcome of a mechanism. Two approaches are studied. The first approach is static where a state-contingent participation...
Risk Averse Behavior in Asymmetric Matching Pennies Games (2007)
Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt, Thomas R. Palfrey
Abstract. This paper studies several variants of 2 × 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria, which we call asymmetric matching pennies games. In experimental studies of behavior in these...
John O. Ledyard, John O. Ledyard, John O. Ledyard, Thomas R. Palfrey, Thomas R. Palfrey, Thomas R. Palfrey
We consider a Bayesian public goods environment with independent private valua-tions. We fully characterize interim e cient allocation rules and prove that they cor-respond to decision rules based on...
An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules 1 (2007)
Serena Guarnaschelli, Richard D. Mckelvey, Thomas R. Palfrey
We also thank Tim Feddersen, Susanne Lohmann, Krishna Ladha, the audiences at several academic conferences and seminars, and three referees for their comments. We present experimental results on...
2000: “Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data (2007)
Robert S. Erikson, Robert S. Erikson, Thomas R. Palfrey, Thomas R. Palfrey
This paper presents a formal game-theoretic model to explain the simultaneity problem that has made it di cult to obtain unbiased estimates of the e ects of both incumbent and challenger spending in...
Voluntary implementation (2007)
Matthew O. Jackson, Thomas R. Palfrey
We examine Nash implementation when individuals cannot be forced to accept the outcome of a mechanism. Two approaches are studied. The rst approach is static where a state-contingent participation...
���ÖÙ�ÖÝ Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions * (2007)
Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt, Thomas R. Palfrey
This paper reports the results of a private-values auction experiment in which expected costs of deviating from the Nash equilibrium bidding function are asymmetric, with the implication that upward...
Enriqueta Aragones, Enriqueta Aragones, Enriqueta Aragones, Thomas R. Palfrey, Thomas R. Palfrey, Thomas R. Palfrey
This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters '...
Division Of The Humanities And Social Sciences (2007)
Jacob Goeree, Brian Rogers, Jacob K. Goeree, Thomas R. Palfrey, Brian W. Rogers
We consider an environment where individuals sequentially choose among several actions. The payo# to an individual depends on her action choice, the state of the world, and an idiosyncratic,...
Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms (2007)
Battaglini, Marco, Morton, Rebecca, Palfrey, Thomas R.
We compare the behavior of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many political institutions, ranging from small committees to...
The Paradox of Voter Participation: A Laboratory Study (2006)
David K. Levine, Thomas R. Palfrey
It is widely believed that rational choice theory is grossly inconsistent with empirical observations about voter turnout. We report the results of an experiment designed to test the voter turnout...
Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium (2005)
Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt, Thomas R. Palfrey
The structural Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) generalizes the Nash equilibrium by augmenting payoffs with random elements that are not removed in some limit. This approach has been widely used...
The effect of candidate quality on electoral equilibrium: An experimental study (2004)
Aragones, Enriqueta, Palfrey, Thomas R.
When two candidates of different quality compete in a one-dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First,...
An experimental study of storable votes (2003)
Casella, Alessandra, Gelman, Andrew, Palfrey, Thomas R.
The storable votes mechanism is a method of voting for committees that meet periodically to consider a series of binary decisions. Each member is allocated a fixed budget of votes to be cast as...
An experimental study of storable votes (2003)
Casella, Alessandra, Gelman, Andrew, Palfrey, Thomas R.
The storable votes mechanism is a method of voting for committees that meet periodically to consider a series of binary decisions. Each member is allocated a fixed budget of votes to be cast as...
Aragonés, Enriqueta, Palfrey, Thomas R.
This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have...
Aragonès, Enriqueta, Palfrey, Thomas R.
This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have...
Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games. Games and Economic Behavior (2003)
Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt, Thomas R. Palfrey
Abstract. In experimental studies of behavior in 2 × 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria, observed choice frequencies are systematically different from mixed-strategy Nash predictions....
The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study (2002)
Aragonés, Enriqueta, Palfrey, Thomas R.
When two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First,...
The effect of candidate quality on electoral equilibrium: an experimental study (2002)
Aragonès, Enriqueta, Palfrey, Thomas R.
When two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First,...
Federal mandates by popular demand (2000)
Crémer, Jacques, Palfrey, Thomas R.
This paper proposes a new framework for studying federal mandates regarding public policies in areas such as environmental quality, public health, highway safety, and the provision of local public...
Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate (2000)
Aragonès, Enriqueta, Palfrey, Thomas R.
This paper examines competition in the standard one- dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters'...
Risk Averse Behavior in Asymmetric Matching Pennies Games (2000)
Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt, Thomas R. Palfrey
. This paper studies several variants of 2 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria, which we call asymmetric matching pennies games. In experimental studies of behavior in these games, observed...
Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions (1999)
Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt, Thomas R. Palfrey
This paper reports the results of a private-values auction experiment in which expected costs of deviating from the Nash equilibrium bidding function are asymmetric, with the implication that upward...
Voluntary Implementation (1998)
Matthew O. Jackson, Thomas R. Palfrey
We examine Nash implementation when individuals cannot be forced to accept the outcome of a mechanism. Two approaches are studied. The first approach is static where a state-contingent participation...
Quantal Response Equilibria (1995)
Richard D. Mckelvey, Richard D. Mckelvey, Richard D. Mckelvey, Thomas R. Palfrey, Thomas R. Palfrey, Thomas R. Palfrey
valuable discussions with Mahmoud El-Gamal and Mark Fey, helpful comments at several conference and seminar presentations, suggestions by a referee, and the research assistance of Yan Chen and Eugene...
Quantal Response Equilibria (1995)
Richard D. Mckelvey, Richard D. Mckelvey, Richard D. Mckelvey, Thomas R. Palfrey, Thomas R. Palfrey, Thomas R. Palfrey
valuable discussions with Mahmoud El-Gamal and Mark Fey, helpful comments at several conference and seminar presentations, suggestions by a referee, and the research assistance of Yan Chen and Eugene...
Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement (1995)
Peter Cramton, Thomas R. Palfrey
this paper has been to take a closer look at participation constraints and a party's decision to participate. Central to this goal is specifying what happens if the parties fail to agree to...
EFFECTS OF INSIDER TRADING DISCLOSURES ON SPECULATIVE ACTIVITY AND FUTURE PRICES (1989)
JAGANNATHAN, RAVI, PALFREY, THOMAS R.
This paper explores a simple model of the effects of requiring public disclosure of insider trading activity in future markets. These disclosures are found to stimulate speculator activity and...
Equilibrium models of multiple-object auctions (1980)
This dissertation uses two different game-theoretic models to explore properties of equilibria in multiple-object auctions and presents the results of an empirical test of one of them. The first...
The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory
Battaglini, Marco, Morton, Rebecca, Palfrey, Thomas R
This paper reports the first laboratory study of the swing voter’s curse and provides insights on the larger theoretical and empirical literature on 'pivotal voter' models. Our experiment controls...
Risk Advantages and Information Acquisition
In some competitive situations under uncertainty, less risk averse competitors have an advantage over more risk averse opponents. Private information acquisition by the advantaged players diminishes...
Casella, Alessandra, Palfrey, Thomas R, Riezman, Raymond
The paper studies a simple voting system that has the potential to increase the power of minorities without sacrificing aggregate efficiency. Storable votes grant each voter a stock of votes to spend...
Efficiency, Equity and Timing in Voting Mechanisms
Battaglini, Marco, Morton, Rebecca, Palfrey, Thomas R
We compare the behaviour of voters, depending on whether they operate under sequential and simultaneous voting rules, when voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many real political...
Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies.
Palfrey, Thomas R, Srivastava, Sanjay
This paper studies the problem of implementation of allocation rules in economic environments when agents are incompletely informed about the environment. The concept of equilibrium used is that of...
Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections
Enriqueta Aragones, Thomas R. Palfrey, Andrew Postlewaite
We analyze conditions under which campaign rhetoric may affect the beliefs of the voters over what policy will be implemented by the winning candidate of an election. We develop a model of repeated...
Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections
Enriqueta Aragonès, Thomas R. Palfrey, Andrew Postlewaite
We analyze conditions under which campaign rhetoric may affect the beliefs of the voters over what policy will be implemented by the winning candidate of an election. We develop a model of repeated...
Palfrey, Thomas R., R.J. Aumann, S. Hart
This chapter surveys the branch of implementation theory initiated by Maskin (1999). Results for both complete and incomplete information environments are covered.
Equilibrium Effects in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data
Erikson, Robert S., Palfrey, Thomas R.
This paper presents a formal game-theoretic model to explain the simultaneity problem that has made it difficult to obtain unbiased estimates of the effects of both incumbent and challenger spending...
Aragones, Enriqueta, Palfrey, Thomas R.
This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have...
Federal Mandates by Popular Demand
Jacques Cremer, Thomas R. Palfrey
This paper proposes a new framework for studying federal mandates regarding public policies in areas such as environmental quality, public health, highway safety, and the provision of local public...
The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory
Carrillo, Juan D, Palfrey, Thomas R
We analyze a game of two-sided private information characterized by extreme adverse selection, and study a special case in the laboratory. Each player has a privately known "strength" and can decide...
An experimental study of storable votes
Alessandra Casella, Andrew Gelman, Thomas R. Palfrey
The storable votes mechanism is a method of voting for committees that meet periodically to consider a series of binary decisions. Each member is allocated a fixed budget of votes to be cast as...
An Experimental Study of Jury Decisions
McKelvey, Richard D., Palfrey, Thomas R.
We present experimental results on individual decisions in juries. We consider the effect of three treatment variables: the size of the jury (three or six), the number of votes needed for conviction...
The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory
We analyze a game of two-sided private information characterized by extreme adverse selection, and study a special case in the laboratory. Each player has a privately known "strength" and can decide...
Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs.
Cramton, Peter C, Palfrey, Thomas R
What cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs? For private cost uncertainty, the authors characterize the set of cartel agreements that can be...
Political reputations and campaign promises
Aragones, Enriqueta, Palfrey, Thomas R., Postlewaite, Andrew
An Experimental Study of Storable Votes
Casella, Alessandra, Gelman, Andrew, Palfrey, Thomas R.
The storable votes mechanism is a method of voting for committees that meet periodically to consider a series of binary decisions. Each member is allocated a fixed budget of votes to be cast as...
Endogenous Entry and Self-selection in Private Value Auctions: An Experimental Study
Palfrey, Thomas R., Pevnitskaya, Svetlana
This paper presents the results of an experimental study of endogenous entry and bidding behavior in first-price independent private value auctions. In the first stage N potential bidders...
A Voting Model of Federal Standards with Externalities
Crémer, Jacques, Palfrey, Thomas R.
This paper proposes a framework for studying policy making in a federal system in the presence of spillover externalities. Local jurisdictions choose local policies by majority rule subject to...
Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model With a Favored Candidate
Aragones, Enriqueta, Palfrey, Thomas. R.
This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters'...
"The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes."
Ledyard, John O., Palfrey, Thomas R.
public goods, interim efficiency, voting, simple mechanism.
Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanism.
Matthew, Jackson O., Palfrey, Thomas R., Srivastava, Sanjay.
An Experimental Examination of Auction Mechanisms for Discrete Public Goods.
Ferejohn, John A., Forsythe, Robert, Noll, Roger G., Palfrey, Thomas R.
Efficient Equilibria in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Private Information
Didier Laussel, Thomas R. Palfrey
We characterize generally the Bayesian Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions public goods game for two consumers with private information.The two consumers simultaneously make voluntary...
Carrillo, Juan D, Palfrey, Thomas R
We investigate, in a simple bilateral bargaining environment, the extent to which asymmetric information can induce individuals to engage in exchange where trade is not mutually profitable. We first...
Jackson, Matthew O., Palfrey, Thomas R.
We examine Nash implementation when individuals cannot be forced to accept the outcome of a mechanism. Two approaches are studied. The first approach is static where a state-contingent participation...
A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games.
El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., McKelvey, Richard D., Palfrey, Thomas R.
Self-Correcting Information Cascades
JACOB K. GOEREE, THOMAS R. PALFREY, BRIAN W. ROGERS
We report experimental results from long sequences of decisions in environments that are theoretically prone to severe information cascades. Observed behaviour is much different-information cascades...
Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy
Most of the laboratory research in political science follows the style that was pioneered in experimental economics a half-century ago by Vernon Smith. The connection between this style of political...
Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy
Most of the laboratory research in political science follows the style that was pioneered in experimental economics a half-century ago by Vernon Smith. The connection between this style of political...
Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study.
Palfrey, Thomas R, Rosenthal, Howard
An experiment was conducted to test whether discounted repeated play leads to greater cooperation and coordination than one-shot play in a public good environment with incomplete information. The...
Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms.
Ledyard, John O, Palfrey, Thomas R
This paper characterizes interim efficient mechanisms for public good production and cost allocation in a two-type environment with risk-neutral, quasi-linear preferences and fixed-size projects,...
On Bayesian Implementable Allocations.
Palfrey, Thomas R, Srivastava, Sanjay
This paper identifies several social-choice correspondences which are or are not fully implementable in economic environments when agents are incompletely informed about the environment. The authors...
Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining
Matthew O. Jackson, Thomas R. Palfrey
The authors examine a bargaining setting where heterogeneous buyers and sellers are repeatedly matched and time is costly. They characterize efficiency and then, using an implementation approach,...
Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies.
Palfrey, Thomas R, Srivastava, Sanjay
The authors study the problem of implementing social choice correspondences via Nash equilibrium in which no one uses a weakly dominated strategy. The main result is that if there are at least three...
Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why?
Palfrey, Thomas R, Prisbrey, Jeffrey E
The authors report the results of voluntary contributions experiments where subjects are randomly assigned different rates of return from their private consumption. These random assignments are...
Enriqueta Aragones, Thomas R. Palfrey
This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have...
The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study
Enriqueta Aragones, Thomas R. Palfrey
When two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First,...
Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms
John O. Ledyard, Thomas R. Palfrey
This paper characterizes interim efficient mechanisms for public good production and cost allocation in a two-type environment with risk neutral, quasi-linear preferences and fixed size projects,...
Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining
Matthew O. Jackson, Thomas R. Palfrey
We examine a simple bargaining setting, where heterogeneous buyers and sellers are repeatedly matched with each other. We begin by characterizing efficiency in such a dynamic setting, and discuss how...
Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement
Peter Cramton, Thomas R. Palfrey
In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed mechanism to some status quo. If equilibrium play in the status quo mechanism depends on the...
Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs
Peter Cramton, Thomas R. Palfrey
What cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs? For private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements that can be supported,...
Theories and Tests of "Blind Bidding" in Sealed-Bid Auctions
Robert Forsythe, R. Mark Isaac, Thomas R. Palfrey
In this article we report the results from a series of laboratory markets in which sellers have better information about the quality of an item than any of the potential buyers. Sellers may...
Repeated Insurance Contracts and Learning
Thomas R. Palfrey, Chester S. Spatt
This article considers a repeated insurance model with incomplete information in which the insurer and the consumer both learn over time about the unknown risk category of the consumer. Care choices...
An Experimental Study of Storable Votes
Casella, Alessandra, Gelman, Andrew, Palfrey, Thomas R
The storable votes mechanism is a method of voting for committees that meet periodically to consider a series of binary decisions. Each member is allocated a fixed budget of votes to be cast as...
Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate
Enriqueta Aragonés, Thomas R. Palfrey
This paper examines competition in the standard one- dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters'...
Effects of Insider Trading Disclosures on Speculative Activity and Future Prices.
Jagannathan, Ravi, Palfrey, Thomas R
This paper explores a simple model of the effects of requiring public disclosure of insider trading activity in future markets. These disclosures are found to stimulate speculator activity and...
Endogenous entry and self-selection in private value auctions: An experimental study
Palfrey, Thomas R., Pevnitskaya, Svetlana
This paper presents the results of an experimental study of endogenous entry in first-price independent private value auctions. N potential bidders simultaneously decide whether to participate in an...
Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees
S. Nageeb Ali, Jacob K. Goeree, Navin Kartik, Thomas R. Palfrey
An Experimental Comparison of Collective Choice Procedures for Excludable Public Goods
Sean Gailmard, Thomas R. Palfrey
This paper compares three collective choice procedures for the provision of excludable public goods under incomplete information. One, serial cost sharing (SCS), is budget balanced, individually...
Self-Correcting Information Cascades
Jacob K. Goeree, Thomas R. Palfrey, Brian W. Rogers, Richard D. McKelvey
An Experimental Study of Storable Votes
Alessandra Casella, Andrew Gelman, Thomas R. Palfrey
The storable votes mechanism is a method of voting for committees that meet periodically to consider a series of binary decisions. Each member is allocated a fixed budget of votes to be cast as...
Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem.
Palfrey, Thomas R, Srivastava, Sanjay
The main result of this paper is that the multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design can be avoided in private-value models if agents do not use weakly-dominated strategies in equilibrium. The...
Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions
Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt, Thomas R. Palfrey
This paper reports the results of a private-values auction experiment in which expected costs of deviating from the Nash equilibrium bidding function are asymmetric, with the implication that upward...
Quantal Response Equilibria: A Brief Synopsis
McKelvey, Richard D., Palfrey, Thomas R., Charles R. Plott, Vernon L. Smith
The Compromise Game: Two-Sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory
Juan D. Carrillo, Thomas R. Palfrey
We analyze a game of two-sided private information where players have privately known "strengths" and can decide to fight or compromise. If either chooses to fight, the stronger player receives a...
An Experimental Study of Jury Decisions
Richard D. McKelvey, Richard D. Mckelvey, Thomas R. Palfrey, Thomas R. Palfrey
We present experimental results on individual decisions in juries. We consider the effect of three treatment variables: the size of the jury (three or six), the number of votes needed for conviction...
On eliciting beliefs in strategic games
Palfrey, Thomas R., Wang, Stephanie W.
Several recent studies in experimental economics have tried to measure beliefs of subjects engaged in strategic games with other subjects. Using data from one such study we conduct an experiment...
Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies
Rogers, Brian W., Palfrey, Thomas R., Camerer, Colin F.
We explore an equilibrium model of games where behavior is given by logit response functions, but payoff responsiveness and beliefs about others' responsiveness are heterogeneous. We study two...
Information Gatekeepers: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Brocas, Isabelle, Carrillo, Juan D, Palfrey, Thomas R
We consider a model where two adversaries can spend resources in acquiring public information about the unknown state of the world in order to influence the choice of a decision maker. We...