Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient? An (2004)
We analyze models of product differentiation with perfect price discrimination and free entry. With a fixed number of firms, and in the absence of coordination failures, perfect price discrimination...
New solid bases as catalysts for organic synthesis (2004)
Figueras, F., Clacens, J.M., Gravelle, M., Sanchez, J., Lopez, J., Genuit, D., ...
Moral hazard and private monitoring (2002)
We clarify the role of mixed strategies and public randomization (sunspots) in sustaining near-efficient outcomes in repeated games with private monitoring. We study a finitely repeated game, where...
Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring (2000)
We clarify the role of mixed strategies and public randomization (sunspots) in sustaining near-efficient outcomes in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. In a finitely repeated game...
Sequential Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring (2000)
We analyze the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma with imperfect private monitoring. The e#cient outome can be approximated in any prisoners' dilemma game, while every individually rational...
Hydrogenation of acetylenics by Pd-exchanged mesoporous materials (1999)
Choudary, B.M., Lakshmi Kantam, M., Mahender Reddy, N., Koteswara Rao, K., Haritha, Y., Bhaskar, V., ...
Minimum Wages for Ronald McDonald Monopsonies (1998)
Recent empirical work on the effects of minimum wages has called into question the conventional wisdom that minimum wages invariably reduce employment. We develop a model of monopsonistic competition...
On te generic stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests (1995)
Although a mixed strategy can never be evolutionarily stable in a truly asymmetric contest, examples show that mixed strategies can satisfy the weaker criterion on neutral stability. This paper shows...
Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model : Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems (1994)
Asynchronous Choice and Markov Equilibria: Theoretical Foundations and Applications (1970)
V. Bhaskar, Fernando Vega-redondo
This paper provides a theoretical foundation for Markov (perfect) equilibria in repeated games with asynchronous moves that is based on memory costs. We show that if players incur a "complexity cost"...
Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring (1970)
We analyze a model of repeated bilateral trade with moral hazard, where the quality of goods received can differ from the quality despatched due to deterioration during transportation. Since the...
On Endogenously Staggered Prices (1970)
Taylor's model of staggered contracts is an influential explanation for nominal inertia and the persistent real effects of nominal shocks. However, in standard imperfect competition models, if agents...
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
V. Bhaskar, G. J. Mailath, S. Morris
This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives...
The Competitive Effects of Price-Floors
We analyze the effects of a legally-binding price floor using Hotelling's model of locational competition. A moderate price-floor destroys the maximal differentiation equilibrium of d'Aspremont et....
Lung volume reduction surgery. Case selection, operative technique, and clinical results.
Daniel, T M, Chan, B B, Bhaskar, V, Parekh, J S, Walters, P E, Reeder, J, ...
OBJECTIVE: A clinical study was undertaken to define optimal preoperative strategies and intraoperative techniques that would result in the least morbidity and maximum physiologic improvements in...
Partial privatization and yardstick competition
V. Bhaskar, Bishnupriya Gupta, Mushtaq Khan
We analyse the dynamics of public and private sector employment in Bangladesh, using the natural experiment provided by the partial privatization of the jute industry. The public sector had...
Heterogeneity and the Distribution of Wages
A number of theories (search and efficiency wages) have been developed, in part, to explain why identically able workers are often paid different wages. However, when there is a minimum wage, they do...
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris
This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives...
Lung volume reduction surgery. Case selection, operative technique, and clinical results.
Daniel, T M, Chan, B B, Bhaskar, V, Parekh, J S, Walters, P E, Reeder, J, ...
OBJECTIVE: A clinical study was undertaken to define optimal preoperative strategies and intraoperative techniques that would result in the least morbidity and maximum physiologic improvements in...
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris
This paper investigates the Harsanyi-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives a...
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris
This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives...
The Competitive Effects of Price-Floors.
Using Hotelling's model of locational competition, the author shows that a moderate price floor destroys the maximal differentiation equilibrium, resulting in minimum differentiation. Equilibrium...
Oligopsony and Monopsonistic Competition in Labor Markets
V. Bhaskar, Alan Manning, Ted To
We argue that models of oligopsony or monopsonistic competition provide insights and explanation for many empirical phenomena in labor markets. Using a simple model with job differentiation and...
Privatization, Yardstick Competition and Employment Dynamics: Evidence from Bangladesh
Bhaskar, V., Bishnupriya Gupta, Mushtaq Khan
We analyze the dynamics of public and private sector employment, using the natural experiment provided by the partial privatization of the Bangladeshi jute industry. A differences-in-differences...
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris
This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player...
Minimum Wages for Ronald McDonald Monopsonies: A Theory of Monopsonistic Competition.
Recent empirical work on the effects of minimum wages has called into question the conventional wisdom that minimum wages invariably reduce employment. The authors develop a model of monopsonistic...
Wage Relativities and the Natural Range of Unemployment.
If workers are concerned about their relative wage, this can give rise to continuum of natural rates of unemployment that are perfect foresight equilibria. These equilibria can be Pareto ranked in...
Testing a Model of the Kinked Demand Curve.
Bhaskar, V, Machin, Stephen, Reid, G
This paper analyzes survey data on the responses firms expect from their competitors when they change prices. There is evidence of an assymmetry in expected responses, which provides some support for...
Partial privatization and yardstick competition
V. Bhaskar, Bishnupriya Gupta, Mushtaq Khan
We analyse the dynamics of public and private sector employment in Bangladesh, using the natural experiment provided by the partial privatization of the jute industry. The public sector had...
Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient? An Analysis of Free Entry Equilibria
We analyze models of product differentiation with perfect price discrimination and free entry. Although perfect price discrimination ensures efficient output decisions given product characteristics,...
Wage Differentiation via Subsidised General Training
We provide a new explanation for why firms pay for general training in a competitive labor market. If firms are unable to tailor individual wages to ability, for informational or institutional...
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris
This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player...
On Endogenously Staggered Prices.
Taylor's model of staggered contracts is an influential explanation for nominal inertia and the persistent real effects of nominal shocks. However, in standard imperfect competition models, if agents...
Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems.
This paper analyses the sustainability of intergenerational transfers in Samuelson's consumption-loan model when agents are imperfectly informed about past events. The authors find that with mild...
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring
We analyze the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma with imperfect private monitoring and discounting. The main contribution of this paper is to construct ``belief-based'' strategies, where a...
Breaking the Symmetry: Optimal Conventions in Repeated Symmetric Games
We analyze the problem of coordinating upon asymmetric equilibria in a symmetric game, such as the battle-of-the-sexes. In repeated interaction, asymmetric coordination is possible possible via...
Asynchronous Choice and Markov Equilibria:Theoretical Foundations and Applications
V. Bhaskar, Fernando Vega-Redondo
This paper provides a theoretical foundation for Markov (perfect) equilibria in repeated games with asynchronous moves that is based on memory costs. We show that if players incur a ``complexity...
Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring
We analyze a model of repeated bilateral trade with moral hazard, where the quality of goods received can differ from the quality despatched due to deterioration during transportation. Since the...
Minimum Wages for Ronald McDonald Monopsonies: A Theory of Monopsonistic Competition
Recent empirical work on the effects of minimum wages has called into question the conventional wisdom that minimum wages invariably reduce employment. We develop a model of \emph{monopsonistic...
Oligopsony and the Distribution of Wages
A number of theories (search and efficiency wages) have been developed, in part, to explain why identically able workers are often paid different wages. However, when there is a minimum wage, they do...
On Endogenously Staggered Prices
064Taylor's model of staggered contracts is an influential explanation for nominal inertia and the persistent real effects of nominal shocks. However, in standard imperfect competition models, if...
Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient? An Analysis of Free Entry
We analyze models of product differentiation with perfect price discrimination and free entry. With a fixed number of firms, and in the absence of coordination failures, perfect price discrimination...
Migration and the Evolution of Conventions.
This paper analyzes an evolutionary model where agents who are locally matched to play a general coordination game can adjust both their strategy and location. These decisions are subject to...
On te generic stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests
Although a mixed strategy can never be evolutionarily stable in a truly asymmetric contest, examples show that mixed strategies can satisfy the weaker criterion on neutral stability. This paper shows...
Wage Differentiation via Subsidised General Training
We provide a new explanation for why firms pay for general training in a competitive labor market. If firms are unable to tailor individual wages to ability, for informational or institutional...
Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems.
game theory ; information
Migration and the Evolution of Conventions
This paper analyzes an evolutionary model where agents are locally matched to play a coordination game and can adjust both their strategy and location. Their decisions are subject to friction, so...
Price and Quantity Adjustment over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Survey Data.
Bhaskar, V, Machin, Stephen, Reid, Gavin C
This paper analyzes responses to an administered questionnaire in which owner-managers of seventy-three small firms were asked how they would respond to booms and recessions. Responses suggest that...
A Public Dilemma: Cooperation with Large Stakes and a Large Audience
We analyze a large-stakes prisoner's dilemma game played on a TV show. Players cooperate 40% of the time, demonstrating that social preferences are important; however, cooperation is significantly...
Commitment and Observability in an Economic Environment
Bagwell (1995) argues that commitment in undermined by the slightest imperfectness in observation. Guth, Ritzberger & Kirchsteiger (1998) question this assertion: for any finite leader-follower game,...
Games Played in a Contracting Environment
We analyze situations where a player must contract with the monopoly supplier of an essential input in order to play an action in a strategic form game. Supplier monopoly power does not distort the...
Rational Adversaries? Evidence from Randomized Trials in the Game of Cricket
In cricket, the right to make an important strategic decision is assigned via a coin toss. We utilize these "randomized trials" to examine (a) the consistency of choices made by teams with strictly...
Relative Performance Evaluation and Limited Liability
We analyze the role of relative performance evaluation when a principal has several agents, who face correlated shocks. If limited liability constraints are binding, relative performance evaluation...
Wage Differentiation via Subsidised General Training
We provide a new explanation for why firms pay for general training in a competitive labor market. If firms for informational or institutional reasons are unable to tailor wages according to ability,...
Minimum Wages in a Symmetric Model of Monopsonistic Competition
We reconsider the employment effect of a minimum wage on employment in a symmetric model of monopsonistic competition, where each employer competes equally with every other employer. The employment...
Asymmetric Price Adjustment: Micro-foundations and Macroeconomic Implications
We present a simple menu cost model which explains the finding that firms are more likely to adjust prices upward than downward. Asymmetric adjustment to shocks arises naturally, even without trend...
Partial Privatization and Yardstick Competition: Evidence from Employment Dynamics in Bangladesh
V. Bhaskar, Bishnupriya Gupta, Mushtaq Khan
We analyze the dynamics public and private sector employment, using the natural experiment provided by the partial privatization of the Bangladeshi jute industry. Although the public sector had...
Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient? An Analysis of Free Entry
We analyze models of product differentiation with perfect price discrimination and free entry. With a fixed number of firms, and in the absence of coordination failures, perfect price discrimination...
Is Beauty only Skin-deep? Disentangling the Beauty Premium on a Game Show
This paper analyzes behavior on a TV game show where players' monetary payoffs depend upon an array of factors, including ability in answering questions, perceived cooperativeness and the willingness...